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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a narrative about the way in which a category of crime-to-be-combated is 
constructed through the discipline of criminology and the agents of discipline in 
criminal justice. The aim was to examine organized crime through the eyes of those 
whose job it is to fight it (and define it), and in doing so investigate the ways social 
problems surface as sites for state intervention. A genealogy of organized crime 
within criminological thought was completed, demonstrating that there are a range of 
different ways organized crime has been constructed within the social scientific 
discipline, and each of these were influenced by the social context, political winds and 
intellectual climate of the time. Following this first finding, in-depth qualitative 
interviews were conducted with individuals who had worked at the apex of the 
policing of organized crime in Australia, in order to trace their understandings of 
organized crime across recent history. It was found that organized crime can be 
understood as an object of the discourse of the politics of law and order, the discourse 
of international securitization, new public management in policing business, and 
involves the forging of outlaw identities. Therefore, there are multiple meanings of 
organized crime that have arisen from an interconnected set of social, political, moral 
and bureaucratic discourses. The institutional response to organized crime, including 
law and policing, was subsequently examined. An extensive legislative framework 
has been enacted at multiple jurisdictional levels, and the problem of organized crime 
was found to be deserving of unique institutional powers and configurations to deal 
with it. The social problem of organized crime, as constituted by the discourses 
mapped out in this research, has led to a new generation of increasingly preemptive 
and punitive laws, and the creation of new state agencies with amplified powers. That 
is, the response to organized crime, with a focus on criminalization and enforcement, 
has been driven and shaped by the four discourses and the way in which the 
phenomenon is constructed within them. An appreciation of the nexus between the 
emergence of the social problem, and the formation of institutions in response to it, is 
important in developing a more complete understanding of the various dimensions of 
organized crime. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
INTRODUCTION 
In the Australian State of Queensland it is a criminal offence for three or more 
persons, on the basis of their status alone, to gather in a public place (s.42 Criminal 
Law (Criminal Organizations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (QLD)). While one 
of the more contentious measures, this is but one of a range of new legal powers that 
have been enacted to deal with the problem of organized crime in Australia. These 
powers are preemptive and discriminatory, and interfere with the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of individuals. An important motivation for the line of inquiry pursued 
in this thesis is to understand the rationalities that have supported and led to this 
approach. But the questions asked in this thesis go further than that. The broader aim 
is to examine the way in which social problems emerge as sites for intervention. This 
examination enters the fray by exploring the historical trajectory leading to the 
present situation in which such responses are considered solutions; where a problem 
emerges as deserving of certain re/actions. In doing so, in Foucauldian terms, a 
‘history of the present’ is written, charting the connection between knowledge of a 
social problem and the actions that are taken against it.  
 
This was achieved, in part, by speaking to a small sample of policy and 
policing leaders who have played important roles in the construction of the problem 
and the development of responses to it. The aim was to examine the phenomenon 
through their eyes and to understand their social realities. The primary empirical data 
collected and analyzed in this research, forms the basis of this original and unique 
contribution, that delineates the way in which criminality is constructed and 
institutions are built around it. At its core, this is a narrative about the way in which a 
category of crime-to-be-combated is created through the discipline of criminology 
and the agents of discipline in criminal justice. It is shown that understandings of 
organized crime are contingent on the social and historical conditions of possibility. 
Then, the ways in which this problem is institutionalized, and some of the 
consequences and alternatives to this approach, are explored. It is an interesting 
contradiction and finding that despite the mutability of the phenomenon in question, 
an extensive legislative and bureaucratic architecture could, and has been, created to 
deal with it. In this way, organized crime becomes real in its consequences. 
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CHAPTER STRUCTURE: THE NARRATIVE THAT FOLLOWS 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  
 
The present chapter provides an introduction to the context, content and 
structure of the thesis. The aim is to examine organized crime through the eyes of 
those whose job it is to fight it (and define it), and in doing so investigate some of the 
ways social problems surface as sites for state intervention. 
 
Chapter 2 contains the method of research, outlining and establishing the 
rationale for the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of data collection and analysis. The aim, paradigm, 
method and methodology are discussed. Ethical considerations, and the way they 
influenced the data that could be collected and presented, are described. The 
techniques through which primary and secondary data were collected, including 
sampling procedures, details of the sample, and interview questions, are presented. 
The analytic strategies, and the difficulties encountered in developing these, are 
explained. Within the paradigm of the research, issues of generalizability, reliability 
and validity are considered. This chapter is the epicenter of the research in that the 
results, and the discussion of them, flow from and are structured according to this. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a genealogy of organized crime within criminological 
thought. It was found that there are a range of different ways that organized crime has 
been constructed within the social scientific discipline, and that each of these were 
influenced by the social context, political winds and intellectual climate of the time, 
meaning these scientific ‘truths’ are contingent. Importantly, through criminology’s 
authority as a ‘science’ and its authority over the ‘scientific truth’ of organized crime, 
it plays a central role in creating and legitimating categories of crime. This first 
finding supported situating this thesis within the epistemological framework of social 
constructionism, which led to questioning the ways in which understandings of 
organized crime have emerged in discourse. 
 
Chapter 4 traces four discourses that have emerged in relation to the 
Informants’ understanding of the social phenomenon in the context of recent 
Australian history. While this examination is historical, it is important because it 
provides a new level of understanding of the current moves in law, contextualizing 
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and setting the scene for the institutionalization of the social problem. It was found 
that organized crime can be understood as an object of the discourse of the politics of 
law and order, the discourse of international securitization, new public management in 
policing business and involves the forging of outlaw identities. Therefore, there are 
multiple meanings of organized crime that have arisen from an interconnected set of 
social, political, moral and bureaucratic discourses. Organized crime is polysemic, it 
is mutable, it exists on different planes and it is when these intersect the phenomenon 
is born as a social problem. Organized crime, as constituted by these discourses, 
provides the impetus for the social response directed towards the phenomenon. 
 
Chapter 5 departs from the discourses mapped out in Chapter 4 and contains 
an examination of the institutionalization of the social problem, including the 
legislative and policing response to it. It was found that the current approach to 
organized crime, with a focus on criminalization and enforcement, has been driven 
and shaped by the four discourses and the way in which the phenomenon is 
constructed within them. An extensive legislative framework has been enacted at 
multiple jurisdictional levels, and the symbolic and instrumental value of these laws is 
considered. It was found that the problem of organized crime is deserving of unique 
institutional powers and configurations to deal with it. That is, the threat of organized 
crime operates as a justification for the expansion and hybridization of a number of 
new intelligence and policing agencies with enhanced powers. 
 
Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings and contributions. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
AIM AND PARADIGM 
The aim of this research is to examine organized crime through the eyes of those 
whose job it is to fight it (and define it), specifically in an Australian context. This 
includes an examination of the institutional architecture that has been built in order to 
respond to organized crime. This is a unique contribution to the literature and is an 
important focus to take given the recent moves in law in Australia’s jurisdictions. 
Before explaining the way in which this research aim was addressed- or the way data 
were collected and analyzed- the research paradigm must first be considered as this 
informed the aim and method. Kinash (2006) defines a research paradigm as the 
theoretical mindset or collection of beliefs that underlie the research. A paradigm is 
contextually dependent on the social and historical context: paradigms are the 
epistemes of the age (and place, and social context and so on) (Kinash, 2006 citing 
Foucault, 1972/1969).  
 
The paradigm of this research project is one of social constructionism: the 
mindset that objects or phenomena (or the knowledge of objects or phenomena) are 
attributed meaning through social interactions and practices, that are independent of 
the intrinsic or inherent quality of any object or phenomena (Gergen, 2009). Social 
constructionism brings into question commonly held assumptions about reality, 
objectivity, knowledge and truth (Gergen, 2009). Social constructionism can also be 
considered an epistemology (that is, how we know about what there is to know about 
the world) as well as a paradigm of thought or collection of ideas. Flowing from this 
epistemology are theoretical stances. This research draws upon a range of theoretical 
resources, including those of key contemporary social theorists and critical thinkers, 
such as Michel Foucault and Anthony Giddens, amongst others. This is because the 
focus of their work is on the constitution of knowledge, social action and system 
re/production (see: Foucault, 1972/1969; 1977; 1980; Giddens, 1979; 1984). I will not, 
however, discuss theory as an (artificially) independent section in this chapter. 
Theoretical considerations are presented throughout the subsequent data chapters. 
 
The aim is to capture the conceptual complexity of organized crime, from the 
perspectives of policy and policing executives, while making comment on the way in 
which understandings of organized crime may serve to direct and legitimize the 
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actions taken towards the phenomenon. This means questioning social actors’ 
knowledge of social phenomena and exploring how this knowledge might influence 
social action, social structures and mediate power relations. As Giddens (1984, p. 25) 
puts it:  
“Analyzing the structuration of social systems means studying the modes in 
which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situation 
actors… are produced and reproduced in interaction.”  
 
This means investigating the way individuals with the mandate to respond to 
organized crime conceive the phenomenon, and considering the consequences for the 
social responses and social structures implemented in order to do so.  I have not 
approached this research from a positivist perspective, and the method differs from 
what an empirical researcher would set out to do. Here, it is worth quoting Sheptycki 
(2003a, p. 122) at length: 
“Criminologists of a strictly empirical bent might be inclined to impatience 
with this linguistic analysis. For them such a pursuit is not a proper scientific 
one, and they would perhaps be inclined to argue that it is more akin to the 
kind of intellectual labor favored by literary critics. To criminologists, who 
conceive themselves as social engineers or surgeons with a box of instruments 
for fixing society, there are more self-evidently important questions. What 
evidence do we have about TOC [transnational organized crime]? How do we 
quantify it? By what calculus do we measure its effects? What are effective 
interventions against it and how do we evaluate them? In pursuit of an 
effective policy of crime control, their first reflex is ‘to the data!’” 
 
These types of empiricist questions about organized crime are valid research 
questions, but they are not the research questions that I have set out to answer in this 
thesis. Instead, the aim of this thesis is to examine institutionalized knowledge 
construction about organized crime, not the reality of organized crime. Again, this is 
a point that has been made previously by Sheptycki (2003a, p. 490) who argues that: 
“Organized crime is not so much something happening “out there” in society 
as it is a product of the institutionalized thinking that goes on in some of the 
major social institutions that govern social life.” 
 
This means examining the different ways of knowing about organized crime, 
whether they are academic (Chapter 3), political, moral, bureaucratic (Chapter 4), or 
legal (Chapter 5). This approach is pluralist in its examination of different ways of 
knowing about social problems. Indeed, ‘organized crime’ looks different to a 
politician, police officer or self-identified ‘bikie.’ This means it is necessary to tap 
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into social actors’ knowledge of organized crime and in the present study, specifically 
senior police who have played an important role in the policing response to the 
problem across recent Australian history. 
 
To achieve the aim of tapping into social actors’ knowledge of social 
phenomena, the research is ethnomethodologically inspired. This is the methodology 
of the research. Kinash (2006) defines methodology as a disciplinary body of 
knowledge that guides the selection of the method. Kinash (2006, p. 6, emphasis in 
original) explains, “the methods are the techniques or processes we use to conduct our 
research. The methodology is the discipline, or body of knowledge, that utilizes these 
methods.” It is important to note, however, that methods do not reveal social realities 
but rather enact and constitute them; method is creative (Latour & Woolgar, 
1986/1979; Law, 2004). The methods of research were qualitative and involved 
drawing from a range of data sources and perspectives, integrating, but not 
necessarily reconciling, often conflicting and contradictory accounts of the social 
order. Without recourse to a single source of data or a priori recipe in approaching 
data analysis, the path towards addressing the research aim developed throughout the 
research. This emergent ethnomethodological spirit could loosely be ‘categorized’ as 
a ‘grounded theory approach.’ Grounded theory approaches aspire to develop new 
theory that is intimately connected to empirical data “without any particular 
commitment to specific kinds of data, lines of research, or theoretical interests” 
(Strauss, 1987, p. 5).  
 
DATA COLLECTION: FAST FORWARD 
The empirical engagement with the social world did not proceed along a linear 
trajectory. The first task was to examine the different ways in which organized crime 
had been previously theorized about (Chapter 3). Thereafter, a preliminary round of 
archival data was collected and supplemented with the key debates arising from the 
policing of organized crime literature. In this sense, the process of data ‘analysis’ 
began before all empirical data was collected. The exercise in collecting archival data 
and examining these data within the context of the academic literature informed a 
pilot interview. The insights from the pilot interview guided the search for further 
archival data and the refinement of the interview questions. Thereafter, a series of 
formal interviews were conducted, while continuously revisiting the literature to 
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direct the approach. The archives were continually revisited whilst writing the 
following chapters as new insights were gained from analysis of the interview data in 
the context of the previous literature and theories.   
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethical considerations are a central concern to the research process: they influence 
both the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of data collection. All human research in Australia is 
subject to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NSECHR) 
as developed by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) (Israel, 
2004). Under the NSECHR, at an individual institutional level, the Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC) must approve all research concerning human subjects. 
This process requires the researcher to demonstrate that they have considered and 
designed measures to ensure the ethical propriety of the research.1 
 
In a study of the views of Australian criminologists and researchers, Israel 
(2004) found that many researchers were frustrated that the NSECHR did not take 
into consideration the space in which criminological research is conducted, for 
example the often ‘sensitive’ nature of the topic under investigation or the potential 
‘vulnerability’ of the subjects of research. The system of pre-emptive or anticipatory 
ethical regulation (as imputed from the biomedical sciences and applied to the social 
sciences) has encountered widespread criticism from social researchers (see for 
example: van den Hoonaard, 2001; Shaw, 2003; Murphy & Dingwall, 2007; Miller & 
Boulton, 2007; Dingwall, 2008; Schrag, 2011; Jennings, 2012; Marks, 2012; 
Monaghan, O’Dwyer & Gabe, 2013).  
 
Israel (2004) outlined four main ethical issues that commonly confront 
criminological researchers: (1) confidentiality; (2) informed consent; (3) harms and 
benefits; and (4) various relationships (or the type of relationships between researcher 
and participant). These ethical issues are relevant not only to the discipline of 
criminology, but arise within other fields of the human and social sciences such as 
sociology, anthropology and psychology (Israel, 2004). Over the course of the present 
                                                        
1 This research project was granted ethical clearance by the Griffith University HREC, protocol 
number: LEJ/01/12/HREC. The research was conducted in accordance with the approved protocol. 
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project the main ethical considerations related to securing the informed consent and 
ensuring the confidentiality of the Informants.  
 
The NSECHR requires all researchers to obtain written and informed 
voluntary consent from the potential participants of the research (Israel, 2004). The 
principle underlying this requirement is that research participants should understand 
what participation in the research would involve and that they have the right to decide 
to participate in the research, without consequence or fear of consequence, if 
participation is declined. This meant that before a dialogue could be initiated with 
Informants I was required to obtain written informed consent via a standard informed 
consent document outlining the study. Here, the ethical double standard is that most 
of the individuals I was interested in interviewing had held positions in which they 
(themselves or others under their command) have covertly (without the knowledge or 
informed consent of the individuals concerned) collected information about private 
citizens.  
 
The requirement to secure a priori written informed consent presented some 
issues for the research. Firstly, individuals were approached who were not willing to 
formally sign informed consent documents and participate in the study, even though 
they were willing to have ‘off the record’ conversations. It can be assumed that this 
response is, in large part, due to the working environment of the population I sought 
to sample from: the policing of organized crime is, by its very nature, secretive. 
Consideration of the operational sensitivities of the working environment was 
necessary: it was made clear to each potential Informant that no operationally specific 
or classified information would be requested or discussed. The data that could be 
collected were therefore limited from the outset. Despite this reassurance, it was the 
case that individuals who were presently employed within policing organizations 
were not willing (nor able) to speak ‘on the record’ about the topic. To overcome this 
barrier to securing formal agreement to participate in the research, I had to target my 
sampling approach towards individuals who had previously worked within such fields, 
but had since left the organization or agency in question (or had since moved to a 
different department within the public service). This was the only way in which I 
could recruit individuals and secure their agreement to participate in the study. These 
individuals were not only more willing to formally agree to participate, but were also 
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more free to discuss issues surrounding the policing of organized crime. The obvious 
disadvantage is that the sample consists of individuals who had previously worked in 
policing/policy organizations (as opposed to currently employed by such 
organizations). This opens the possibility that the Informants’ insights may not reflect 
the current state of play. In this sense, the ethical requirement of obtaining written 
informed consent limited the potential pool of Informants for the study. 
 
In actual practice, the process of securing written informed consent from each 
Informant was time consuming and inconvenienced the Informants (each of whom 
were located in different jurisdictions within Australia). Therefore the Informants 
were required to print, sign and return (either via mail or e-mail) the signed consent 
document before the scheduled interview. In one case an Informant had agreed to 
participate but had not signed and returned the informed consent document. This 
meant I was required to repeatedly request and stress the importance of this form 
being returned before a dialogue about the research topic could begin. This influenced 
the nature of the researcher and Informant relationship, as instead of talking freely 
about the research topic I was required to assume an administrative role constantly 
following up Informants for the return of incomplete documents (that were not 
particularly of great significance to them). In this instance, obtaining formal informed 
consent (specifically in the form of a signed consent document) was just a process 
required to tick a bureaucratic box, as the Informant had already previously agreed to 
participate in the study (in writing) in an e-mail discussion. This is evidence of the 
point made by Miller and Boulton (2007) who argue that obtaining formal informed 
consent is becoming increasingly bureaucratically regulated (for example by requiring 
documentation for potential auditing by the HREC). 
 
Moreover, the Informants who did agree to participate in the research were 
also provided on the informed consent document, as required by the HREC, the 
additional feature to agree or to decline to have the interview recorded and transcribed. 
One Informant did not agree to have the interview recorded and transcribed. The 
consequence of this is that during the interview detailed notes (including ad verbatim 
quotes) were being made, whilst concurrently managing the interview, asking 
questions, processing the responses and furthering inquiry with probes. Immediately 
following the interview further notes were recorded however the interview was now 
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being reconstructed from memory. The requirement to secure agreement to have the 
interview recorded and transcribed limited the way in which the interview data could 
be recorded and processed. 
 
Following the transcription of the recordings of the interviews (for the 
Informants who agreed to have the interviews recorded) and the processes of typing 
up the hand written notes from the Informant who did not agree to have the interview 
recorded, HREC required that each of the Informants were to be presented with an 
opportunity to confirm the ‘accuracy’ of the interview transcription. It could be 
confirmed that the interview transcriptions were indeed ‘accurate’ as the original 
recordings of the interview were maintained and therefore it was possible to check 
that the transcription corresponded with the recording (by listening to the recording 
whilst reading the corresponding transcription). Despite the accountability of 
maintaining digital evidence of the interview, I was required to provide the 
Informants with the opportunity to edit their responses before inclusion in the final 
corpus of data. This process was significantly time consuming as some Informants 
took months to return their edited transcripts and other Informants did not return the 
transcript which meant continual reminding. Furthermore, some Informants used the 
opportunity to strike out comments. Therefore the process of allowing the Informants 
to ‘confirm the accuracy’ of the data resulted in the loss of important and interesting 
data. The Informants, at times, filtered the data. For example, one of the Informants 
stated: 
“I’m embarrassed about my interview transcript. I didn’t realize I sounded so 
‘all over the place’, with some paragraphs being incomprehensible. At this 
stage, the main stuff I would like removed is the opening where I am vague 
about my previous or secret employment and some of the jumbled statements 
that don’t mean much.” 
 
During the process of negotiating what data could or could not be included in 
the sample of data, the Informants were reassured that the data included would be de-
identified- the final optional feature of the informed consent document. 
Confidentiality was an additional ethical requirement, particularly as the research 
concerned a sensitive topic (on this point see: Israel & Hay, 2006). Although the 
majority of the Informants agreed to be personally identified in the reporting of the 
research, three did not. As a consequence, and with a view to maintain consistency 
 20 
across the reporting of the results, reassure the Informants during the process of 
transcript editing and to ensure the Informants who did not consent to be identified 
cannot be, all data has been de-identified. Informants have been assigned a reference 
number ranging from one to seven. Ensuring the confidentiality of the Informants of 
the research is difficult because the population sampled from is small. It is necessary 
to ensure that the identification of Informants is not possible and that their identities 
cannot be inferred or traced from the information presented in the reporting of the 
research (Israel & Hay, 2006).  
 
 The ethical issues of informed consent and ensuring Informant confidentiality 
have resulted in the data collection being limited in the possible sample to be 
recruited, the information that could be discussed, the recording of the interviews, the 
information that could be included after transcript editing, and the identifying 
information that can be provided to the reader of the results. While the ethical 
considerations and requirements of informed consent and confidentiality are 
acknowledged and respected as important rights of human research participants in 
principle, these principles, by their required processes in practice, have limited the 
data collected and reported in the research. 
 
ARCHIVAL DATA COLLECTION 
The archival data consisted of a range of open source data relevant to the policing of 
organized crime in an Australian, context. International material was considered when 
it was of direct relevance to the Australian context. This included treaties that 
Australia is party to (i.e. the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, UNCTOC) and instances of policy transfer between Australia and 
the United Kingdom in the development and structure of organized crime agencies 
(discussed at length in Chapter 5). It is beyond the scope of this Australian study to 
include complete treatment of international trends of organized crime, and the 
policing of organized crime in different countries.2 The aim of this thesis is not to 
                                                        
2 Interested readers are directed to the work of a number of European scholars who have written on the 
problem of organized crime in Europe. For treatment of organized crime in Italy see: Paoli (2004); in 
Greece see: Antonopoulos (2007); in the Netherlands see: van Duyne (1996); in Belgium see: vander 
Beken (2004); in Germany see: von Lampe (2003); in Western Europe see: Paoli and Reuter (2008); in 
Europe and the European Union more broadly see: Dorn (1998); Dorn and vander Beken (2009) and 
van Duyne, von Lampe and Newell (2003).  
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conduct an international comparison of organized crime trends, but to conduct an in-
depth examination of the Australian context. 
 
Archival data considered in the present study included organized crime 
legislation (within Australia’s nine jurisdictions and the international conventions that 
Australia is party to), Hansard debates about legislation, legislative amendments and 
proposed bills, submissions to proposed bills, annual reports of the federal policing 
agencies (particularly the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal 
Police), reports of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement (formerly 
known as the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission 
and prior to that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority), 
and any other official/government documents or grey literature that were deemed 
relevant.  
 
The sampling strategy consisted of saturation sampling of open source official 
data concerning organized crime in Australia. Strict temporal boundaries were not 
drawn around the data collected and considered, but there was a focus on the recent 
legal measures implemented to respond to organized crime. The data were collected 
from relevant intergovernmental, Australian Governmental and federal law 
enforcement websites, legal databases (CommLaw and AustLII), libraries and the 
National Archives. I drew on my contacts in policing agencies, and the Informants in 
this study, to source documents of interest. Furthermore, I was able to negotiate 
access to a number of libraries that are not open to the public. These included the 
United Nations Library, the Australian Federal Police Library and the J.V. Barry 
Library at the Australian Institute of Criminology.  This enabled me to source and 
compile historical grey literature that is generally not publicly available. 
 
Archival data that are explicitly referred to in the results are cited in the body 
of the text that follows. However, a considerable amount of data were read and 
reflected upon in the development of the study. These data, although not explicitly 
cited, were used in the research process in informing, developing and refining the 
interview questions. For example, reading law enforcement annual reports inspired 
questions about the way in which law enforcement performance is measured. 
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INTERVIEW DATA COLLECTION 
As the aim was to examine organized crime through the eyes of those whose job it is 
to fight it, it was necessary to speak to individuals who had experience in intervening 
in organized crime. The objective was to interview key stakeholders who had held 
senior leadership positions within a range of federal policy, policing and intelligence 
agencies. This was the target population. Pursuing this population was the best 
approach because these individuals are the most informed about all strategic and 
operational elements within any given agency, effectively direct the work of the 
agency and are immediately accountable to the executive government. However, 
access to this population was contingent on first identifying, and secondly securing 
agreement to participate. Numerous challenges and obstacles in attempting to access 
the target population were encountered, particularly in identifying and making initial 
contact with the Informants (for example obtaining their contact details from third 
parties). The Informants only agreed to be interviewed (indeed, if they agreed) on 
recommendation, and after numerous e-mail exchanges and informal ‘off the record’ 
discussions. Throughout the research process these informal conversations, meetings 
and teleconferences allowed me to gain trust and establish rapport within the 
Informant community, providing further direction and recommendations to speak 
with other Informants. I considered this process as collateral data collection that led to 
further practical insights into the world of the policing of organized crime.  
 
Therefore, in social scientific terms, the interview phase of data collection 
consisted of purposive and snowball sampling (on sampling methods see: Berg, 2009) 
of key stakeholders in the policy making and policing of organized crime within an 
Australian context. In the absence of other feasible sampling options, the obstacles 
encountered in accessing the target population, and as directed by the empirical aim, 
the sampling strategy was necessarily selective. The Informants were identified on 
recommendation and approached because of their professional experience within the 
field of organized crime policing or the expert consultancy positions that they had 
held (for example questions about measuring the size of the organized crime problem 
directed one Informant to recommend an economist who had developed models 
estimating the size of the illicit drug market and the amounts of proceeds of crime 
laundered). A disadvantage of this approach is that the sample is non-random and, 
therefore, it cannot be claimed that the sample is representative of the target 
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population (as is often desired in positivist empirical studies, although this attitude is 
quite distinct from my own epistemological preoccupations, see also: Ruane, 2005; 
Silverman & Marvasti, 2008). This does not preclude, however, higher order 
conceptual and analytic generalizations being made (discussed further below, see: 
Firestone, 1993; Yin, 1994; 2011). In total and over a period of sixteen months of 
fieldwork (the first interview was conducted in February 2012 and the last in May 
2013), seven individuals were recruited to participate in formal interviews (although I 
had informal ‘off the record’ discussions with many more).  
 
There have been limited research studies that have been conducted in 
Australia that specifically set out to speak to police leaders. A notable exception being 
research conducted by Moore (1994) who surveyed police leaders about their careers, 
understandings of crime and public disorder, and police accountability and 
management more generally. Another notable study included Robert Reiner’s (1991) 
study of chief constables in the United Kingdom (U.K.). Reiner (1991, p. 5) discusses 
that “in terms of power, economic class and social status chief constables can now be 
considered a significant elite group.” The limited research that has been conducted 
with this population is possibly due to the difficulties associated with accessing and 
securing agreement to participate, barriers that Reiner (1991) also faced (specifically, 
refusals to participate, refusals to have interviews recorded and refusals to be 
identified in the reporting of the results). In their book on trends in policing, Das and 
Marenin (2009, p. xvii) consider a police leader as any individual: 
“Occupying a position in the top hierarchy of the police as a leader. He or 
she has knowledge of policy making, a position that enables him or her to view 
issues and events from the top, and has had several years in her or his 
policing career to speak on the various topics such as police administration, 
crime, public relations, future developments and so on with a degree of 
authority based on knowledge and experience” 
 
Despite the difficulties associated with access, I reasoned that a focus on 
speaking to police leaders would benefit the research and further criminological 
knowledge, as this population would be able to draw upon their extensive professional 
knowledge and experiences negotiating different aspects of the policing enterprise. 
This included their unique position negotiating the space between their respective 
agencies and the associated bureaucratic demands from below, and their dual role in 
shaping political agendas and being subject to political pressures from above (on this 
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point see: Tunnell & Gaines, 1992). It is for this reason that I aimed for breadth in 
professional experience and depth in the executive positions that the Informants had 
held, instead of recruiting a large(r) sample of individuals lower down the 
bureaucratic hierarchy or from a range of jurisdictions. This is because the individuals 
I sought to sample had played a key role in shaping the policing response to organized 
crime in Australia, and were also responsible for authorizing operations against 
organized crime. The political processes and agenda setting is top-down, policing 
organizations are hierarchically organized and driven from above. 
 
I targeted my sampling approach to the federal policing agencies as these have 
been recently created specifically to deal with organized crime (a point that is 
discussed in Chapter 5). Attempting to interview individuals from all States and 
Territories of Australia would not be logistically feasible within the constraints of the 
project. Furthermore, jurisdictional idiosyncrasies within Australia’s federal system 
would complicate the research; comparative studies could come later. The Informants 
were approached on the basis of their role in the development of the policing and/or 
policy responses to organized crime in Australia at the national level, and their ability 
to provide information of value to the research. I aimed to recruit Informants across 
policy and policing (intelligence and operational) areas that had collectively been 
involved in the policing of organized crime in Australia across the previous 3 decades 
(that is, during the time of formation and transformation of the main federal policing 
agencies listed immediately below).  
 
The breadth of organizations in which the Informants had professional 
experience, and represented in this research, included the following:  
 The National Crime Authority (NCA)  
 The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) 
 The Australian Federal Police (AFP)  
 The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs) 
 The Attorney-General’s Department (AGDs) 
 The Office of Strategic Crime Assessments (OSCA) 
 The Office of National Assessments (ONA) 
 The Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI) 
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 The Australian Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific (AUS-CSCAP) (a division of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN) 
 The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)  
 The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) 
 The Australian Trade Commission (AUSTRADE) 
 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)  
 The United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP)  
 The Australian Intelligence Community (Informants could not disclose 
specific agencies or exact roles)  
 
This encompassed the complete range of Australian federal agencies with the mandate 
to respond (through policy or enforcement) to organized crime. While being careful 
not to identify the Informants in this study, the type of positions the Informants had 
held included: 
 Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Crime Commission 
 National Manager of Intelligence and Assistant Commissioner of the 
Australian Federal Police (three of the seven Informants had held this 
position) 
 National Director of Criminal Intelligence of the Australian Crime 
Commission 
 Executive Director of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence 
 Director of the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments 
 Acting Director of the Australian Institute of Criminology 
 Strategic Coordinator of the Intelligence Division of the Australian 
Federal Police 
 Executive Director of the Australian Committee of the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
 Co-chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
Working Group on Transnational Crime (two Informants had held this 
position) 
 Assistant Secretary of National Law-Enforcement Policy in the 
Attorney-General’s Department 
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The Informants in this study have experience in various advisory, consultancy, 
analyst, policy and operational roles. During their careers the Informants were at the 
forefront of the policing of organized crime at a federal jurisdictional level and at the 
helm of the federal agencies with the mandate to respond to organized crime in 
Australia, at the times of their formation or transformation. While the Informants 
cannot possibly tell the whole story (which is not a weakness of the research but 
rather an epistemological reality, McConville, Sanders & Leng, 1991), these were the 
most knowledgeable people to talk to about the policing of organized crime in an 
Australian context. 
 
As the empirical aim was to understand organized crime from the perspective 
of the Informants and to explore their perceptions and experiences across their careers, 
in-depth interviews were the most suitable method to adopt. This is because this 
enabled the discussion and probing of Informants’ insights about, and their 
experiences in, their world. I had specific empirical questions that I wanted to ask the 
Informants, however at the same time, semi-structured interviews would allow a 
degree of flexibility to adapt the questions to the Informants’ unique experiences, ask 
further questions if a novel topic or idea was raised by an Informant, and to let the 
Informants direct and guide the interview (Berg, 2009; Henn, Weinstein & Foard, 
2006; Ruane, 2005). It also provided an opportunity to gather further direction to 
archival data and referrals to other stakeholders for the purposes of snowball sampling. 
The disadvantages of this approach include the issue that memories are fallible, the 
information reported is reconstructed in hindsight, and there is a tendency for 
individuals to think in a smooth or linear progression of events overtime, whereas this 
is not necessarily the way in which events may have unfolded.   
 
The semi-structured interview schedule was informed by the literature and the 
archival data. The interview questions were situated firmly within the paradigm of the 
research. These questions were used as a starting and reference point to initiate and 
guide the interviews, though departure from these questions occurred frequently. I 
encouraged the Informants to elaborate on the questions dependent on their own 
specific experiences, allowed them to direct the interview by asking if there were 
questions that they thought I should ask, or if there was anything they thought was 
important to consider in addressing the research aim. This was my attempt to let the 
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Informants direct the data collection process, letting the data be grounded in their 
insights to as great a degree as possible. At the same time, the interviews allowed for 
open discussions with the Informants along the lines of the empirical aims and 
questions. This provided opportunities to challenge their conceptions of, and ‘truths’ 
about, organized crime. The semi-structured interview schedule consisted of these 
types of questions:  
 
 What do you consider as organized crime?  
 How would you describe organized crime in terms of structure, activities and 
operations?  
 What directs you to making that description?  
 What types of metaphors and models are (were) used to describe organized 
crime within your agency or domain?  
 Has this model of organized crime changed over time, or over the course of 
your career?  
 How does this concept of organized crime translate into law and policing?  
 Were there any specific incidents or events that led to an increase in this 
approach to organized crime?  
 What makes the problem of organized crime difficult or challenging to police? 
 How do you reconcile that as more legal responses and policing resources are 
dedicated to the problem of organized crime, the problem grows? 
 
The final interview was conducted with a senior federal policy maker. This 
Informant was sought out because they were responsible for the idea, design and 
architecture of the 2010 Commonwealth Organized Crime Strategic Framework 
(COCSF). As the interview took place towards the conclusion of the fieldwork phase 
and the Informant was providing a perspective specifically relevant to policy 
development and implementation, the questions were targeted accordingly. The semi-
structured interview schedule (and probes) consisted of the questions: 
 
 What were the political rationalities supporting the introduction of the 
Commonwealth Organized Crime Strategic Framework? 
o What were the deficiencies in the earlier approach? 
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o Why was this strategy required? 
o What events triggered its creation? 
 Why was the Commonwealth Organized Crime Strategic Framework decided 
as the best policy option? 
o As an enforcement focused policy? 
o At a Commonwealth level? 
o How did the States and Territories respond? 
 What was the process of development of the Commonwealth Organized Crime 
Strategic Framework? 
o Within the Attorney-Generals Department? 
o At a broader multi-agency bureaucratic level? 
o At a broader multi-jurisdictional level? 
 
The interviews ranged in duration from one hour and fifteen minutes to three 
hours and fifteen minutes. All interviews (with the exception of one- as the Informant 
did not consent to the interview being recorded) were recorded and transcribed ad 
verbatim, though the text excerpts were later edited for ease of readability (removing 
hesitations such as ‘ums’ and ‘ahhs’). This resulted in over two hundred pages of 
transcribed interview data. Interviews were later supplemented and given context with 
reference to relevant historical archival data (for example, from the Informants’ 
respective agencies or other relevant sources available). 
 
ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW AND ARCHIVAL DATA  
Faced with this body of qualitative data (interview transcriptions and the archival 
database) it was necessary to adopt an analytic strategy that enabled me to speak to 
the research aims, and at the same time, enable the process of analysis be data driven. 
The data required both interpretation and situation in a body of literature and theories. 
I faced a series of analytics difficulties in imposing a top-down or deductive approach 
in analyzing the data: it was not possible to wrap the data up under one theory and 
‘test’ it. Perhaps a coherent theory had not yet been identified and a dialogue essential 
to intellectual development might have to start in earnest. Given this, a bottom-up or 
inductive analytic process towards theory generation was more appropriate. Yet, at 
the same time, the process of data collection was always informed and directed by 
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previous literature and data (that is, the interview questions were informed by the 
literature and archival data, the interview data directed the search for further archival 
data and so on). Moreover, I knew that it is impossible to infer from a specific 
circumstance or datum without some degree of prior existing knowledge (about the 
nature of the world) directing the inferences that are drawn (see: Hyde, 2000; Marks 
& Yardley, 2004). There is no true ‘grounded theory’ or purely inductive research. 
 
Therefore, it was necessary to adopt an analytic strategy that enabled 
switching between inductive and deductive reasoning processes, while mediating the 
relationships between the data and concepts arising from the data (and literature) and 
theoretical ideas, without making bold unsupported leaps to higher order conceptual 
claims. It was imperative to ensure that the claims made and the narrative arches were 
always sustained by the data, concepts, and theories.  
 
Xiao and Vicente (2000) argue for the use of inductive abstraction hierarchies 
guiding the transition from context specific (idiographic) knowledge (or in this case 
specific excerpts of data) to higher order conceptual descriptions and (nomothetic) 
analytic generalizations. Although the process of abstraction hierarchies makes 
intuitive sense, Xiao and Vicente (2000) do not specify exactly how to make the first 
(or any subsequent) analytical hurdle. It is important that these analytic leaps of faith 
are transparent and that there is some sort of analytic trace left behind (Dekker & 
Nyce, 2004) so the critical reader can follow the analytical footsteps, assess the 
connection between the data and higher order conceptual claims, and ultimately judge 
the value of the research. 
 
In making this first analytic jump up the abstraction hierarchy, I relied on the 
qualitative research techniques of ‘open’ and ‘axial’ coding (Berg, 2009) and ‘content’ 
and ‘thematic’ analysis (Marks & Yardley, 2004). The interview transcripts were 
initially examined with the view to identify broad themes. Of course, the 
identification of the themes was shaped by the previous literature, archival data, and 
the interview questions asked: they are a reflection of my own conceptual and 
empirical choices throughout the research process. Novel themes arising from the data 
were also identified. This is (again, to a degree) inductive or open coding. Therefore 
the initial phase of categorization of the data was both concept driven (deductive) and 
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data driven (inductive). The data were then physically structured into different 
documents, a process that Yin (2011) refers to as ‘disassembling’ and ‘reassembling.’  
 
Once these themes were identified the interview transcripts were read and re-
read with the view to identify every excerpt that was relevant to that theme: the 
transcripts were scoured for evidence of each theme. Then once all incidents of each 
theme were located and sorted into the independent documents, each theme was read 
and re-read and coded with a view to identify subthemes in order to meaningfully 
structure the data. This involved returning to the literature and theories to aide in 
interpretation of the data; the data directed the search for new literatures and the 
consideration of new theories. To identify connections and linkages I contextualized 
the data with concepts arising from the literature at progressively higher levels of 
analysis. This involved stitching together and making links between different 
concepts arising from the data (both archival and interview) and literature (on 
qualitative researcher as bricoleur and quilt maker, see: Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
This was an emergent and cyclic process of managing the constant interplay between 
data, concepts, and theories. This meant that in the first instance the analysis was data 
driven, and then the previous literature(s) and theories were consulted to inform 
interpretation. Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007, p. 53) term this “data-theory coupling” 
explaining “we show data and tell their significance.”  
 
Through the process of interrogating and structuring the data into themes and 
subthemes, linkages and connections between the subthemes became evident and the 
meta-argument of the thesis took shape. Through the iterative phases of data analysis 
and data-theory coupling, a coherent story was developed drawing on a range of 
perspectives, across a range of data sources and the previous literature and theoretical 
resources. The results follow the presentation of the themes and subthemes as 
structured into the narrative arch or meta-argument of the thesis: the results invoke the 
themes and thus it is clear how the analysis has produced the findings. In this way the 
method is the epicenter of the thesis: the analysis, interpretation and presentation of 
the results is aligned throughout this document (see: Smagorinsky, 2008). Consistent 
with both qualitative research traditions and the way I have approached analysis, the 
discussion presented in the subsequent chapters is folded into the data presentation, so 
rather than just presenting data, the following chapters will, in lieu of a separate 
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discussion chapter, also integrate literature and theory to interpret and explain the data. 
The aim is to make clear connections between concepts from those theories and 
contributions to the literature and the primary data generated by my research: showing 
the data and telling its significance. 
 
VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND GENERALIZABILITY 
This section considers three qualities of empirical research: (1) validity (2) reliability 
and (3) generalizability. Although listed independently, these qualities are 
interdependent, and taken together provide an indication of the rigor and robustness of 
the research (Berg, 2009). It is necessary to explain each of these qualities because 
they dictate judgments about the overall value of the research. There are accepted 
assumptions about these terms, particularly from a positivist empiricist perspective. In 
theory building and qualitative inquiry these considerations are as important as in any 
empirical endeavor, however, they become differently patterned (see: Krefting, 1991; 
Healy & Perry, 2000; Long & Johnson, 2000; Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000; 
Stenbacka, 2001; Whittemore, Chase & Mandle, 2001; Fade, 2003; Morrow, 2005). 
Importantly, the meanings and criteria for these qualities are consistent with the 
paradigm and the methodology of the research. According to Morrow (2005, p. 250), 
the value of qualitative inquiry “is assessed on the basis of the paradigmatic 
underpinnings of the research.”  
 
i. Validity (internal validity) 
The main question of validity is whether the “intended object of measurement 
actually is measured” (Stenbacka, 2001). The epistemological perspective in which 
the research is grounded determines the criteria to evaluate validity. Within a social 
constructionist paradigm of research it is assumed there are multiple local truths or 
realities (Healy & Perry, 2000). In this research the truths that I need to ensure are 
valid are the truths of the Informants of the study. This is a form of interpretive 
validity (Burnard, 1991; Maxwell, 1992). Therefore, the research can be considered 
valid if it reflects the Informants’ worldviews. The research can also be considered 
valid provided it is credible in the wider Informant community (Appleton, 1995). 
Another way of guaranteeing the validity of the research is the presentation of the 
findings as rich descriptions of the Informants’ worldviews. This was achieved by 
presenting the Informants’ statements in their own words as a form of descriptive 
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validity (Maxwell, 1992). The validity of the present research was further guarded 
through the process of asking the Informants to provide their perspectives and 
allowing the Informants to direct interviews and guide the data collection process. 
Stenbacka (2001, p. 552) concludes, “validity is therefore achieved when using the 
method of non-forcing interviews with strategically well-chosen Informants.” Of 
course, the Informants were also provided an opportunity to confirm, edit and add to 
their statements.  
 
In order to ensure that the research findings were considered credible to the 
wider Informant community, the preliminary findings of the research were presented 
at the 2013 International Serious and Organized Crime Conference (ISOC). The aim 
was to obtain feedback, hold discussions and conduct further consultations with 
members of the Informant community. This was another form of cross-validating the 
insights generated by the research with the broader Informant community.  
Furthermore, discussions were held with senior policing and policy representatives 
through my direct involvement in research roundtables, such as the Criminal 
Motorcycle Gang (CMG) Research Roundtable held by the Queensland Department 
of Premier and Cabinet in early 2014. In this way, I continued to take my preliminary 
findings back into the Informant community in order to test and develop them. 
 
ii. Reliability 
The term reliability is particularly controversial within qualitative methodology. 
Stenbacka (2001, p. 552) points out “if a qualitative study is discussed with reliability 
as a criterion, the consequence is rather that the study is no good.” This is because the 
typical assumption of reliability is that the results are repeatable and dependable over 
time, place and researcher. Assuming that the results of the research can be obtained 
time and again negates recognition of the intersubjectivity and dependence between 
the specific context, the individual researcher and the method (Stenbacka, 2001). 
Instead of this positivist assumption about reliability (which is at odds with the 
epistemological underpinnings of the research), it is suggested that a thorough 
description of the study is indicative of reliability. According to Stenbacka (2001, p. 
552):  
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“A thorough description of the whole [research] process, enabling conditional 
intersubjectivity, is what indicates good quality when using a qualitative 
method”  
 
This means making the research auditable so that the reader can follow the 
researcher in their footsteps (through data collection, analysis and interpretation, 
presentation of the results, and the drawing of conclusions) (Appleton, 1995 citing 
Guba & Lincoln, 1981). Therefore, the method and the analytic reasoning should be 
transparent with an analytic trace left between data and higher-order analytic 
generalizations (Dekker & Nyce, 2004). In order to ensure that the research is reliable 
the method was detailed at length and the results are presented in a way in which the 
reader can evaluate the links between the data and my interpretations, conclusions and 
higher-order analytic generalizations.  
 
iii. Generalizability (external validity) 
The term generalizability (or external validity) typically relates to the researcher’s 
ability to generalize or make inferences from the sample studied to a larger population. 
For this type of statistical generalization it is important that the sample is 
representative of the larger target population. This means selecting a proportionately 
large cross-section of the target population to study, through random sampling 
techniques (Berg, 2009). It can be difficult for qualitative researchers- who purposely 
study small(er) samples in great(er) depth via nonrandom sampling methods- to make 
assertions about the statistical generalizability of the results of their research (for 
discussion of different meanings of generalizability, see: Lukka & Kasanen, 1995; 
Larsson, 2009; Polit & Beck, 2010). This is relevant to the current study. Although a 
sample of seven individuals may be considered a small sample, the sample was 
selected according to different criteria than sample size. However, with this noted, the 
target population sampled from is likely to be limited from the outset, and therefore 
the sample of seven individuals may be highly representative of the target population. 
That is, there may be some limits to the generalizability of the research, however, that 
is not to say that it is not generalizable at all. The point is that without a sampling 
frame (a complete list of all individuals within the target population, something that 
would not be possible to obtain given the population sampled from) it is neither 
possible, nor is it necessarily desirable within the paradigm of this research, to make 
such assertions (Merriam, 1995). 
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Instead, in the context of the present research project as an endeavor in 
qualitative inquiry and theory building, the significance of generalizability rests upon 
the higher-order (conceptual and theoretical) generalizations that can be made 
(Firestone, 1993; Yin, 1994; 2011). Analytic generalizability is assured by forging 
links between individual datum and higher-order conceptual claims in the context of 
the previous literature and theory. Stenbacka (2001) adds that analytic generalization 
is made possible by the strategic choice of Informants. It is more important to select 
Informants who are relevant to the study and who have a high degree of experience or 
expertise, as opposed to samples that are selected solely on the basis of statistical 
probability.  
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CHAPTER 3: GENEALOGY OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THOUGHT 
INTRODUCTION 
The starting point of this research project, as is the tradition, was a literature review. 
The purpose was to canvass the work that had previously been completed, and due to 
the definitional issues surrounding organized crime (see for example: Finckenauer, 
2005; Levi, 2007), the aim was to examine the ways this phenomenon had previously 
been theorized about within the criminological literature. It is important to note, from 
the outset, that this examination is necessarily constrained and ordered by the present 
state of knowledge and the current social context. This is because, from my own 
vantage point, I looked back throughout post-World War II criminological thought 
and reconstructed the different ways in which theorists had thought about the object 
of organized crime. Of course, this imputes neatness and a degree of continuity that is 
not achieved in real life. 
 
 This examination, as the upcoming chapter will show, demonstrated the 
importance of the social and historical context in which ideas about organized crime 
emerged within this social scientific discipline. Attentiveness to the ‘conditions of 
possibility’ about different ways of thinking about an object, and in this case 
organized crime, is similar to Foucault’s methods of archeology of knowledge and 
genealogy. Foucault’s (1972/1969) methods involve tracing the formation and 
transformation of knowledge through time across epistemes. According to Foucault 
(1972/1969, p. 211) epistemes are “the total set of relations that unite, at a given 
period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and 
possibly formalized systems.” Essentially, these are socially and historically 
contingent ways of thinking, talking and writing about objects or phenomena. This 
also includes the relations between knowledge of, and power over, an object of 
knowledge; these ideas are developed further in some of Foucault’s (1977; 1980) later 
writing and interviews.   
 
 The relationship between power and knowledge became an important 
consideration when conducting this literature review and reflecting upon the 
‘scientific’ discipline of criminology that maintains authority over the study, and the 
creation of scientific knowledge, of organized crime. As Foucault (1977, p. 204) 
comments “knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new objects of 
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knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised.” Through knowledge 
creation and the techniques of the scientific method, criminology maintains it’s own 
unique power and authority over the object of organized crime. In fact, criminology, 
as a claims-making discipline, plays a central role in the process of construction and 
legitimation of organized crime as a social reality. It can be argued that the ‘scientific’ 
study of crime is a regime of truth that creates and legitimates power relations 
(Foucault, 1972/1969; 1977; 1980) because the “knowledges produced about the 
objects of governance shape the types of strategies that are imaginable” (Haggerty, 
2004, p. 214).  
 
Academic attention on organized crime was ignited by Cressey’s (1969) 
publication Theft of the Nation. Cressey (1969; 1972) depicted the American Cosa 
Nostra as a hierarchically structured organization with rigid division of labor, 
governmental oversight and formalized rule of law. Then, Albini’s (1971) patron-
client model described social relationships forming into decentralized flexible 
syndicates. Thereafter, Ianni (1972) articulated a patrimonial model of organized 
crime placing familial ties at the heart of family business. Smith (1971; 1980) 
proposed a model of illicit enterprise, suggesting that enterprise occurs on a spectrum 
of legality. Later Haller (1990; 1992) extended Smith’s ideas, while challenging 
conceptions of enterprise that were aligned with conventional bureaucracy. Reuter 
(1983; 1985) argued for disorganized crime because of the influence of the invisible 
hand mechanisms of supply and demand. Then, organized crime was considered as 
criminal networks (Morselli, 2005; 2008). Most recently, there has been an extension 
of the threat of organized crime to transnational organized crime afforded by new 
opportunities of globalization. It is the multiplicity and mutability of organized crime 
that intrigues.  
 
ORGANIZED CRIME 
Donald R. Cressey, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of California, is 
widely credited as the pioneer of modern criminological study3 of organized crime. 
                                                        
3 Authors have written on organized crime prior to the 1960s, including, for example the 1920s and 
1930s American prohibition ‘gangsters’ (see: Brauer, 2003; Beshears, 2010). However, these works 
were not completed until sometime after the period of interest, and therefore represent historical 
reconstructions shaped by contemporary ideas of the phenomenon (for critique on history and the study 
of organized crime see: Block, 1978).  
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Cressey’s (1969) publication Theft of the Nation was written following the 1967 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration in America, of 
which he was one of the lead authors and organized crime consultant (University of 
California, 1988). Theft of the Nation is an extensive revision and elaboration of the 
report of the Task Force on Organized Crime. In this text, Cressey (1969) argues a 
secret society exists within American society. This secret society, or to use Cressey’s 
term “Cosa Nostra,” maintains a strategic monopoly over a range of illicit markets 
and the provision of illicit products and services (such as gambling, loan 
sharking/usury, narcotics, labor racketeering) creating vast profits for the organization. 
The organization then uses these profits to nullify the sovereignty of the American 
State, through corruption of law-enforcement and government officials.  
 
Cressey’s model structures the relations of individuals of Italian descent 
organized within at least twenty-four families, although the individuals within the 
families are not necessarily related. Collectively these families form the Cosa Nostra. 
Within each family there is a clear hierarchical structure, rigid division of labor and 
role allocation. There is a “boss,” “underboss,” “lieutenants,” “captains,” and 
“soldiers.” There are also positions for “buffer,” “money mover,” “enforcer,” and 
“executioner” (Cressey, 1969, pp.  x-xi). Cressey assumes that this structure indicates 
the organization is rational, with top-down coordinated command. This is further 
developed by Cressey’s discussion of ‘The Commission.’ The Commission serves as 
executive oversight for the collective Cosa Nostra families, links the families together, 
and exits as a judicial apparatus in resolving disputes. Under the direction of the 
political division of The Commission, each individual economic division or family 
profits from a range of criminal endeavors. Cressey believes it is this formal 
governmental-bureaucratic structure that enables the organization to prosper and self-
perpetuate, regardless of the removal of any single figure. Cressey (1969) maintains 
‘The Code’ underlines the structure of the Cosa Nostra, which is the organization’s 
equivalent of a rule of law, which serves to protect the organization (i.e. code of 
silence) and confer power to the higher positioned members of the hierarchy. Cosa 
Nostra members who violate The Code are punishable by enforcer, acting on the 
orders of senior members. Cressey (1969) argues that the existence of the role of 
enforcer provides evidence for the inference that a political division exists, in addition 
to a business or economic division of the organization. 
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According to Cressey (1967; 1969; 1972), it is the strategies of corruption of 
law enforcement and political systems, through bribery and influence (i.e. donations 
to political campaigns), which shield the organization from intervention by authorities. 
Furthermore, the architecture of the Cosa Nostra (with roles such as ‘buffer’) serves 
to insulate senior members from prosecution. Cressey (1967; 1969; 1972) concludes it 
is the structure of the Cosa Nostra that enables the organization to withstand attack. It 
is not the men who occupy the positions of the organization who enable continuity of 
operation; rather it is the structural positions themselves. It becomes clear that 
Cressey’s (1967; 1969; 1972) analysis centers on the structural roles of the 
organization (while painting a picture of a military organization i.e. ‘lieutenants,’ 
‘captains,’ ‘soldiers’) and the pervasiveness of corruption that poses the risk of ‘Theft 
of the Nation.’ In fact, these two elements form the definitional foundation of 
Cressey’s organized crime.   
 
The President’s Task Force Commission concluded that organized crime is 
distinguishable from other kinds of criminal activity by corruption and enforcement 
(Cressey, 1969). For Cressey (1967; 1969; 1972), organized crime is an organization 
that has the ability to interfere with the executive, while maintaining an executive. 
Cressey’s (1967; 1969; 1972) choice of language (‘theft of the nation’, ‘nullify’ state 
sovereignty, structural roles according to military positions, prominence of ‘families’), 
emphasis on alien ethnicities (Italian), and the importance of political oversight (‘The 
Commission’), is interesting as links between organized crime and national security 
are evident, and at this point in time the United States of America faced a similar 
‘threat’ of ‘theft of the nation’ by alien communist powers. Writing from an executive 
position (for the President of the United States) Cressey (1967; 1969; 1972) 
constructs a model of organized crime that defines the phenomenon according to 
hierarchical structure, alien ethnicity, and the price of political influence and 
corruption for the American State. 
 
SYNDICATED CRIME 
In what is stated as direct disagreement with Cressey’s (1967; 1969; 1972) model of 
organized crime, Albini (1971) proposed a model of patron-client relationships that 
collectively form syndicated crime. Here, the influence of previous authors can be 
seen to be influencing subsequent understandings of the phenomenon. According to 
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Albini (1971) syndicated crime does not have formal structure, the individuals are not 
members of an organization, and instead the system is arranged according to the 
stratification of power relations between individuals. An individual may serve as a 
client to a patron who is more powerful, and also a patron of a less powerful client 
simultaneously. Therefore, power is a central theme of this model of organized crime. 
Albini (1971) explains power is achieved by being a patron or client with the 
resources necessary to achieve any enterprise activity. It is the nature and number of 
patron-client relationships an individual is party that is indicative of their relative 
power. Albini (1971) describes syndicated crime as consisting of various levels of 
patron-client relationships, which also includes family and friendship relationships. 
As evident from the range of patron-client, and various other relationships that shape 
syndicated crime, there is an array of potential structures in which it may exist. Unlike 
Cressey, Albini (1971) does not presuppose the structure of power relations. Yet, in 
ways similar to Cressey’s assertions, power remains an important theme. 
 
Albini (1971) discusses each patron and client involved in syndicated crime 
participates to achieve his or her own ends. Individuals act to benefit themselves (and 
not an organization) using the resources that are at their immediate disposal. It is for 
these reasons that syndicated crime consists of “fluid and changing operations whose 
participants vary in the types of functions they perform” (Albini, 1971, p. 284). The 
number of different enterprise activities an individual maybe involved in is limitless; 
as is the number of patron-client relationships an individual can participate. In 
contrast to Cressey’s assertions, individuals involved in syndicated crime are not 
assigned static roles and complete one specific function (that of ‘boss,’ ‘underboss,’ 
‘lieutenant’ etc) but rather there is diversity in the roles of individuals, dependent on 
whether they are acting as patron or client and the particular activity in which they are 
engaged. Furthermore, the structure, size and function of a syndicate is dependent on 
the type of activity in which it is involved, whether that be trafficking in narcotics, 
loan sharking, or illicit gambling operations. 
 
Albini (1971) discusses the use of violence within syndicated crime as a 
necessary function to exercise control. Again, implicit in the notion of control is the 
importance of power relations within Albini’s (1971) model. Albini (1971) assumes 
the main reason for the use of violence is because syndicated crime occurs outside the 
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law, and therefore individuals are unable to pursue legal avenues of enforcement or 
reparation. Violence as a tool of enforcement is the consequence of illegality. 
However, according to Albini (1971), participants of syndicated crime also employ 
non-violent techniques of control such as debt repayment through employment 
schemes or signing over part ownership in legitimate businesses (i.e. blackmail). It is 
these strategies that enable criminal syndicates to enter, exploit and corrupt legitimate 
business.  
 
Essentially, syndicated crime is exemplified by loose fluid relationships 
structured according to the power relations relevant to the activity that participants are 
involved in at any point in time. It is for this reason Albini (1971) believes the 
syndicate system frustrates law enforcement intervention. The flexible nature of the 
system enables it to extend into legitimate spheres where “virtually every syndicate 
participant is a potential ‘corrupter’” (Albini, 1971, p. 300). Unlike Cressey who 
asserts it is the financial resources available that enable corruption of authority, for 
Albini (1971) it is the flexible and changing nature of power relations. Although the 
means of corruption differ, it is evident the same end exists. Quite interestingly 
despite the key differences between Cressey’s and Albini’s understandings of 
organized crime, both models depict the corruption of authority and the interference 
with the state, as central features of the phenomenon. 
 
FAMILY BUSINESS 
Ianni’s (1972) aim was to study the social organization of secret societies, and in 
particular Italian-American crime families. Like Cressey, there is a focus on 
individuals of Italian ethnicity. Ianni (1972) spent two years as a participant-observer 
within the Lupollo family, conducted interviews with each of the central members of 
the family, and presented a detailed case study in the book Family Business. Ianni 
(1972, p. 106) traces the Lupollo family’s origins in Sicily arguing it is “the kinship-
based clan organization of the Lupollo family business [that] has enabled family 
members to preserve.” According to Ianni (1972) it is the cultural importance 
assigned to kinship that unites the Italian-American community and functions as a 
method of social organization. Therefore, Ianni’s (1972) object of analysis is the 
kinship relation between individual members of a family. Unlike Cressey (1967; 
1969; 1972), Ianni (1972) uses the term family in the literal sense. Between these two 
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models the status of relations of the families differ, yet the fundamental structure for 
both understandings of the phenomenon is founded in the same notions of ethnicity 
and culture, that is ultimately, identity. Ianni (1972) describes the four lineages 
(Lupollo; Salemis; Tuccis; Alcamos) of the kinship group of the Lupollo family and 
charts the family tree over five generations. Ianni (1972, p. 63) argues “these four 
lineages as a kinship group and their alliance as a business enterprise are one and 
inseparable.” The elements of family and business are intertwined. Business is bonded 
by blood. 
 
Ianni (1972) describes both the legitimate and illegitimate business enterprises 
the Lupollo family is involved in. The family participates in more than twenty 
legitimate business operations, and a range of illegitimate business operations 
(gambling and loan sharking). The legitimate and illegitimate enterprises are 
integrated in a complementary manner in that the illegitimate operations run parallel 
to the legitimate operations, with profits being converted into legitimate income, and 
reinvested into illegitimate activities. Collectively, the legitimate and illegitimate 
arms of the Lupollo family business operate as a single unit. Like both Cressey’s and 
Albini’s models, the ability to extend illegitimately into legitimate spheres (through 
corruption or legitimate business) is an overarching theme for Ianni’s model. 
 
 The authority roles in this model of organized crime are assigned according to 
kinship and generational status. Members of the older generations hold leadership and 
authority positions, with ultimate power conferred to the head of the family. The 
organization is structured and operates as a patriarchal hierarchy. Again, the concepts 
of power, control and structure are emphasized, albeit for Ianni (1972) the basis of 
these are founded in familial relations, where male family members rule supreme. In 
this sense social-familial and business relationships are merged. Furthermore, in 
addition to the relation provided by birth and marriage, the godparent-child 
relationship serves to cement the power relations within the family, which is an 
important element of Italian family custom, as it creates closer familial links when 
blood ties are absent. In fact, Ianni’s (1972) study of the Lupollo family coincided 
with the release of the classic The Godfather film (released in 1972) based on the 
Mario Puzo (1969) novel of the same title. 
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For Ianni (1972), the individuals of the family are socially organized 
according to the degree of respect afforded by their role in the family. Respect is 
another word for power. Moreover, the social organization of the family is dictated by 
a set of rules and values, the premier being the “importance of kinship and family as 
the base of both social and business organization” (Ianni, 1972, p. 83). Above all, 
members must be loyal to the family because “the individual does not exist except as 
part of the group” (Ianni, 1972, p. 155). Ianni’s (1972) model of family business 
constructs the basis of the organization, including the allocation of power, roles, and 
enterprise functions, as kinship.  
 
 This model of organized crime differs from Cressey’s in that the organization 
is not a bureaucracy. Instead, Ianni (1972, p. 108) argues that organized crime groups 
are “traditional social systems, organized by action and cultural values which have 
nothing to do with modern bureaucratic virtues.” Ianni (1972, p. 153) emphasizes that 
organized crime groups are not “hierarchies of organizational positions” but instead 
“patterns of relationships among individuals which have the force of kinship.” 
Although differing in this sense, there are undeniable similarities between these 
models. There is a central focus on Italian ethnicity, cultural values and origins of 
organized crime in the Sicilian Mafia. Although less bureaucratic than Cressey’s 
model, Ianni’s (1972) depiction of the Lupollo family is similarly internally structured 
with a hierarchy organized according to generational status. In both models exists an 
enforceable code of conduct that exercises social control over, and serves to 
cohesively bond, members of the group. Furthermore, although their choices of 
metaphors differ, for Cressey, Albini and Ianni the concepts of power, structure, and 
interference in legitimate spheres are reoccurring themes that conceive the 
phenomenon in an undeniably similar way 
 
ILLICIT/ILLEGAL ENTERPRISE 
Dwight C. Smith Jr. followed a career path from Counter-Intelligence Corps in the 
United States military to the position of Assistant Deputy Director for Systems 
Planning and Research for the New York State Identification and Intelligence System 
(NYSIIS). It was while he was at NYSIIS that he assumed the role of principal 
recorder for the Oyster Bay Conferences on Organized Crime, and developed a 
spectrum-based theory of enterprise (Woodiwiss, 2014). Smith (1971) rejected the use 
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of the term organized crime and instead adopted the term illicit enterprise. This 
conveys Smith’s denunciation of Cressey’s bureaucratic model of organized crime, 
and highlights the entrepreneurial focus of Smith’s theory. Smith’s (1980) later work 
provided a complete articulation of his spectrum-based theory of enterprise. Smith 
(1980) posits that enterprise behaviors take place on a continuous spectrum of legality 
inclusive of both licit and illicit enterprise at the poles. In fact, the poles of the 
spectrum are not mutually exclusive in that entrepreneurs can participate in both 
legitimate and illegitimate activities simultaneously. Smith’s (1971; 1980) argument 
is that illicit enterprise is an extension of, the same as, licit enterprise, differing only 
in the illegal or underworld domain in which it operates. Smith’s (1971; 1980) 
underlying presumption is that what is and is not considered legal changes (for 
example gambling and prostitution) but enterprise behavior is the same, regardless of 
where the line of legality is drawn from time to time.   
 
Smith (1980) outlines four components of the theory of enterprise: entrepreneur, 
customer, stratification, and power. Both entrepreneur and customer operate on a 
continuum of legality. For example, an entrepreneur may: (1) produce legal products 
and provide them legitimately, (2) legal products and provide them illegitimately, or 
(3) illegal products and provide them illegitimately. Conversely, customers may: (1) 
obtain legal products legitimately, (2) legal products illegitimately, or (3) illegal 
product illegitimately. Following this, Smith (1980) describes three entrepreneurial 
positions of the spectrum: (1) the saintly paragon who operates within the legitimate 
market legitimately, (2) the pariah who operates on the margins of legality, and (3) 
the sinful pirate who operates within the illegitimate market illegitimately. Smith’s 
(1980) choice of metaphors depicts the various positions of the spectrum in an 
illuminatory way. Individuals can occupy multiple positions simultaneously, or slide 
between them. For Smith (1980), it is the interaction between entrepreneurs and 
customers across the spectrum of legality that creates stratification of the market. 
Underpinning the notion of stratification is Smith’s (1980) assumption that customers 
seeking illicit products and services participate in transactions with entrepreneurs who 
provide illicit products and services.  
 
Finally, the entrepreneur must balance dependency with power and control over 
environment. Smith (1980) discusses that dependency on the environment is a 
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weakness, whereas power provides strength in navigating and responding to changes 
and problems in the environment. Like Cressey’s, Albini’s, and Ianni’s models of 
organized crime, power is a prominent theme. For Smith, however, it is power over 
the environment that becomes important, rather than the structural or resource power 
of individuals within an organization, patron-client relationship or family. 
 
Influenced by the organizational theories of the day, Smith (1971) questions 
how the task environment of illicit enterprise is distinguishable from the task 
environment of licit enterprise. Smith (1971) queries how the environment differs for 
paragons, pariahs and pirates, and considers how this influences their respective 
business operations. The task environment consists of the four sectors of enterprise 
that are consumers, suppliers, competitors, and regulatory mechanisms. Smith (1971) 
emphasizes the importance of the consumer in creating the demand for illicit products 
and services, providing the business entrepreneur opportunities for supply. Regulatory 
mechanisms are the ways in which the illicit enterprise regulates the task environment 
in which it is situated. With reference to the unique features of illicit task 
environments, Smith (1971) examines the function of violence and corruption as 
techniques of regulation. As the illicit enterprise operates outside the law, formal 
regulatory mechanisms (such as contracts with customers) or dispute resolution 
methods are not available. Instead, violence and corruption are employed to regulate 
the task environment in lieu of legal mechanisms. Smith’s (1971) discussion of 
violence is akin to Albini’s (1971) argument that violence is a method of control in an 
illegal milieu. However, Smith (1971) is more explicit in arguing it is the nature of the 
task environment in which illicit enterprise operates that propagates both violence and 
corruption. Yet again, power, control and corruption are important elements of 
organized crime.  
 
Mark Haller commenced his career as a historian at the University of Chicago, 
where he was offered an opportunity to undertake a study on crime and criminal 
justice in Chicago in the 1920s. From this introduction into the history of crime in 
Chicago, Haller became interested in illegal enterprise, and continued this study at the 
Departments of History and Criminal Justice at Temple University in Philadelphia 
(Yeager, 2012). Across his career, Haller (1990; 1992) continued with Smith’s 
conceptual divide from Cressey’s model of organized crime, and extended the theory 
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of illicit enterprise (Haller preferred the term ‘illegal’ enterprise). However, unlike 
Smith, Haller explored the notion of decentralization of enterprise. The 
entrepreneurial partnership became Haller’s object of analysis. In contrast with 
Smith’s argument that illicit and licit enterprise operate in a fundamentally similar 
way, Haller (1992) argues that illicit enterprise is markedly less bureaucratic than 
what one observes within the legitimate sphere. It is through overlapping partnerships 
that entrepreneurs have achieved control over a range of illicit activities. Again, 
power and control feature as central elements in this understanding of organized 
crime. However instead of control over the organization, patron-client relationship, 
family or environment, it is power over the activity that is important for Haller.  
 
Haller (1990) outlines that it is the internal economics of enterprises that 
determine the degree of coordination, and subsequently the structure of enterprise. 
Structure is an important feature of Haller’s theory and his assumption is that the 
nature of the activity determines the structure of organized crime. Haller (1990) 
contrasts two examples to illustrate this argument: that of the chain of supply of illicit 
products, and that of illegal gambling. Haller explains that entrepreneurs involved in 
the sale of illicit products generally operate on three different levels: manufacture, 
wholesale and distribution to consumers. Each level of operation requires 
specialization, and each level must coordinate both within and between other levels 
throughout the chain of supply. Conversely, illegal gambling operations often involve 
small groups, where independent entrepreneurs assume a collective in order to 
mitigate the economic risk of paying out winnings (that any individual would not be 
able to return alone). Haller cautions that although these types of groups do indeed 
require a high level of coordination, centralized bureaucracy should not be assumed. 
 
Smith (1971; 1980) argues for the importance of the interdependency of the illicit 
task environment and the enterprise, and how this differentiates from the task 
environment of legitimate enterprise. Haller (1990; 1992) argues it is important to 
examine the internal economic conditions of enterprise activities, as this will 
determine the degree of coordination between entrepreneurial partnerships and 
criminal collectives, and the way these are structured. There are similarities between 
Haller’s (1990; 1992) entrepreneurial partnership and Albini’s (1971) patron-client 
relationship as both describe the existence of decentralized syndicates. Further 
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similarities include the importance of power, the exercise of control through violence 
and corruption, and occupation with structure. 
 
DISORGANIZED CRIME 
With a PhD in Economics from Yale University, Peter Reuter founded RAND’s (a 
public policy research organization) Drug Policy Research Centre and was its 
Director from 1989 to 1993. Reuter is now a Senior Economist at RAND, Professor in 
the School of Public Affairs and the Department of Criminology, and Director of the 
Program on the Economics of Crime and Justice Policy at the University of Maryland 
(University of Maryland, 2014). At the outset of his impressive career, Reuter (1983) 
redirected criminological knowledge and the study of organized crime with the 
publication of Disorganized Crime. Reuter (1983) differed from his predecessors, as 
his focus was the economic conditions of the illicit market, not the criminal 
bureaucracy, syndicate, family, enterprise or entrepreneurial partnership. Reuter’s 
earliest works scrutinized the notion of monopoly power and control over illicit 
markets while tentatively exploring the fluid, fragmented and competitive nature of 
the illicit market, setting the stage for what was to follow (see: Reuter & Rubinstein, 
1978). Reuter (1983) claims that his study of three illicit markets (bookmaking, 
numbers and loan sharking, i.e. illegal gambling and lending) provides evidence 
against Cressey’s depiction of organized crime as a centralized monopoly. Influenced 
by economic theories emerging at that time, Reuter pioneered a new empirical 
tradition within the organized crime literature (see: Bouchard & Wilkins, 2010). 
Indeed, the articulation of Reuter’s (1983, 1985) model of organized crime coincided 
with an increased focus on neoliberal markets based on neoclassical economic 
principles such as supply and demand4. 
 
 Reuter (1983; 1985) applied theories of industrial organization to examine the 
consequences of product illegality in structuring the illicit market. Here, there are 
links between Smith’s examinations of the task environment in which illicit enterprise 
operates. Differences exist in Reuter’s explanation of ‘invisible hand’ mechanisms. 
                                                        
4 Note: Neoliberalism refers to the ideology that underpins economic policies based on free-market 
principles including privatization, deregulation and free trade. The periodization of neoliberalism is 
typically placed at the acceptance of these economic theories in the 1970s or 1980s and because of its 
association with the ‘New Right’ conservative policies of Margret Thatcher (which is also known as 
‘Thatcherism’) (see for example: McQueen, 1994 who discusses the neo-liberal philosophy of the 
‘New Right’). 
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Invisible hand mechanisms consist of numerous economic variables. Those examined 
by Reuter include cost and demand curves, employment, credit, regulation, customer, 
geographic scope, and diversification. Reuter argues it is these numerous and 
interdependent factors that influence the conditions of the market. Reuter (1983, pp. 
130-131) argues the forces of the invisible hand have resulted in “illegal markets 
being served by localized, fragmented, ephemeral, and undiversified enterprises,” 
with the consequence that the market is disorganized. Power does not rest with the 
individual nor the organization, but rather with the market. 
 
Reuter (1983; 1985) compares the invisible hand market mechanisms to the 
visible hand mechanism of violence. Reuter (1983; 1985) argues violence is pursued 
for economic reasons, such as eliminating market competition, in an attempt to secure 
control of the market. This is similar to assertions made by Albini and Smith, as 
violence is a means to extend power and control. However, Reuter differs by 
cautioning there are numerous constraints and associated economic costs on the use of 
violence, such as increased risk of police attention. It is for these reasons Reuter 
asserts the use of violence to assume control is uncommon. Reuter’s (1983) model is 
founded in his assumption that economic mechanisms regulate both the illicit market 
and visible hand apparatus such as competitive violence. For Reuter (1983, p. 2) 
ultimately “the invisible hand is victorious.” The economic conditions of the market 
dictate the structure (or lack thereof) and activities of market participants. 
 
Reuter’s (1983; 1985) object of analysis is illicit market mechanisms and his 
stance refutes any notion of monopolization over the market. However, Reuter (1983; 
1985) does acknowledge the ‘Mafia’ in New York provides dispute resolution 
services. That is, the Mafia acts as an arbitration body extending social control over 
individuals participating in illicit markets. Like Cressey’s model, an Italian 
organization is constructed as wielding power over participants, albeit for Reuter it is 
market participants as opposed to Cressey’s organizational participants. Reuter (1983; 
1985) discusses that this presence was necessary as a result of legal arbitration 
services not being available in the illicit market, which also enables links to be drawn 
with Albini and Smith and their suppositions relating to illicit environment control.  
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CRIMINAL NETWORKS 
Following from this, the next major model of organized crime was borne out of the 
application of social network theory. This approach is founded in the view that 
interdependent relationships between individuals form the foundation of any 
organized crime activity (McIllwain, 1999; Borgatti, Mehra, Brass & Labianca, 2009). 
Differing from previous understandings of the phenomenon, the criminal network 
perspective does not presuppose what structure these relationships may form but 
instead aims to identify, examine and explain structure. Criminal networks have been 
identified in both centralized (Natarajan, 2000) and decentralized (Natarajan, 2006; 
Morselli, 2008) forms. According to this perspective, network structures can consist 
of individual actors or hierarchies that are integrated into a larger network structure 
(Morselli, 2008). Through techniques of social network analysis the degree of 
centralization of both the network, and individual actors within the network can be 
examined empirically (see: Freeman, 1978/1979 for complete discussion of centrality 
measures). Coinciding with the emergence of the preeminence of the internet in an 
ever more interconnected and networked information age, the network perspective has 
been used to examine a range of criminological phenomena including corporate crime 
(Baker & Faulkner, 1993), organized crime (Morselli, 2001; 2003; 2005; 2008; 2009; 
Morselli & Giguere, 2006; Morselli, Giguere & Petit, 2007; Morselli & Petit, 2007; 
Morselli & Roy, 2008; Cockbain, Brayley & Laycock, 2011; Kenney, 2007a; Klerks, 
2001) and terrorism (Krebs, 2002; Harris-Hogan, 2013; see also: Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
1996; 2001).  
 
Carlo Morselli, Assistant Professor at the School of Criminology at the 
University of Montreal, is a prominent author in the application of social network 
theory to organized crime (University of Montreal, 2014). In his book Inside Criminal 
Networks Morselli (2008) details a series of case studies and concludes criminal 
networks are less centralized than what is commonly portrayed. Instead, Morselli 
(2008) articulates a flexible order thesis that maintains it is the interactions between 
participants that aggregate to form a flexible-order context characterized by shared 
interests and benefits. In direct conflict to previous assertions of top-down command, 
this flexible-order is not orchestrated by an overarching bureaucratic organization, but 
rather emerges from bottom-up interactions generating self-organization of the 
network. Morselli (2008, p. 11) summarizes “the network is a self-organizing 
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structure that is essentially driven by the emergent behavior of its parts.” While the 
flexible order thesis presents a reversal of previously espoused models, this 
perspective underscores that an understanding of the structure of the network is vital 
to understanding the phenomenon of organized crime.  
 
‘GLOCAL’ CRIME 
Finckenauer (2005, p. 81), amongst many others, has claimed “transnational 
organized crime, on a large scale, is the new reality.” The rise of globalization has 
resulted in a new conception of ‘transnational organized crime.’ This perspective 
assumes that changes in the now global economy have “greatly benefited the criminal 
underworld” as transnational crime groups are able to capitalize on cross-border trade 
and new opportunities (Viano, Magallanes, Bridel, 2003, p. 3). Authors argue the 
extension of markets on a global scale has increased opportunities for criminals 
involved in activities such as narcotics, human trafficking and money laundering 
(Williams & Savona, 1996; Gregory, 1998). Moreover, transnational organized crime 
represents a significant threat as it escapes the reach of any sovereign state, with 
profits allegedly feeding directly into terrorism (Levi, 2007). Direct connections can 
be identified with Cressey’s declaration of ‘theft of the nation’ and links to national, 
and now international, security (I return to this theme in the following chapter).  
 
The notion of transnational organized crime has been criticized for two main 
reasons. This is because the transnational groups are identified with certain ethnic 
aliens (Italian, Russian, Asian etc) portrayed as the cause for the organized crime 
problem, as opposed to local demands (Edwards & Gill, 2002a; Hobbs, 1998a). 
Writing from a British perspective, Hobbs (1998a) argues that this enables British 
society to avoid responsibility for its own crime problem, and writing from an 
American perspective Woodiwiss (2003a; 2003b) expresses similar sentiments. For 
these authors, it is the local demands that fuel the market for organized crime and it is 
clear that this is similar to Reuter’s economic perspective, although the focus here is 
made at a local level in an attempt to dispel the notion of transnational organized 
crime. 
 
Hobbs (1998a; 1998b) is skeptical of any notions of crime that hold 
connotations of globalization and instead argues for the concept of localization. 
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Hobbs assumes that relational connections between individuals form the basis for 
organized crime. Following from this, Hobbs (1998b, p. 143) argues that crime cannot 
be “experienced globally or transnationally, for these are essentially fields devoid of 
relations.” It is the overlapping networks of locally based relations that give rise to 
crime on an international scale. Here it is clear that Hobbs develops an explanation 
similar to the ideas that were espoused under the network perspective. Hobbs (1998a, 
p. 412) elaborates that achievement on an international level is very much contingent 
on the “structural dynamics of a local class milieu that is realigned in negotiation with 
global markets.” In this statement Hobbs (1998a; 1998b) returns to ideas described 
under Reuter’s market approach. However, where Hobbs (1998a; 1998b) differs is the 
emphasis on the links between global and local levels, what Hobbs (1998a) coins the 
‘glocal.’ Hobbs later seeks empirical evidence to support this argument by completing 
case study research of a middle market drug broker (Pearson & Hobbs, 2003). 
Pearson and Hobbs (2003) identified local relationships between participants, while 
noting that the drug trafficking operations extended internationally. Although there is 
a degree of vertical structure drug markets are not organized in a rigid hierarchical 
manner and instead there is “horizontal complexity” across the different levels 
(Pearson and Hobbs, 2003, p. 16).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Successive literatures have constructed the problem of organized crime in a variety of 
ways. The earliest theorists examined the phenomenon through an ethnic Italian 
migrant lens, with a focus on criminal organizations (Cressey, 1967; 1969; 1972), 
criminal syndicates (Albini, 1971) and criminal families (Ianni, 1972). Theorists then 
shifted to a focus on forms of illicit enterprise or entrepreneurial partnership (Smith, 
1971; 1980; Haller, 1990; 1992) and the illicit market (Reuter, 1983; 1985). 
Thereafter, the network perspective reversed ideas about structure from rigid top-
down structures to flexible bottom-up interactions (Morselli, 2005; 2008). There are 
three distinct phases in the development of criminological knowledge of organized 
crime, and these are temporal (i.e. 1960-70, 1980-90, post-2000), not merely 
conceptual. 
 
There has been a range of different lenses through which the phenomenon of 
organized crime has been examined in criminological thought which are dependent 
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upon the contextualized assumptions regarding the primary object of analysis. The 
intellectual climate at the time of articulation of each model (such as organizational 
and economic theory) has also directed the language authors have used to construct 
the phenomenon. There have been multiple ‘scientific truths’ about the phenomenon 
of organized crime and these ‘truths’ are contingent. This lends support for the idea 
that organized crime is a social construct because the meaning of organized crime is 
contextually dependent. In their work tracing the development of the concept of 
transnational organized crime, van Duyne and Neleman (2012) examine the role of 
the ‘scientific’ community in creating and legitimating the construction of the social 
problem. van Duyne and Nelemans’ (2012, p. 47) argue that “criminology 
wholeheartedly embraced the ‘organized crime’ concept… by assuming as true what 
still had to be proven.” van Duyne and Nelemans (2012, p. 47) criticize “the 
shallowness of theory building” in criminological thought about organized crime, 
arguing that “the conceptual construction [of organized crime] was only shallowly 
analyzed (if at all).” Further, van Duyne and Nelemans (2012, p. 47) argue that 
organized crime theorists do not challenge the definition of organized crime that is 
used by authorities “while taking the associated threat image as a given.”  
 
With each new theorist proposing their own ‘truth’ of organized crime within 
academic discourse, this chapter has shown the way in which the social scientific 
discipline of criminology operates as a regime of truth (Foucault, 1972/1969; 1977; 
1980). The discipline of criminology exercises power through its authority as a 
‘science’ and its authority over the ‘scientific truth’ of organized crime. The following 
chapter takes this as a point of departure and looks at the way in which social, 
political, moral and bureaucratic understandings of this phenomenon have emerged in 
recent Australian history.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME 
INTRODUCTION 
The hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is that multiple ways of understanding 
organized crime have emerged overtime, and that these are situated within social-
political discourses on crime and security. I show that ways of knowing about 
organized crime have been influenced by the social and political context. The primary 
interview data indicate four key discourses of organized crime have emerged in an 
Australian context.  
 
These are:  
1. The politics of law and order 
2. Securitization and the war on organized crime 
3. New public management in policing business 
4. The forging of outlaw identities 
 
The figure presented below is one possible way to visually depict the relationship 
between the discourses. The discourses are at times competing and antagonistic. At 
other times they overlap. In the centre, where the discourses converge, the official 
policy problem of organized crime is born.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between the four discourses of organized crime 
New Public  
Management 
Outlaw Identities 
 
Law and Order 
Securitization  
and War 
 53 
THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER 
This section examines organized crime as an object of political discourse drawing 
from David Garland’s (2001) treatise on The Culture of Control and the ideas of 
leading Australian criminologists Russell Hogg and David Brown (1998) and Don 
Weatherburn (2004). Characteristics of the contemporary political discourse include 
the state’s ‘tough on crime’ crime control agenda and the political capital provided by 
criminal justice as an area for governance. Garland (2001) traces the social, economic 
and cultural conditions of late modernity in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the 
United States of America (U.S.) demonstrating that crime policies are founded in a 
new-shared experience of crime and insecurity. Garland (2001) terms this the crime 
complex of late modernity. Garland (2001, p. 163) argues that this cultural formation 
is defined by a collection of attitudes, beliefs and assumptions, including the 
following: 
 
i. “high crime rates regarded as a normal social fact, 
ii. emotional investments in crime as widespread and intense, encompassing 
elements of fascination as well as fear, anger and resentment, 
iii. crime issues are politicized and regularly represented in emotive terms 
iv. concern about victims and public safety dominate public policy 
v. the criminal justice state is viewed as inadequate and ineffective 
vi. private, defensive routines are widespread and there is a large market in 
private security 
vii. a crime consciousness is institutionalized in the media, popular culture 
and the built environment” 
 
Garland (2001, p. 142) argues that these conditions have led to a new 
punitiveness: the rhetoric of severe crime control policies and a ‘law and order’ 
platform are a cultural response to the crime complex of late modernity. Garland 
(2001, p. 164; 142) terms this “punitive segregation” arguing this is a form of 
“expressive justice” characterized by ‘tough on crime’ policies that enable the state to 
attest to its ability to control crime. Cohen (1996), also writing from a British 
perspective, comments on the politicization of crime in contemporary times. That is, 
crime has become an object of the political discourse. Cohen (1996, p. 8) draws a 
distinction between the level of crime or risk of becoming a victim of crime, public 
perceptions of crime and “the rhetorical manipulation of the crime problem and public 
anxiety in media and political discourse.”  
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At the same time as an increasingly punitive stance towards crime, Garland (2001) 
notes there is a contradiction in the implementation of preventative partnerships, 
where state and non-state actors coordinate efforts to prevent crime.  Garland (1996) 
explains the coexistence of such contradictory crime control strategies (i.e. punitive 
segregation and preventative partnerships) by examining the notion that the state 
maintains sovereign crime control. Garland (1996) argues that state’s sovereignty 
over crime control has been challenged and therefore governments must either 
succeed in their claims to be able to control crime and be the primary source of 
security in contemporary society, or withdraw them. Garland (1996) elaborates that 
this has led to the two contradictory discourses about crime control: the coexistence of 
political strategies of punitive segregation and preventative partnerships. Hence, as 
Garland (2000, p. 348, emphasis in original) summarizes in a later article, currently 
there are two streams of governmental response to crime: “an adaptive strategy 
stressing prevention and partnership and a sovereign state strategy stressing enhanced 
control and expressive punishment.” 
 
Although Garland’s (1996; 2000; 2001) work is specific to the U.K. and the U.S., 
parallels can be drawn to the Australian political crime control climate. In relation to 
the Australian political climate, a number of authors point to the increasing political 
rhetoric of ‘law and order’ over the past two decades (see for example: Casey & Mohr, 
2005; Hogg & Brown, 1998; Hogg, 1999; 2008; Weatherburn, 2004). Leading 
criminologist and Director of the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research (BOCSAR) Don Weatherburn (2004) relays examples of punitive 
approaches to crime control in Australian governments. Weatherburn (2004) provides 
the specific example of the Western Australian government’s mandatory sentencing 
laws regarding vehicle theft as, at the time of their introduction, were being touted as 
the ‘toughest laws’ in the country. Weatherburn (2004) then shows that the car theft 
problem in Western Australia was not abated because of the mandatory sentencing 
laws, but because of the requirement for engine immobilizers to be installed in all 
registered vehicles. That is, a preventative strategy. Weatherburn’s (2004) example of 
the Western Australia’s ‘law and order’ platform towards car theft, and the 
subsequent implementation of the preventative strategy of immobilizers, provides 
evidence of Garland’s (1996; 2000; 2001) observation of the coexistence of 
contradictory discourses on crime control in contemporary Australian society.  
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TOUGH ON CRIME 
Organized crime as a target of a ‘tough on crime’ platform is evidenced in Australia’s 
legislative response. This is detailed at length in Chapter 5. Sufficient for the present 
argument, Weatherburn (2004, p. 31) offers the example of Australia’s asset 
confiscation regime arguing that “the political attraction of such laws is that they 
seem to strike at the heart of organized crime.” An Informant in this study made a 
similar statement about the Commonwealth Organized Crime Strategic Framework 
(COCSF): 
“The [Attorney-General’s Department’s] position is to construct a picture of 
organized crime, bring out the threats and the harms and show the logic and 
reasoning: this is the threat, it makes sense. Recognizing the political need to 
make tough statements, there are elements of the framework [COCSF] you can 
pull out and stand on the hustings. One example was the seizure of criminal 
funds, we can make statements on ‘aggressively attacking the proceeds of 
crime.’” 
         Informant 7 
 
In the statement made above, Informant 7 notes the process of constructing an 
image of organized crime with an emphasis on the associated threats to society. 
Informant 7 discusses the importance of making ‘tough on crime’ statements in 
relation to confiscating the proceeds of crime. The development of Australia’s anti-
money laundering, asset confiscation and unexplained wealth regime has been 
examined by a number of Australian scholars who tend to note the political rhetoric 
(i.e. ‘aggressively attacking the proceeds of crime’) and then subsequently question 
their efficacy in practice (see for example: Bartels, 2010a; 2010b; Ross & Hannan, 
2007-2008; Lusty, 2002; Freiburg & Fox, 2000a; 2000b; Freiburg, 1992).  
 
Freiburg and Fox (2000a, p. 48) conclude that the targets of forfeiture laws 
tend to be political as opposed to criminal: “forfeiture and attainder served to control 
or destroy ‘enemies’ of the state, rather than to incapacitate conventional criminals.” 
Freiburg and Fox (2000a) point to organized crime as the major target of the state 
because of the ‘threat’ it poses to social order. Freiburg (1992, p. 69) concludes on a 
similar note:  
“When a social object, like the elimination of organized crime or drug-
trafficking seems worthy enough, the pressure to create legislation that allow 
fewer rights to individuals is intense and often proves irresistible.”  
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According to O’Malley (1996, p. 197) the free and responsible individual as 
the pivotal point of neoliberalism has resulted in the “rejection of correctional and 
therapeutic programmes of criminal justice.” What this means is in this social-
political context, crime is not viewed as a result of some malady or social 
disadvantage, but instead is understood as the actions of rational actors following 
economic analyses (see: Cornish & Clarke, 1986; 2002). In this way, the rational 
actor at the heart of neoliberalism can help explain the punitive turns in political 
discourse. Instead of rehabilitation or social (re)programming, it could be suggested 
the state has adopted a punitive stance because criminals are viewed as rational and 
responsible for their offending. In O’Malley’s (1996) examination of the rise of the 
neo-liberal risk society, it becomes evident that there are two contradictory discourses 
of crime control: one that stresses punitiveness because individuals are rational and 
choose to commit crime, and the other that stresses crime prevention because 
individuals, and in particular potential victims, are responsible for themselves (on the 
risk society, see: Beck, 1992). Connections are evident between the arguments made 
by Garland (2001) in relation to his examination of the crime complex of late 
modernity as discussed immediately above.  
 
This can also be related to points made by Simon (2007) in his book 
Governing Through Crime. In reference to Garland’s (2001) crime complex, Simon 
(2007, p. 23) discusses the emergence of a new world order that “stresses personal 
responsibility… with a harshly enforced, highly moralistic criminal law promising 
almost total protection against crime.” Simon (2007, p. 25) considers this a 
consequence of neo-liberalism (in the U.S.) and terms this “new deal governance.” 
Simon (2007, p. 25) argues that new deal governance occurred in response to “a crisis 
of the New Deal political order, both politically and in its capacity to exercise power 
effectively.” There was a shift towards governing crime in order to: 
“Redefine the style and ambitions of government, [and] political leaders were 
able to take advantage of existing cultural preference in America for political 
narratives emphasizing personal responsibility and will over social context 
and structural constraints on freedom.”  
 
Therefore, Simon (2007, p. 25) argues that crime problem was at the same time the 
solution to the crisis of the New Deal political order.  
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Hogg (2008, p. 281) also points to the “changing character of the political 
order and the place of law and order within it.” In a similar vein to Garland’s (2001) 
argument that punitive approaches enable the state to attest to its ability to control 
crime, Hogg (2008, p. 281) argues that “tough measures are seen to be necessary to 
‘restore public confidence’ in government, law and the criminal justice system” 
(Hogg, 2008, p. 281). Hogg (2008, p. 281) discusses that crime and punitive 
responses to crime have become increasingly more important in the “governing 
practices and legitimacy of liberal democratic states” and also points out that this has 
coincided with the “erosion of social democratic values and institutions.” With these 
thoughts in mind, let’s now turn to what the Informants in this study said about 
organized crime as an object of contemporary political discourse.  
 
THREATS TO SOCIAL ORDER 
Characterizations of Garland’s (2001) crime complex of late modernity, particularly 
emotional investments in the problem of organized crime and the politicization of 
organized crime are clearly present in Australia’s political discourse. In my study it 
was also observed that senior police, not just politicians, depict organized crime as an 
existential threat to social order: 
“I found something I was reading just the other day. It’s just a speech by 
Karen Harfield, one of the Executive Directors of the Australian Crime 
Commission. This was a speech she gave about organized crime as a national 
security threat and the relationship between enforcement agencies and the 
national security community. And it’s full of statements like, ‘organized crime 
has the potential to undermine the very fabric of Australian society.’ Now, I 
mean, that’s pretty serious. You know, ‘exploitation of our infrastructure and 
systems on a national scale, could result in the undoing of our social cohesion.’ 
And it’s just full of this sort of stuff.” 
        Informant 2 
The exact excerpt from Karen Harfield’s (2012) speech (referred to above) is: 
“Organized crime has the potential to undermine the very fabric of Australian 
society.  Exploitation of our infrastructure and systems, on a national scale, 
could result in the undoing of our social cohesion.” 
 
The statement is hyperbolic, and can be directly related to Garland’s (2001) 
characterization of the crime control complex of late modernity: there is extreme 
concern for public safety, social order and the “very fabric of Australian society.” The 
Informant further elaborated on the tensions within the political discourse about the 
state’s ability to eliminate organized crime from society, a point that folds neatly into 
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Garland’s (2001) theory about punitive rhetoric as a technique for the state to express 
its ability to control crime: 
“I’m not sure that it’s [organized crime] actually more difficult to control than 
any other form of…[crime]. I mean crime is difficult to control. Well, in a 
sense, we have kind of stopped talking about eliminating crime from our 
society. But we still talk as though we can eliminate organized crime. So, it’s 
not, you know, polite company, you don’t say we just accept a certain amount 
of crime as being the consequence of the way that we organize our society and 
do business and all that sort of thing because that’s not proper...You know, the 
government could never say that. But that is the reality. I mean you could have 
much lower levels of crime with much higher levels of repression.” 
        Informant 2 
 
The discourse centers on the state’s ability to eliminate organized crime from 
society. Informant 2 states that the state cannot concede to the statement that crime is 
a consequence of the way in which society is organized because this would 
demonstrate that the state is unable to control crime. The Informant then elaborates 
that this is why analogies are drawn between organized crime and a range of evils, for 
example cancer: 
“So, and that’s why you get analogies about evil and cancer and all that sort 
of thing. I mean they are emotional labels. They generate emotional responses. 
And they’re really good for speeches and politics and that sort of thing. But 
they are actually partly designed to avoid people looking seriously at 
alternative policy.” 
        Informant 2 
 
These are points also made by Sheptycki (2003a, p. 127) who highlights that 
transnational organized crime is “figuratively linked with infection and disease” or 
that “organized crime is a cancer to be cut from the social body.” The implication of 
this is that organized crime can be “excised from the social body” (Sheptycki, 2003a, 
p. 127). As Informant 2 suggests these labels generate an emotional response that is 
good for political speeches. At the same time, this technique directs the policy options 
to punitive policies based on criminalization and policing (Chapter 5). Informant 2 
continues by discussing why a punitive stance is favorable to taking a longer-term 
more strategic policy focus: 
“I can see why it’s attractive to try to simplify things or to take a moralistic 
stance. Particularly for action-oriented people, particularly for politicians 
who need to sell solutions, but there are more compelling reasons to try to 
grapple with the complexities involved and think about things analytically and 
think about things long term and strategically, but unfortunately these are all 
big ‘no, no’s’ in terms of making and setting policy for complex, politically 
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charged issues. Instead, you just get an operational focus which gives 
immediate results of some sort and deliverables and announcables.” 
        Informant 2 
 
There is a clear understanding that politicians need to be able to deliver and 
announce results. Informant 2 claims politicians need to be active and to show they 
are tough on crime, and this leads to an operational focus because it provides results. 
These data fold in with Garland’s (2001, p. 191) argument that a ‘tough on crime’ 
approach to crime control is:  
“Very much a political process… governed not by any criminological logic 
but instead by the conflicting interests of political actors and by the exigencies, 
political calculations and short-term interests that provide their motivations.” 
 
Hogg (2008, p. 281) argues that social anxieties, and especially those 
concerning crime, have become an “increasingly important currency of political 
power.” According to Hogg (2008, p. 281) in times of social insecurity these fears 
“are tapped, or frequently stirred, and political remedies and reassurance is then 
offered.” Hogg (2008, p. 281) discusses that the remedies offered in the political 
discourse are  “often in the form of tough, symbolical doses of punitiveness.” For 
example, Hogg and Brown (1998, pp. 99-100) discuss commonsense depictions of 
organized crime: 
“May serve a limited purpose in provoking public interest and concern, but 
ultimately it distorts public debate and invites simplistic solutions…Organized 
crime is depicted as a conspiracy against society, another case of the criminal 
outsider and alien intruder. This conveniently overlooks the many factors 
within particular societies and settings, such as the demand for particular 
illicit goods and services, that sustain ‘organized crime.’” 
 
Another Informant reflected on these sort of political plays: 
“We cannot say organized crime will be eliminated from society, it is the same 
as drugs, at a political level they hate, really hate, this term: ‘harm-
minimization,’ minimize, it means to accept and we want to take a hard 
stance… it is political, like Howard, like the ‘war on drugs.’ Howard used the 
expression ‘tough on drugs’ because ‘war on drugs’ was too American.” 
        Informant 7 
 
Informant 7 notes that it is not palatable for politicians to admit that it is not 
possible to eliminate crime, or drugs, from society because this means acceptance of 
their inability to control crime. Politically it is better to take a hard stance. Informant 7 
recognizes the state’s need to attest to its ability to control crime and touches upon the 
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conflicting policies of harm minimization and ‘tough on drugs’ in Australia’s history 
to make this point. Bronitt and McSherry (2010) note that between the years of 1985 
and 1997 Australia’s drug policy favored a ‘harm minimization’ approach where the 
main principle underlying drug laws was to minimize the harms of drug use, which 
included those associated with criminalization. Bammer, Hall, Hamilton and Ali 
(2002) outline the different meanings and strategies of harm minimization, including 
providing access to drug injecting paraphernalia and supervised injecting rooms, 
education campaigns, and the diversion of drug users from the criminal justice system 
into treatment programs (i.e. the methadone program). Under harm minimization, the 
drug user is an object of the discourse of public health instead of the object of the 
discourse of criminal law (Bessant, 2008).  
 
The year 1997 was a watershed moment. The Australian government, under 
the leadership of former Prime Minister John Howard, introduced the National Illicit 
Drugs Strategy (NIDS) also known as the ‘tough on drugs’ strategy where support for 
harm minimization approaches to drug policy were challenged by a criminalization 
and enforcement focused approach (see: Attorney-General’s Department, 2001; 
Bronitt & McSherry, 2010; Bammer et al., 2002; Weatherburn & Lind, 1999; James 
& Sutton, 1999-2000; Bessant, 2008). Bammer et al. (2002, p. 87) note that the 
federal government blocked trials of supervised injecting rooms and instead 
“allocated more than Australian $500 million to education, treatment, and law 
enforcement to address the high rates of opioid overdose deaths.” Bammer et al. 
(2002, p. 88) state that the national policy on drug use employs “the rhetoric of ‘tough 
on drugs’ to cover a strong budgetary emphasis on law enforcement and interdiction.” 
What this means is that Australia’s political stance towards drug policy was 
characterized by the tension highlighted by Garland (2001) in the coexistence of 
contradictory polices in the political discourse of law and order. 
 
Informant 3 confirmed that laws, policies and the funding of policing agencies 
occurs as a result of politically charged electoral issues, such as terrorism, heroin 
overdoses and the arrival of asylum seekers. These issues become the subject of 
political campaigns during elections: 
“The resourcing has opened up exponentially.  9/11 had a great deal to do 
with this but it was actually evolving even before 9/11. The really big money 
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came after 9/11 but there was some new money coming in. But the reason for 
that is two-fold. Both reasons are political.  Firstly, the heroin deaths became 
a major political issue as one can imagine. People’s sons and daughters were 
dying. And secondly, people smuggling, under The Coalition, became a major 
issue and that’s when the boats started to come, and so I remember boats 
started to appear, one off Wollongong and one off Cairns, and this was a 
major electoral issue, when boats, people start to walk down the street of 
Cairns in shiny suits, fresh off boats, you know, that’s a major Queensland 
electoral issue.  So it became a major issue for the Howard government and 
further resources were put into it. That’s when the whole-of-government 
approach really got under way. It wasn’t with 9/11 it was with people 
smuggling. All of this was in evolution, and in place before 9/11.  Of course 
once 9/11 came along it was ramped up enormously.” 
         Informant 3 
 
As described by Informant 3 in the statement above the two highly politicized 
issues of heroin overdoses and the arrival of asylum seekers both tied into the issue of 
organized crime (through drug trafficking and people smuggling respectively). These 
issues, predating the events of 9/11, resulted in the increased funding of the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) and a whole-of-government response (discussed further in 
Chapter 5). As the Informant explains, these two issues were key electoral issues for 
former Prime Minister John Howard (regarding drugs see: discussion above; on issue 
of asylum seekers see: Betts, 2002; Gale, 2004; McAllister, 2003; McCulloch, 2004). 
Prime Minister Howard adopted a punitive zero-tolerance platform, on both the 
electoral issues of drugs and asylum seekers, and in doing so enjoyed increasingly 
favorable polls leading to eventual victory at 2001 election (Gale, 2004). This can 
also be related to a point made by Roach (2011) who discusses Australia’s ‘hyper’ 
legislative approach to terrorism following 9/11. Roach (2011, p. 310) notes 
“terrorism was a winning political issue for the Howard government when it was re-
elected in both 2001 and 2004.” 
 
Sheptycki (2003a, p. 128) also discusses the issue of migration and argues “it 
would be naïve to deny that there are those who seek to profit from human misery.” 
This can also be related to the issue of heroin overdose in that someone profits from 
the sale of the substance to the user. However, and as discussed by Sheptycki (2003a, 
p. 128) “immigration pressures from war-torn and immiserated regions are described 
in the language of criminal responsibility.” Similarly McCulloch (2004, p. 91) argues 
that the issue of asylum seekers (a humanitarian issue) was transformed into an issue 
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of “security politics [which] are an intensified version of law and order politics.” A 
‘tough on borders’ stance was adopted, coupling the issue of asylum seekers with 
terrorism and border security and national sovereignty (McCulloch, 2004). That is, 
the government had to attest to its ability to control Australia’s borders. This is 
epitomized in the statement John Howard (2001) made during his election speech: 
“we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.”  
 
AGAINST THE TIDE: PREVENTATIVE PARTNERSHIPS 
At the 2013 International Serious and Organized Crime Conference (ISOC),5 the then 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) Mr. John 
Lawler gave a keynote address about the importance of preventative partnerships (or 
perhaps was paying lip service to prevention). Some of the most telling statements 
from this address are presented below. The first concerns the difficulties involved in 
politically ‘selling’ prevention in comparison to making arrests and seizing criminal 
proceeds and drugs (key performance indicators are discussed later in this chapter). 
The second statement, which enables links to be made to Garland’s (2001) treatise, 
emphasizes the combination of the adaptive strategy of prevention and the punitive 
sovereign state strategy: 
“Added to this problem is the fact that prevention does not sell. How do you 
measure something that you prevented, compared with the number of people 
arrested or prosecuted the drugs and money seized?” 
 
“What is clear, is that all of the intelligence, all of the evidence, and all of the 
facts point to prevention and disruption of serious and organized criminals 
will only come with a two pronged attack—criminal justice responses 
combined with disruption or prevention activities.” 
 
 Here, what Garland (2000) terms the adaptive strategy of crime control is 
manifest: the focus on prevention in combating organized crime. Lawler (2013) notes 
the difficulties in publically ‘selling’ the preventative approach in comparison to the 
punitive segregation platform. At the conclusion of the address Lawler (2013) points 
to the coexistence of the two contradictory discourses of crime control: the two 
pronged strategy of criminal justice responses and prevention. 
 
                                                        
5 ISOC is a practitioner conference jointly hosted by the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the 
Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC). 
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An increasing focus on approaches to prevent organized crime is evident in the 
academic literature. For example, von Lampe (2011) examines the application of the 
framework of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) to organized crime. von Lampe 
(2011) highlights assumed differences between ‘non-organized crime’ and ‘organized 
crime’ (for example, extension over time, geography and the resourcefulness of 
‘organized offenders’), arguing that there needs to be modifications in the framework 
of SCP before it can be adapted to organized crime. von Lampe (2011, p. 158) argues 
that SCP cannot be “universally applied” and that further consideration of the social 
context needs to be incorporated into this framework. As alternatives to law 
enforcement (and further evidence of the co-existence of contradictory crime control 
strategies in discourses of crime control), examples of preventative responses to 
organized crime, including administrative approaches (Ayling 2013b; 2014) are 
discussed further in Chapter 5. 
 
Consistent with Garland’s assessment of the crime complex of late modernity, 
organized crime has emerged as an object of the discourse of ‘law and order’ in an 
Australian political context. This includes the political need to express a ‘tough on 
crime’ platform, showing that the state can control crime. Organized crime, as an 
object of the discourse of law and order, is depicted as a significant, even existential, 
threat to social order. The problem is politicized and there are emotional investments 
in the problem. There is evidence of the coexistence of the contradictory crime 
control strategies of the sovereign state strategy of punitive segregation and the 
adaptive strategy stressing prevention (Garland, 1996; 2000; 2001). 
 
SECURITIZATION AND THE ‘WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME’ 
The theoretical framework of ‘securitization’ (from the Copenhagen School of 
International Relations and Security Studies) represents, in essence, the application of 
a social constructionist critique to international security. Buzan (1997, p. 14), the 
main author writing from this perspective, explains that within this framework the 
task is not to assess objective threats, but rather to “understand the processes of 
constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered, and collectively 
responded to, as a threat.” Williams (2003) elaborates that “in securitization theory, 
security is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social 
process: the social construction of security issues” (Williams, 2003, p. 513). It is the 
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social, economic and political conditions that led to an issue being identified and 
established as a threat to security that are the main points of interest. While discussing 
the ideas and works of Buzan (1997), Loader and Walker (2007, p. 11) connect 
security with politics arguing that security can be understood as “a political practice, a 
speech act, one way of framing and naming problems.” 
 
According to Buzan (1997) securitization as a process involves “the 
intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects” (Buzan, 1997, p. 14). Once an issue is securitized, it 
enables significant action to be taken against the threat to security: “the securitizing 
formula is that such threats require exceptional measures and/or emergency action to 
deal with them” (Buzan, 1997, p. 14). Like crime in the discourse of law and order 
politics, security becomes a discursive technique of governance (Garland, 2001; 
Zedner, 2003; 2005; Simon, 2007; Loader & Walker, 2007). At the same time, 
security raises the stakes by elevating the problem, and in this case (transnational) 
organized crime “out of the realm of normal democratic politics, to claim that as an 
emergency it demands an urgent, even exceptional response.” (Loader & Walker, 
2007, p. 12). This exceptional response, as will be shown later in this section, is often 
framed in terms of ‘war’ which ultimately serves to blur the lines between criminal 
justice and military action.  
 
The framework of securitization directs analysts to an examination of how 
threats to security emerge (and transform overtime) and serve to legitimate 
(international) responses. It is for this reason that the framework of securitization, 
consistent with the paradigm of this research, represents the ideal framework to adopt 
when examining the emergence of organized crime in the discourse of international 
security. The interview data suggested there are a number of interrelated issues 
relevant to the chronology of the development of an international security agenda 
centered on organized crime (at the Asia-Pacific regional and global levels). This 
section examines how organized crime has emerged as an object of the discourse of 
international security since the end of the Cold War. 
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DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA 
During the Cold War, the focus of international security was the “ideological 
confrontations” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Buzan, 1991, p. 433). Buzan 
(1997, p. 6) writes that the Cold War was initially about a competition between “two 
mutually exclusive systems of political economy over the future of industrial society.” 
This was a broad view of security that encompassed ideological, social and economic 
factors. Buzan (1997, p. 6) elaborates, “this initially wide conception of security 
quickly narrowed down to a largely military focus under the pressure of a nuclear 
arms race.” In other words, there was a distinct shift in what was considered a threat 
to security at that time: from an ideological rivalry (i.e. capitalism versus 
communism) to a full blown nuclear challenge.  
 
Buzan (1991, p. 438) notes that during the Cold War the Western States  
“established a particularly rich international societal network of institutions and 
regimes” including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Group of Seven (G7). These 
institutions, later became active in the process of constituting the object of organized 
crime, as this section will show. 
 
The end of the Cold War, and the success of the Western liberal project, is 
cited by Buzan (1991; 1997) as a significant point of departure towards a wider global 
order of international security (i.e. beyond the existential threat of nuclear war the 
Cold War presented). Edwards and Gill (2002b, p. 245) also note that following the 
Cold War there has been a “reorientation of western security, intelligence and defence 
agencies towards crime control.” This is a point that was raised by Informant 5 who 
discussed the chronology of the development of an international security agenda: 
“We are dealing with a reality and we are dealing with the chronology of the 
development of a security agenda, which changed the basic security agenda 
which was there at the end of the Cold War. When national security just meant 
one thing and that is: you have got two sides with their finger next to the 
nuclear button trying to blast the buggery out of the other side. And so that 
was the only national security interest. That sort of existential threat between 
the two great power blocks and all the other neutrals and non-aligned states 
sitting in the middle and trying to play one against the other, trying to get 
deals for themselves, but that was the dynamics. And so it wasn’t until the 
early nineties and after the collapse of the Soviet Union and abandonment of 
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the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that these attitudes started to 
change, and started to look more broadly at what are the other issues that 
impact on the international stability and security that are not necessarily 
described as national security issues, but are nevertheless very important... 
But prior to that they’ve always been there but because you had these two 
elephants in the room of the existential threat problem that they were 
regarded as trivial.” 
 
Informant 5 
 
The above statement shows that during the Cold War the focus of the 
international security agenda was the possibility of nuclear war between the U.S. and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, the Soviet Union). The Informant 
notes it was not until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the 
threat of nuclear war subsided that new inter/national security issues were considered 
by the international community.  
 
Informant 5 further discussed the specific process of developing a 
transnational crime agenda at that time. The example provided by Informant 5 
specifically concerns the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP) in the 1990s. CSCAP is a division of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) (on the evolution of ASEAN as a security community see: Acharya, 
2001; on the securitization of transnational organized crime within ASEAN see: 
Emmers, 2003): 
“What we did, we had a big white board and I said right-o let’s start: ‘China 
what are the two or three most prominent transnational crime problems you 
have?’ And China came up with something like drug trafficking, capital 
flight–in other words the theft of their national treasury and moving it out of 
the country- and you know whatever else it was... We’d go from there to 
Canada: ‘What are your main problems?’ and they came up with two or three. 
And then we went right around the room including Australia, New Zealand 
and Russia and Malaysia and Thailand and the Philippines obviously. So it 
was reasonably representative. So over the day we went through that process 
and we identified 18 different crime types… So we were able to identify 18 
different types of crime and from that 18 we were able to pick out 5 or 6, 
which are obviously of broad regional concern. So that represented our first 
menu of work. So we then started to concentrate on two or three of those 
particular crime types, to try and develop a sort of policy response and 
certainly to encourage a greater exchange of information and ideas about 
those particular crime types.” 
         Informant 5 
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Aligned with the specific experiences of Informant 5, and at around the same 
time (1990s) as the development of the international treaty on transnational organized 
crime (discussed below), this statement provides insight into how the development of 
a specific security agenda- or ‘menu’ of threats to security- occurs in practice. States 
select the main issues that represent a threat to security and stability and through a 
process of negotiation eventual consensus is achieved about which issues should form 
the basis of the security agenda. The Informant stated that the main security issues 
confronting the Asia Pacific region identified at that time were drug trafficking, arms 
trafficking and terrorism. This then also raises questions about why some issues were, 
and conversely were not, identified as threats to security: 
“Because at the end of our discussions, that identified these 18 different crime 
types, I said to the group that it seemed to me that there were 2 issues that 
there weren’t raised in our discussion. The first issue was corruption, and the 
way of answering that question; you could have heard the hissing of teeth 
from Singapore to Sydney when I mentioned the word corruption… ‘We are 
not going there, that is an internal problem, so we are not going there’… The 
second thing that they didn’t mention that I drew attention to, and I did not 
use the right words –the words now would be sex trafficking or human 
trafficking- and I did not use the right words, I said something like 
international forced prostitution or something like that. And do you know what 
the response was? Again there was a sucking of teeth and all the macho men 
in the room… ‘So what?’ And really that was the response. ‘So what?’ The 
implication was: ‘Isn’t that what women are for?’  They didn’t quite put it as 
bluntly as that, but the response was definitely: ‘So what? It’s not a security 
problem.’” 
        Informant 5 
 
The way in which the ‘crime menu’ for this first phase, was developed was 
highly political and gendered. The Informant notes at that time (circa 1998) 
corruption was considered a domestic issue and human trafficking was not considered 
a security problem at all. This is noteworthy as Acharya (2001, p. 57) emphasizes “the 
single most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism is the doctrine of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of member states” and corruption is considered 
to be, as the Informant states, an internal issue. However, the issues of corruption and 
human trafficking now register as key international security issues, evidenced by the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (opened for signature 9th of 
December 2003, entered into force 14th of December 2005) and the protocol 
supplementing the UNCTOC specific to trafficking in persons, especially women and 
children (opened for signature 12th of December 2000, entered into force 29th of 
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September 2003). This demonstrates how threats to security emerge, transform and 
fluctuate overtime, lending further support for the framework of securitization. That is, 
security ‘threats’ are not objective conditions; they are intersubjective, contingent and 
extremely political. 
 
At the exact same time of the development of the CSCAP regional security 
agenda as described above, the process of the development of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC, the Palmero 
Convention) was under way. This, and the leadership of the U.S. in this process, is 
examined in the next section. 
 
U.S. LED CAMPAIGN: DRUGS, MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE UNCTOC  
The internationalization of crime control policies has been discussed by a number of 
scholars writing from the field of international relations, law and policing 
(Nadelmann, 1990; 1993; Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Scherrer, 2009a; 2009b). 
These authors focus on the important role that the U.S. played in the international 
sphere. While it is noted that the U.S. have played an important part in lobbying for 
international instruments against drugs (discussed below), it is stressed that the 
process of development of an international security agenda is more complex than 
attributing this solely to the lobbying efforts of the United States. With this point duly 
acknowledged, the influence of Western political power following the Cold War is 
credited as an important factor in the development of international criminal law 
(Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). It has been said that international prohibition regimes 
tend to reflect the economic, political and moral values of the dominant members in 
international society, particularly those of the United States and Europe (Nadelmann, 
1990; Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). Aligned with the points made by Buzan (1991), 
discussed immediately above, Nadelmann (1993, p. 475) argues that the “moral 
imperative of U.S. foreign policy” was anticommunism during the Cold War, and this 
then shifted to illicit drugs, organized crime and terrorism. Andreas, Bertram, 
Blachman and Sharpe (1991-1992, p. 106) also claim the fall of the Soviet Union 
caused a “fundamental reevaluation of U.S. security interests.” Sheptycki (2000. P. 
219) notes that following the Cold War “narco-diplomacy’ replaced anti-communism 
as the guiding rationale for security agencies around the world.” This point was 
extended by Woddiwiss (2003a; 2003b) who argues that a focus on transnational 
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organized crime explained the failure of the ‘war on drugs’ while justifying the 
existence of intelligence and security agencies in the post-Cold war era (this type of 
bureaucratic entrepreneurialism is discussed further below). Woodiwiss (2003a, p. 20) 
is worth quoting at length: 
“At the same time as the international war on drugs was being so 
comprehensively lost, American politicians, government officials, journalists 
and academics were seeking ways to reduce the world’s complexities to the 
same type of ‘good versus evil’ propositions that served so well during the 
Cold War itself. In the immediate post-Cold War era, intelligence and security 
agencies also needed to justify the high level of expenditure for their services. 
The menace of transnational or global organized crime not only helped 
explain away the failure in the drug war but was also as easy to 
communication as Containment.” 
 
Scherrer (2009a) examined the developmental trajectory of international 
security issues, specifically drug trafficking and money laundering. Scherrer (2009a) 
traced how these issues first emerged on the agenda of the G7 leading to the 
establishment of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Scherrer (2009a) argues 
that the G7 faced a series of crises in the post-Cold War era where its legitimacy was 
challenged. This is relevant to the points made by Buzan (1991) about the 
establishment of a network of international organizations. The international 
organizations (i.e. the G7) established during the Cold War became active in the 
constitution of organized crime as a security issue, after the threat of nuclear war had 
subsided. van Duyne and Nelemans (2012) make similar arguments in their 
examination of the transformation of the concept of transnational crime, to 
transnational organized crime.  
 
Scherrer (2009a) points to the 1989 Paris Summit as the first time that drug 
trafficking and money laundering appeared on the agenda of a G7 meeting, noting 
that at this meeting the G7 decided to target international crime as the new security 
issue of the post Cold-War era. Scherrer (2009a) notes that it was at the 1989 meeting 
that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established with the mandate to 
develop 40 recommendations of best practice to prevent and detect money laundering. 
Scherrer (2009a, p. 15) remarks “the inclusion of these two related issues- drug 
trafficking and the laundering of its proceeds- on the Seven’s [G7] agenda cannot be 
dissociated from the U.S. context of the time.” Scherrer (2009a, p. 15) states that 
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during the time (the late 1980s and early 1990s) “the ‘war on drugs’6 rhetoric was 
constructed in the United States, a war which, as a result of its [the United States] 
influence and ricochet effect, became international.” Scherrer (2009a, p. 17) stresses 
that it was not until the 1970s that the regulation of drugs began to adopt a “strictly 
security-based approach” while noting that this was “inspired by U.S. anti-drug 
policies.” Sheptycki (2000, p. 209) comments at that time “domestic American and 
international politics concerning the control of drugs were intertwined in complex 
ways.” Similarly, van Duyne and Nelemans (2012, p. 41) note that during the 
development of the problem of transnational organized crime in the international 
arena it was for the U.S. “satisfying that its stand on a tough drugs policy was 
maintained while its anti-money laundering policy became internationally accepted.” 
Woodiwiss (2003b, p. 25) agrees with these writers, stating, “U.S. influence was 
helping to ensure that most countries fell into step with an international prohibition-
based drug control regime.” This can be related to the timing of the tensions in 
Australia’s drug policies as they shifted from a harm minimization approach to a 
‘tough on drugs’ stance under the Howard Government, as discussed above. 
Informant 4 described this as: “The U.S. obsession with drugs – illicit drug trades, the 
war on drugs.” 
 
Informant 4 discussed the U.S. led campaign against drugs and money 
laundering and noted the crusade against money laundering was a technique to target 
drug trafficking. Informant 4 attests that a bias was clear in the focus on drug 
trafficking as a predicate offence to money laundering. This point shows international 
institutions (such as the FATF) as both constituting and being constituted by the 
object of organized crime within the discourse of international security:  
“The FATF was set up by the OECD to track and deter money laundering. It 
was really set up at the request of the U.S. The U.S. in the eighties was 
obsessed with following the money logic in illicit drugs... And to promote that 
they pushed this idea of financial intelligence and money laundering. The 
whole idea of money laundering was really a 1980s thing. This FATF was set 
up by the OECD. Which is basically the rich countries. They impose on the 
pain of sanctions, all of these things, which are mostly sensible: you must have 
a FIU [Financial Intelligence Unit], the FIU must do certain things: require 
banks and financial entities (that list has been growing over a number of 
years) to report suspicious transactions, the FIU must analyze and keep 
                                                        
6 On the goals, strategies and failures of the U.S. ‘war on drugs’ see further: Andreas, Bertram, 
Blachman and Sharpe (1991-1992); Sheptycki (2000); Woodiwiss (2003a; 2003b); Ayling (2005); 
Nadelmann (2007); Scherlen (2012). 
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statistics on these sorts of things, the law must criminalize money laundering, 
the act of money laundering, the law criminalizing money laundering must 
specify predicate offences. This is where the U.S. bias started, and while that 
has been watered down, things are improving. But initially, it was clear the 
objective was drug trafficking. Predicate offences (as they are called), lists for 
most countries starts with drug trafficking and then who cares about anything 
else?” 
Informant 4 
 
The remainder of Scherrer’s (2009a) analysis centres on how the G7/8 Lyon 
Expert Group (LEG), socialized norms about transnational organized crime through 
its recommendations and suggestions for best practice, including providing the 
impetus towards harmonization of international criminal law. Heads of State and 
Governments of the Member States of the G7/8 convened and tasked the LEG with 
the mandate to provide information about transnational organized crime and to assist 
in the design of a strategy to respond to the problem internationally (Scherrer, 2009a). 
Scherrer (2009a, p. 145) examined the role of the LEG on organized crime in the 
construction of the security issue of transnational organized crime (on the role of 
experts in a knowledge society see: Stehr, 1992, discussed further below). Scherrer 
(2009a) argues that due to the strategic position of the LEG, it was able to influence 
the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), during the negotiations leading up 
to the development of the UNCTOC and immediately prior to its entry into force in 
2003. For example, Scherrer (2009a) points to the important role played by the LEG 
in drafting the UNCTOC. According to Scherrer (2009a) the LEG drafted a common 
position on the UNCTOC based on proposals put forth by the U.S. delegation. 
Scherrer (2009a) highlights that all of the proposals7 appear in the final version of the 
UNCTOC. 
 
The records of the meetings and negotiations leading up to the UNCTOC are 
contained within the Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiations for the Elaboration of 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols thereto (2006). This document shows that the history and trajectory of 
                                                        
7 The proposals mentioned by Scherrer (2009a, p. 106) relate to the definition of organized crime 
adopted in the final convention (i.e. focused on criminal activities rather than “serious crimes”), the 
applicability of the convention to all crimes where a sentence of four or more years can be incurred, the 
inclusion of dual criminality, and the promotion of preventative mechanisms. 
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development of the UNCTOC is considerably more convoluted than Scherrer’s 
(2009a) assessment, although there was a clear initial focus on drug trafficking and 
money laundering which then transformed into organized crime, and thereafter, 
transnational organized crime (see also van Duyne and Nelemans, 2012). It is noted in 
the Travaux Préparatoires that the UNCTOC was modelled on the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotic Substances, 1988. 
This was the template. Manderson (1993) notes at the time the 1988 Convention was 
introduced it “reflected the new Conventional wisdom that the ‘drug problem’ was 
about the links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal activities” 
or the ‘Mr. Big(s)’ of organized crime (see: Article 3(5)(a) of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotic Substances, 1988). 
The main point here is that the issue of drugs transformed into the issue of organized 
crime. Then, in the context of the discourse of international security, organized crime 
transformed from a national or local problem to an international security problem 
warranting a coordinated international response and the development of an 
international convention. That is, within the context of this discourse, organized crime 
became transnational organized crime. At the same time, there was the corresponding 
internationalization of the law and the use of treaties to target the ‘Mr. Bigs’ of 
transnational organized crime.  
 
As is noted in the Travaux Préparatoires it was at the World Ministerial 
Conference on Organized Transnational Crime (held in Naples in 1994) that the 
possibility of developing an international convention against transnational organized 
crime was first raised. At this meeting, the Conference unanimously adopted the 
Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational 
Crime. It was a year later at the Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and Treatment of Offenders (held in Cairo in 1995) that the “expansion of 
organized crime and the dangers posed by its transnational dimensions” featured as 
central issues of the discussions between delegations (Travaux Préparatoires, 2006, p. 
xvi):  
 “The traditional approach of considering organized and economic crime as a 
law and order problem to be addressed mainly at the local or national level 
had yielded poor results and therefore the response of Governments to the 
global operation of criminal networks had equally to be a global one.”  
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According to the Travaux Préparatoires “the United Nations… has always 
provided the most appropriate forum for promoting a common understanding of and 
global action to combat transnational organized crime.” Since its formation, the 
United Nations has had an extensive constellation of agencies that together make up 
the international drug prohibition regime (see: Fazey, 2003; Jelsma, 2003; Bewley-
Taylor, 2005). Sheptycki (2000) also traces the development of the international 
prohibition regime surrounding drugs and the transnational system of bureaucracy 
that was created to institutionalize it. Sheptycki (2000, p. 216) argues that the 
“transnational system developed its own bureaucracy existing ‘above’ that of the 
apparatuses of national state.” There is an interesting history surrounding the 
formation and transformation of these agencies over time, resulting in the 
international drug prohibition regime being structured in various configurations. 
Originally there were three separate agencies operating under the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND), which was formed in 1946 with the mandate of drafting all 
international instruments relating the control of narcotic drugs, and to advise the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Fazey, 2003).  
 
These three agencies were:  
(1) The Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND), which was created in 1946 from 
the League of Nations;  
(2) The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), which was 
established in 1971 at the instigation of the U.S. with the objective of 
suppressing the growth and trafficking of illicit substances, and; 
(3) The Secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
which was formed in 1961 with the mandate to monitor and control the import 
and export of all narcotic drugs that are grown and used for legitimate 
purposes (i.e. scientific and medical) (Fazey, 2003).   
 
Overtime, with the Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 and the 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances 1998, the remit of the INCB was progressively broadened to illicit 
substances and their precursors. In 1991, these three bodies were then merged to form 
the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). Later in 2002, 
the UNDCP was merged with the Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) 
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to form the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, which was 
renamed the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Fazey, 2003; 
Jelsma, 2003).  
 
The mandate of the UNODC is to “implement the Organization’s drug 
programme and crime programme in an integrated manner, addressing the interrelated 
issues of drug control, crime prevention and international terrorism” (United Nations 
Secretariat, 2004, pp. 1-2). The functions of the UNODC are separated according to 
the drug and crime programmes. Through the drug programme the UNODC “serves 
as the central drug control entity with exclusive responsibility for coordinating and 
providing effective leadership for all United Nations drug control activities” (United 
Nations Secretariat, 2004, pp. 1-2). Through the crime programme the UNODC “is 
responsible for carrying out activities in the field of international crime prevention 
and control… preventing and combating transnational crime, in particular organized 
and economic crime” (United Nations Secretariat, 2004, pp. 1-2). 
 
Informant 5 noted that leading to the development and drafting of the 
UNCTOC the UNODC was attempting to establish itself as a key international 
organization in the fight against transnational organized crime, and not solely as the 
guardian of the three conventions on narcotic drugs (i.e. Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971; United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotic Substances, 1988):  
 
“The UNODC up until that time… I think was struggling for relevance and its 
main effort would have been just plain drug trafficking issues.” 
Informant 5 
 
Informant 5 continued, noting there has been increasing emphasis placed on 
the significance of the issues of both transnational crime and corruption by the 
UNODC. The Informant stated that the UNODC put significant effort into the 
development of the two international protocols around these issues: 
 
“From the UN point of view, from the UNODC point of view, because there 
has been much more focus on the significance and the seriousness of those 
things, principally transnational crime and corruption. Those are the two 
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areas where the UNODC has put a big effort into developing two 
international protocols under the UN auspices.” 
Informant 5 
 
These are points that are also made by van Duyne and Nelemans (2012, 
emphasis added) who note that UN documents at this time repeated “concerns about 
the threat of transnational organized crime, the need for concerted action and the 
important role of the UN.” While struggling for relevance and the expansion of its 
mandate, the UNODC’s campaigning efforts for the development of international 
conventions around transnational crime and corruption can be related to the notion of 
moral enterprise. In the seminal study of the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act 1937 
(U.S.) Howard Becker (1963) coined the term ‘moral entrepreneur.’ Becker (1963, p. 
147) contends that this law was passed as a result of “crusading reformers” who 
lobbied to legislate against marihuana. Specifically, Becker (1963) attributed the 
passage of legislation against marihuana to the campaigning efforts of the U.S. 
Treasury Department’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), and in particular, its then 
Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger. Becker (1963, p. 145, emphasis in original) terms 
this “moral enterprise, for what they are enterprising about is the creation of a new 
fragment of the moral constitution of society.” Extending Becker’s (1963) study, 
Dickson (1968) also examined the campaigning efforts and influence of the FBN in 
the emergence of marihuana as a social problem, leading to the passage of the 
Marihuana Tax Act. Dickson (1968) argues the existence of the FBN, as a public 
bureaucracy, was dependent on an external body that created and continues to fund it. 
Dickson (1968) points out the FBN was intimately invested in the social problem 
because there was an ongoing need for the FBN to demonstrate that it was necessary. 
This was because the survival of the Federal Narcotics Bureau (FNB) was, at that 
time, being threatened due to decreasing budgetary appropriations. According to 
Dickson (1968), this provided the FNB with sufficient incentive to mount a crusade 
against marihuana use, which had two outcomes: the enactment of the Marihuana Tax 
Act, and the shift in societal values against marihuana use. Sheptycki (2000) also 
draws links to Anslinger as moral entrepreneur in relation to the development of 
international prohibition regimes and the transnational system of bureaucracy. 
 
Given this, what is especially noteworthy about the trajectory and 
transformation of the security issues of drug trafficking and money laundering to 
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organized crime, and finally to transnational organized crime, is that the object of this 
discourse is constituted by the international organizations that were involved in the 
process of defining transnational organized crime as a threat to international security. 
At the same time, these organizations are themselves constituted by the discourse of 
international security, and in particular that which shifted from the existential threat of 
the Cold War to the threat of transnational organized crime.  
 
METAPHORS OF WAR 
As discussed in the sections above, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet 
Union led to a fundamental shift in the international security discourse. The ‘war 
against communism’ shifted to a ‘war against drugs’ and most recently (following 
9/11) a ‘war against terror.’ Each of these ‘wars’ has been an American invention.  
 
Steinert (2003) examines the ‘war’ metaphor. According to Steinert (2003) the 
war metaphor is favored because “politics needs a crisis and a situation of 
extraordinary urgency in order to move interest positions and established balances of 
power” (Steinert, 2003, p. 281). Steinert (2003, p. 267) argues that the main 
explanation of the use of the war metaphor is that “it fits so well into today’s ‘populist 
structure’ of politics.” This can be related to the points made by Garland (2001) on 
law and order politics. Findlay (2008), for example, examines para-justice (i.e. 
criminal justice responses justified through the necessities of ‘war’). In the context of 
international criminal justice, Findlay (2008) scrutinizes the crime/governance nexus 
and the risk/security nexus, which are said to operate in the interest of political control 
agendas which are “repressive, recursive and regressive” (Findlay, 2008, p. 317). That 
is, the use of the metaphor of war enables the state to express its sovereignty and 
attest to its monopoly over the use of force, while at the same time intertwines 
policing and warfare:  
“The metaphors that are used [to describe organized crime] are things like 
cancer and it’s a war on organized crime” 
Informant 2 
 
The Informant links both metaphors of war and metaphors of disease 
(discussed in the section above). Sheptycki (2003a, pp. 127-128) points out that 
“martial metaphors are particularly powerful when the object can be constructed as an 
external threat.” The use of the war metaphor is, as Sheptycki (2003a, p. 128) notes, 
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“an appeal to arms” against organized crime. 
 
Relevant to the use of metaphors of war and specific to an Australian context, 
Finnane (2008a) examines the way in which ‘apocalyptic rhetoric’ has shaped the 
legislative and policing landscape. Finnane’s (2008a) historical analysis traces, over 
the previous century, the transitions in security policing in Australia. Finnane (2008a) 
demonstrates “‘apocalyptic rhetoric’ is part of the politics of policing” (Finnane, 
2008a, p. 7). Finnane’s (2008a) genealogy extends from the First World War and the 
beginnings of security policing, to the Second World War, the Cold War and the war 
on terrorism, highlighting how the “generation of political and administrative 
rhetorics… have decisively shaped the capabilities of policing, both its possibilities 
and its limits” (Finnane, 2008a, p. 10). Furthermore, Finnane (2008a, p. 10) argues 
state actors “have an eye on such rhetoric, in ways that help shape choices in making 
laws.” The historical research completed by Finnane (2008a) points to the antecedents 
of security policing in Australia, and indicates that although there are distinct shifts 
and transformations in policing arrangements overtime there is continuity in the 
political strategies adopted, and in particular apocalyptic rhetoric in times of ‘war.’ 
 
What is interesting about the use of the rhetoric of war is that the term ‘war’ 
implies eventual victory, but victory (eliminating all drugs or terrorism or organized 
crime from society) is not a realistic outcome. There is an internal contradiction in the 
state’s attempt to declare a war to express its crime fighting capabilities, and its actual 
ability to be victorious in ending the war. Therefore, the use of the term ‘war’ 
becomes both a reason and a technique to continue the ‘war.’ This can be related to a 
point made by McCulloch (2007, p. 25), who comments, “the lack of a possible 
victory ensures that the wars are open-ended geographically and temporally.” The 
implication is that the ‘war’ must continue: 
“I mean you can’t actually win in the sense of eliminating anything. But that’s 
because you got this model of fighting crime and a ‘war against drugs’ and a 
‘war against terrorism’ and all that sort of thing. That means eventually 
victory. And, you know, realistically there will never be a victory.” 
Informant 2 
 
Most importantly, metaphors of war transform the issue of organized crime 
from an object of the discourse of crime warranting a law enforcement response, to an 
object of the discourse of (international) security warranting a military response. This 
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is a point made by Steinert (2003, p. 266) who comments the use of the metaphor of 
war has the effect that “the line between warfare and police work becomes blurred.” 
As Bronitt and McSherry (2010, p. 946) explain, through risk of literalization the war 
metaphor “fosters explicit use of military powers.” Fox and Lydeker (2008, p. 287) 
cite the Australian Defence Force’s expansion into matters of federal criminal justice, 
arguing that the “hybridization of crime and war” has eroded the boundaries between 
the military and policing. Similarly, Bronitt and Donkin (2012) examine anti-
terrorism measures implemented in Australia as examples of ‘regulatory hybridity’ 
between ordinary (criminal justice) and extraordinary (military) responses. Bronitt 
and Donkin (2012) argue that regulatory hybrids should not be conceived as a duality, 
but rather a new model of regulation that exists on a continuum between these two 
poles.   
 
This is an issue that is considered at length by Jude McCulloch (2001; 2007) 
in her examination of the paramilitarization of the police, detailed in her book Blue 
Army. In this work McCulloch links the establishment of counter-terrorist units within 
the police to the militarization of policing in Australia. This is because, as McCulloch 
(2001) argues, the methods and tactics of the specialist units have, over time, 
permeated everyday policing operations. The notion of police militarization is further 
developed specific to transnational organized crime in McCulloch’s later work. 
According to McCulloch (2007, p. 29), linking transnational organized crime to 
security “facilitates a blending of internal and external coercion through hybrid 
policing and military configurations of state power.” McCulloch’s arguments were 
foretelling. In late 2013 the Australian Defence Force assisted the Victorian Police to 
conduct operations and raids on a property that was associated with the Hells Angels 
(The Australian, 2013) and there have been calls for the Army to join the Queensland 
Police in their operations against Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs) (Vogler & 
Donaghey, 2013). This demonstrates that responses to organized crime are now a 
hybrid of ordinary criminal justice responses and extraordinary military responses 
(McCulloch, 2007; Fox & Lydeker, 2008; Bronitt & Donkin, 2012). This is a point 
that one of the Informants in this study discussed: 
“It [organized crime] was very much a law enforcement matter and now it’s 
become national security issue, [linked with] terrorism, for example. Even 
now the Defence Force is getting involved in drug interdiction.” 
Informant 6 
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The statement presented above demonstrates the coupling of organized crime 
and terrorism, and that anti-terrorism strategies are being adapted to deal with 
organized crime in Australia. Bronitt and McSherry (2010) point out “terrorist laws 
are providing the template for responding to serious and organized crime groups in 
Australia” (Bronitt & McSherry, 2010, p. 1033). This was a point also made by one of 
the Informants in this study: 
“I mean the control mechanisms that have come out of terrorism have 
certainly been picked up and been adapted by organized crime agencies.” 
Informant 2 
 
In sum, this section examined how the international security agenda 
transformed from a focus on the existential threat of nuclear war during the Cold War 
to international crime, drug trafficking, money laundering and transnational organized 
crime. This included a review of the work of Scherrer (2009a), complemented with a 
close reading of the Travaux Préparatoires of the negotiations leading up to the 
drafting of the UNCTOC. The use of war metaphors was examined and it was argued 
that this blurs the lines between organized crime as an object of policing, to a 
securitized object of warfare. Transnational organized crime is an object of the 
international security discourse that is constituted by the international institutions that 
play an active role in shaping this discourse. At the same time, the international 
institutions are themselves constituted by the object of transnational organized crime. 
The securitization and development of an international security agenda around 
organized crime is but one dimension of the emergence of the problem. Let us now 
turn to the policing context, and investigate some of the ways organized crime is 
constituted as an object of the discourse of new public management (NPM). 
 
THE RISE OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE BUSINESS OF POLICING 
ORGANIZED CRIME 
Starting from the 1980s there has been a paradigm shift from public administration to 
‘new public management’ (NPM) (also known as professional managerialism) in 
public sectors in OECD countries including Australia (see: Hood, 1991; Hood, 1995; 
Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Gray & Jenkins, 1995; Dixon, Kouzmin & Korac-
Kakabadse, 1998). For example, A.J.P. Butler’s 1984 seminal text ‘Police 
Management’ argues for a rational and results driven approach to police management. 
Indeed, one of the basic concepts of police management articulated by Butler (1984) 
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at this time was “managing for results.” Similarly, in the book The New Policing 
McLaughlin (2007) argues modern (and the future of) public policing is characterized 
by managerialization.8 The main tenet of NPM is that the public sector adopts a result 
driven method to management, borrowing from the principles and practices of 
management in the private sector (Dixon et al. 1998). This section is specific to an 
Australian policing perspective, although this trend has been observed in other 
Western countries (for example for U.K. perspective, see: Leishman, Cope & Starie, 
1995; Collier, 2006; Cope, Leishman & Starie, 1997; McLaughlin, Muncie & Hughes, 
2001; Butterfield, Edwards & Woodall, 2004; 2005).  
 
One of the most pervasive themes that arose in this study was the shift towards 
NPM in policing organizations. Giauque (2003, p. 574) points out “NPM principles 
and tools are underpinned by a particular philosophy that is largely based on neo-
liberal rationale” (Giauque, 2003, p. 574). One of the distinguishing features of 
neoliberalism is “an emphasis on cost-effective, pragmatic, results-based government, 
coupled with accountability at all levels, and especially a desire to make government 
accountable for expenditure and productivity” (O’Malley, 2008, p. 57). In accordance 
with this focus on cost-effectiveness and accountability the “police had to introduce 
new managerial principles that reflected a business environment” (O’Malley, 2008, p. 
57). According to O’Malley (2008, p. 58, emphasis added) “crime control has been 
refocused in terms of ‘stronger’ and more ‘efficient’ state agencies responsive to 
populist demands.” Hogg (2008, p. 285) notes that these developments are  “part of a 
more general developing neo-liberal logic within late modern Western polities.”  
 
Hood (1991), the leading authority on NPM, comments the move towards 
NPM is “one of the most striking international trends in public administration” (Hood, 
1991, p. 3). Hood (1991) outlines the central principles of NPM: professional 
managers; explicit standards and measurement of performance; emphasis on output 
controls and consistency of outputs; disaggregation and decentralization in 
organizational structure; greater competition in the public sector; emphasis on private 
sector management practices; and greater accountability and restraint in the 
expenditure of public resources. Each of these principles has an underlying 
                                                        
8 McLaughlin (2007) also points out the new policing is also characterized by global securitization (as 
discussed in the section immediately above). 
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justification such as providing accountability, objectives and a focus on results in the 
public sector. NPM principles relate to accountability and transparency in the 
allocation of resources and the measurement of performance as a means to achieve 
greater efficiency in expenditure (Noordegraff & Abma, 2003). As such NPM is 
rooted in economic rationalism and the discipline of economics. Hood (1991, p. 5) 
notes that NPM has arisen from the “new institutional economics movement” which 
was influential in bringing about the aforementioned doctrines for administrative 
reform. 
 
Against a background of high-level and systemic corruption,9 Australian 
police organizations have embraced the managerial principles of NPM (Hoque, 
Arends, Alexander, 2004; Fleming & Scott, 2008). Fleming and Lafferty (2000) argue 
that in Australia the inquiries into police corruption provided the impetus for new 
techniques of police management and mechanisms of accountability. The annual 
reports of policing organizations in Australia reveal NPM in practice: the language of 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Returns on Investment (ROIs) permeates the 
pages of these documents. Writing from an Australian policing perspective, Fleming 
and Scott (2008, p. 322) note the most “distinctive feature of NPM is the setting of 
key performance indicators to enable the auditing of efficiency and effectiveness.” 
There has been academic critique about this type of managerialist stance towards 
policing (see for example: Winstanley & Stuart-Smith, 1996; Vickers & Kouzmin, 
2001), which has largely centered on the use of questionable measures of performance 
(see for example: Castle, 2008; Eterno & Silverman, 2010; 2012; Legrand & Bronitt, 
2012; Donkin & Bronitt, 2013). 
 
Giauque (2003) argues that NPM tools and techniques have resulted in an 
entirely new form of regulation and this is termed the ‘liberal bureaucracy.’ 
According to Giauque (2003, p. 586) the ‘liberal bureaucracy’ is a “special 
configuration emerging within the public organizations” and is “inspired by the 
precepts and principles of the neoliberal economy.” Consistent with principles that 
underlie liberalism and the market society, Giauque (2003) outlines the importance 
                                                        
9 On the Fitzgerald Inquiry in Queensland in the late 1980s and early 1990s, see: Lewis, Ransley and 
Homel (2010). On the Wood Royal Commission in New South Wales in the 1990s, see: Dixon (1999). 
I return to the issue of police corruption again in Chapter 5. 
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placed upon the efficiency and effectiveness of liberal bureaucracies, and their 
constant need to legitimize their activities. Giauque (2003, p. 571) assert that 
legitimization occurs in two distinct ways: “conformity to the laws and the rules of 
the state; and secondary legitimization concerns the efficiency with which the 
administrative products and services are produced.” This contributes to an 
understanding of why there is a persistent focus on measurement of costs, outcomes 
and performance. This section will show that the discursive technologies and 
practices of NPM have a range of consequences for the policing of organized crime 
and policing organizations, and at a deeper level, the very construction of the problem 
of organized crime itself. Organized crime (and its economic cost) is constituted as an 
object of the application of the discipline of economics to policing in an era of NPM. 
 
Informant 5 confirmed the importance of the allocation of resources to 
policing organizations. The Informant highlighted that individuals within policing 
organizations are acutely aware that resources are finite and they must be allocated 
strategically. In the first two statements presented below the Informant raises the 
issues of ‘money and manpower’ (sic). In the third statement, the Informant discusses 
that police organizations have to be selective in their targeting and operations due to 
finite resources. In essence, the Informant speaks the discourse of NPM: 
“The biggest thing is the results that you get are directly related to the 
resources you put into it. So if your resources are limited, both money wise 
and manpower [sic] wise, well clearly you aren’t going to have the same effect 
when your resources are much more generous.” 
“You can assume the police are very sophisticated and all this sort of thing 
but it still comes back to money and manpower [sic].” 
 
“A whole range of intelligence collection capabilities may be available but 
then it is a matter that you have to keep your feet on the ground about this. 
That is the matter of resources; they don’t simply have the resources to do 
everything. It is exactly the same as traffic offences. Everyone knows there are 
millions of traffic offences everywhere around Australia everyday. Everyone 
knows that hundreds of people get involved in accidents and scores of people 
get killed. You would think if the police had the resources to deal with them we 
wouldn’t have that problem. It is exactly the same with organized crime; they 
have to be selective. They aren’t always going to select the right strip of road, 
because an accident will occur in the next strip of road but they are going to 
do the best that they can in the circumstances.” 
         Informant 5 
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The issue of finite resourcing was a point that was touched upon further by 
Informant 1. Informant 1 spoke of the importance of ensuring there is no duplication 
of work or overlap between agencies, and described some of the structures that have 
been implemented to prioritize the allocation of resources: 
 
“Based on an assessment process the groups and individuals were placed in a 
priority order based on how compelling the information was, bearing in mind 
at the same time State police forces or Federal police forces may or may not 
have been actively looking at these people. There was a process in place to 
make sure there was no overlap between agencies. In consultation with its 
policing partners, the ACC [Australian Crime Commission] worked on a 
prioritized targeting campaign to establish which organized criminals were 
active and were considered a threat to society. We then, via the Board process, 
allocated multiagency taskforces with designated terms of reference to target 
them and put them out of business. That is the process that basically happens 
today.” 
 
         Informant 1 
 
The strategic assessment process described by Informant 1 above is an 
example of intelligence-led policing. This is relevant to priority setting and the 
re/ordering of policing priorities according to the results of strategic criminal 
intelligence (see for example Ratcliffe 2009). Innes and Sheptycki (2004, p. 2) argue 
that intelligence-led policing is “oriented to the logic” of NPM as it is focused on 
prioritizing resource allocation and the efficient delivery of police work. Innes and 
Sheptycki (2004) draw links between the shift towards NPM in policing and 
intelligence work becoming more ‘scientific’, which is a point discussed at length in 
Chapter 5. It is assumed that the rational processes of strategic intelligence analysis 
will assist with decision-making about resource allocation and police priorities 
(Sheptycki, 2004). For example, Ratcliffe and Sheptycki (2009, p. 248) argue: 
“Understanding what constitutes the criminal environment and its interface 
with criminal law enforcement is essential in order for agencies to prioritize 
the allocation of limited resources and that is where strategic intelligence 
analysis comes in.” 
 
Further, Sheptycki (2003b) conducted a study demonstrating how strategic 
intelligence analysis operates to establish organized crime as an object of governance, 
in addition to defining police priorities. This research highlights “micro-processes of 
knowledge construction” (Sheptycki, 2003b, p. 490). Sheptycki (2003b) describes 
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how the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) conducted a Delphi10 survey of 
experts concerning the relative threat posed by organized crime groups in Canada, in 
order to identify police targets. This can be related to the assessment processes 
described by Informant 1 above in relation to prioritizing targets according to threat 
level. 
Informant 1 provided another example of the importance placed on the 
effective utilization of finite resources while discussing how the Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC) makes a determination of whether to use its coercive powers 
(see: Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth); coercive powers are discussed 
further in Chapter 5). Like the statement presented above, the language used by 
Informant 1 is particularly telling as it points to the principles of NPM in the 
identification and selection of which cases of organized crime should be targeted. The 
pivotal role that intelligence plays in this process is emphasized (intelligence is 
discussed in Chapter 5). In order to use coercive powers, the Informant noted that the 
ACC must first ‘justify the business case’ to its Board (corporate oversight of policing 
agencies is also taken up in Chapter 5):  
“Yes that is right the Board works on the basis that you have got a finite 
resource because the ACC has around 550 people. But under this unified 
approach if your intelligence is strong enough you can have Federal and State 
police allocated to a task force in Sydney or Perth for example. You have the 
intelligence to use the coercive powers under that unified approach; this 
approach can be quite effective and a more efficient utilization of your 
resources. However, to do that you have to be able to justify the business case 
in relation to who should be targeted it has got to be very strong and reliable 
intelligence.” 
         Informant 1 
 
Taken together and in the context of the literature of NPM, the above 
statements point to the NPM principles of increasing value for money in the 
expenditure of public resources, and reveal some of the decision-making process and 
structures that are founded in economic rationalism. Due to finite resources the police 
must be selective in who they target (for intelligence collection, analysis or 
intervention), that is, there is an element of discretion. As such police organizations 
must implement institutional structures to evaluate what organized crime targets 
                                                        
10 Sheptycki (2003b, p. 494) explains the Delphi method is employed when “no paradigm of normal 
science reigns” and “aims to make the best of less than perfect knowledge.” This method involves a 
structured process of surveying experts with processes for feedback and revision until consensus is 
achieved.  
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represent the most efficient use of resources and provide the most compelling 
‘business case’ to executive oversight to secure the investment of resources. The 
implication of this is that police are more likely to target operations that have a return 
on that investment. 
 
PROBLEM CONSTRUCTION THROUGH MEASUREMENT 
The issue of problem measurement is a prickly one. Problem measurement is a direct 
consequence of NPM, as in order for policing organizations to ‘justify’ their 
resourcing, the extent of the problem must be established. Andreas and Greenhill 
(2010, p. 1) state that in “practical political terms, if something is not measured it 
does not exist, if it is not counted it does not count.” In order for police to make the 
business case for their continued funding and operations, they must demonstrate that 
there is a significant social problem warranting their existence (this is relevant to 
bureaucratic entrepreneurialism as discussed above, see: Becker, 1963; Dickson, 
1968). Informant 4, an expert in the measurement of the size and cost of organized 
crime and money laundering, spoke at length about this type of economic rationalism 
in justifying the ‘business case’:  
“Well the [Australian] Crime Commission should be operating in the public 
interest. The public interest should be knowing whether organized crime is a 
billion dollar problem or a million dollar problem or a ten-dollar problem. 
Parliamentarians are supposed to decide if we should have a Crime 
Commission or not, and how resources are allocated or whether schools get 
the money or law enforcement get the money. They need to have some 
ballpark figure and that as a ballpark figure serves that purpose. It tells you 
it’s a big problem.” 
         Informant 4 
 
The Australian Crime Commission (2011; 2013) consistently places the cost 
of organized crime at 10 to 15 billion AUD per annum.11 This statement is repeated 
throughout the Australian Crime Commission’s publications, including the annual 
reports, website and factsheets on organized crime. The ACC has also produced a 
video (on their website under the ‘cost of organized crime’)12 that shows what 10 to 
                                                        
11 Levi, Innes, Reuter and Gundur (2013) estimated the costs of different types of organized crime and 
the response to it in the European Union (E.U.) obtaining similarly large figures. Interestingly, Levi et 
al. (2013) focus their assessments on fraud as organized crime, perhaps reflecting the area of expertise 
of the first author. 
12 The video is accessible at: https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/media-centre/release/australian-
crime-commission-multimedia/cost-organised-crime-australia 
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15 billion dollars in $100 notes ‘looks like.’ That is, the volume of space that is 
consumed by the cost of organized crime to Australian society on an annual basis. 
The voice that speaks over the video encourages the viewer to “imagine filling the 
entire North Atrium of Federation Square, Melbourne with $100 notes- that is what 
Australia is losing to organized crime every year.” Not only does the video encourage 
the viewer to imagine the volume of money, it shows them through visual imagery the 
amount of physical space that it consumes.  
 
The methods by which this figure is brought to life and is made real- or 
imagined by the public- are worthy of comment. Through the imagery of the amount 
of money organized crime costs Australian society, this amount is made 
unquestionably real: not only does the cost of organized crime exist; it exists in a 
physical dimension. This is closely related to advice provided by Foucault (1977, p. 
139) about being attentive to the practices of disciplinary institutions:   
“Beneath every set of figures, we must seek not a meaning, but a precaution; 
we must situate them not only in the inextricability of a functioning, but in the 
coherence of a tactic.”  
 
Informant 4 confirmed that the cost of the organized crime problem is used to 
provide the ‘business case’ for police organizations and also the imposition of special 
regulations. This can be related to Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012, p. 88) discussion 
of the role of “the entrepreneur” in policing. According to Bowling and Sheptycki 
(2012, p. 88) “the rhetoric of sales has deeply permeated the police subculture.” 
Relating their discussion to Becker’s idea of moral entrepreneurialism (discussed 
above) Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p. 89) argue “the technical wizardry of 
scientific policing needs to be sold to users and to the paymasters who finance the 
acquisitions.” The excerpt below details how Informant 4 was strategically recruited 
as a consultant by the Founding Director of AUSTRAC to develop estimations of the 
extent of money laundering in Australia. Informant 4 explains the purpose of 
estimating the extent of money laundering was to establish the rationale for 
AUSTRAC as an anti-money laundering and specialist financial intelligence 
organization: 
“AUSTRAC had been in existence for three years or four years at that stage. 
The banks did not like being regulated and monitored. So AUSTRAC was 
under some pressure to justify its existence. He [the Director of AUSTRAC] 
explained ‘one of the things we would dearly like is some idea of the 
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magnitude of money laundering, so we can say you know this is the budget of 
AUSTRAC and this is the size of the problem.’ [Interviewer: To justify the 
existence of AUSTRAC?] Yes, and to justify the imposition of the regulations.” 
         Informant 4 
 
It is evident Informant 4 was operating as an ‘entrepreneur’ in this process. 
Informant 4 was a financial expert employed for the purposes of ‘creative accounting,’ 
and an entrepreneur in the construction of the (cost of) money laundering, for entirely 
political (and bureaucratic) purposes. These are points that are made by van Duyne 
(1998) who mounts a powerful critique on money-laundering policy and the ‘Threat 
Assessment Industry.’ It is worth quoting van Duyne (1998, p. 359) at length: 
 “The concept of organized crime is not a neutral one. It has a heavy 
emotional component, which is frequently exploited by what may be called the 
Threat Assessment Industry. This consists of public agencies, private firms or 
persons, who are primarily interested in conveying an image of organized 
crime which suits their purposes. Frequently this image is an apocalyptic one: 
a huge threat of the sinister forces of darkness. The threat assessment reports 
are composed accordingly and sold for not too modest prices… There is little 
irony in the observation that the organized crime industry is a big money-
maker indeed, not the least for respectable problem-owners in private or 
public services, whose socio-economic status increases with the size of the 
problem.” 
 
It is important to keep in mind that Informant 4 was operating outside the 
bounds of peer-review rigor; the claims made were not subject to review. This is 
noteworthy as van Duyne (1998) argues, “the approach to money-laundering has been 
accompanied more by fact creation than fact finding.” Nevertheless, the facts and 
figures become incontestable truths. It is the credibility (or perhaps utility) of the 
results that is important in this process. For example, when reflecting upon the 
method, assumptions and data used to construct a global model of the amounts of 
proceeds of crime laundered, Informant 4 remarked: 
“Accuracy is meaningless. Credibility is everything. Even with the crappiest 
data and the most heroic of assumptions that global model produced results 
that people thought looked credible. It doesn't mean to say it was accurate. I 
know it wasn't accurate because I know the data that went into it was 
miscellaneous crap.”  
Informant 4 
 
This is worrying because statistics, as Andreas and Greenhill (2010) note, are 
often uncritically accepted because of the legitimation provided by the experts 
themselves. According to Andreas and Greenhill (2010, pp. 2-3) statistics are 
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accepted as true because they “are assumed to have been generated by experts who 
possess specialized knowledge and who know what they are doing.” This also raises 
an interesting consideration about why agencies, AUSTRAC in the present case, 
contract consultants to complete this work, instead of referral to other relevant 
Australian Government agencies that have the mandate to evaluate these issues. The 
Australian Productivity Commission, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), and the Australian Institute of Criminology 
(AIC) are all positioned to complete these assessments.  
 
‘Criminologists for hire’ are an example of the “commercialization of 
criminological knowledge” (Walters, 2003a, p. 14; Walters, 2003b). It is discussed in 
the literature that there is an increasing demand for criminological consultants or 
“technocrats” (Walters, 2003a, p. 14). Walters (2003b, p. 21) argues that 
“criminologists are becoming entrepreneurial” as there is both private and public 
sector demand for their expertise (Walters, 2003b, p. 21). Relevant to this argument is 
the observation that society is becoming increasingly founded on a knowledge-based 
economy (Bauman, 1992; Stehr, 1992). Bauman (1992, pp. 91, emphasis in original) 
argues that “expertise creates and enhances the need of itself… it also means the 
creation and a principally unlimited multiplication of new problems which render 
expertise indispensable.” Experts are entrepreneurial; they peddle their expert 
knowledge about social problems, and at the same time, create a demand for their 
expertise (see van Duyne, 1998, discussed above).  
 
Expert knowledge is a commodity of power as experts are often employees of 
the most politically powerful in society; experts “advise women and men at the apex 
of power, that is, in executive positions of influential social institutions” (Stehr, 1992, 
p. 128). In this sense, the expert bridges the divide between knowledge and power. 
This is demonstrated in Scherrer’s (2009a) examination of the Lyon Expert Group 
(LEG) advising the G7/8 on the problem of transnational organized crime (as 
discussed above). Scherrer (2009a, p. 111) comments: 
“The LEG should not be understood as purely and simply a purveyor of 
international norms [about transnational organized crime] but rather as one of 
the key actors in their emergence.”  
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By acting as an expert consultant developing estimates of the extent of money 
laundering, Informant 4 played an active and important role in the construction of the 
problem, in order to demonstrate value for money and the imposition of special 
regulations. Informant 5 develops this point: 
 
“Well it [organized crime] may be growing because we are becoming better 
aware of it.  And it may not necessarily be growing in itself, but because we 
are becoming better aware of it. Secondly I suppose we have people like 
[Informant 4] and others who are actually spending their time and effort 
trying to estimate these things. Which most coppers couldn’t give a bugger 
about how much it actually costs? They are more concerned about putting 
somebody into court and getting them convicted for the offence. But there are 
others like [Informant 4] who would like to be able to put a dollar figure on it. 
And that is useful if you can put a dollar figure on it because it gives you an 
argument to go back to Government and say well you give us this, and we will 
be able to develop that. And that is the theory behind tax investigations: 
Operation Wickenby.13 The Government outlaid 300 or 400 million dollars 
and Wickenby in itself has now produced something like a billion dollars of 
money back to the Government as a result of that investment. [Interviewer: So 
the ability to put a dollar figure on it?] It makes it easier to argue with the 
mandarins in the treasury.” 
         Informant 5 
 
As the statement from Informant 5 indicates, the ability to monetize organized 
crime assists negotiations about the funding of police organizations and particular 
operations. By no means is the monetization of social problems limited to organized 
crime. The Australian Institute of Criminology regularly develops estimates of the 
broader cost of crime in Australia (see: Walker, 1997; Mayhew, 2003; Rollings, 2008). 
There is also evidence of specialist interest groups producing estimates of the costs of 
specific crime types to further their cause (for example, ‘The Costs of Violence 
Against Women and their Children’ produced by The National Council to Reduce 
Violence against Women and their Children, 2009). The technique of monetizing 
social problems has been transferred to other fields that need political attention. As a 
result of this, the practice has become much more routine. 
 
                                                        
13 Operation Wickenby refers to criminal investigations led by the Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC) into tax evasion, and Project Wickenby is a broader cross-agency taskforce that was established 
in 2006 following the successes of Operation Wickenby. The main objective of Project Wickenby is to 
prevent international tax evasion and money laundering in Australia’s taxation system (Australian 
Taxation Office, 2014) 
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To summarize, with the advent of NPM and its focus on the efficient 
utilization of resources, police organizations must provide an indication of the size 
and extent of the problem of organized crime in order to justify budgetary allocations. 
This is achieved by the application of the discipline of economics and the principles 
of economic rationalism that characterise NPM. Police organizations recruit expert 
consultants, such as Informant 4, for the purposes of problem measurement to make 
the ‘business case’ for their existence, funding, imposition of regulations and 
operations. As the next section will show, performance measurement is also an 
important consideration in the policing of organized crime, which was raised by 
Informant 5 in the statement presented above in reference to the ‘return on investment’ 
that Operation Wickenby has provided.  
 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: ROIs AND KPIs 
The literature indicates that performance measurement is the defining characteristic of 
NPM in police organizations (Fleming & Scott, 2008). Aligned with the rationale of 
NPM and “managing for results”, the measurement of key performance indicators has 
become an important concern for police, routinized in their everyday practices (Butler, 
1984). This was confirmed by the interview data. Informant 1 continually used the 
language of performance metrics when discussing the policing of organized crime: 
“The process includes a financial assessment process to ensure that the 
combined agency effort provides value for money.” 
 
“I think the return of investment on the operation was very favorable. In the 
end the government requested information on the cost in resources and the 
return on investment.”  
 
“In regards to performance measures there are assessment matrices… that 
the ACC then used on actual projects to clarify that they were providing a 
return on the investment.” 
 
“That is done on each project. You can’t go all the way to the end of it and 
then say ‘well, that was a financial disaster you didn’t even effectively put the 
syndicate out of business or you didn’t even stop the drugs coming in.’ It is 
something that is very well monitored.” 
 
         Informant 1 
 
Informant 5 commented that the law enforcement community as a whole felt 
the push from Government to produce a favorable ROI. The same Informant also 
discussed that a favorable ROI was not limited to a good financial result in terms of 
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the amount of criminal proceeds forfeited, and asserted that governments are likely to 
invest in operations that will provide a good political return as evidence of a strong 
law and order policy. Here links can be drawn with the discourse of law and order 
politics as the state attempts to attest to its ability to control crime. This observation 
also shares affinity with public choice theories of political action that emerged 
immediately prior to NPM (see for example: Dunshire, Hartley, Parker & Dimitrou, 
1988; Eskridge, 1988; Farber & Frickey, 1987; 1988; Mitchell, 1988; Tollison, 1988). 
The main thrust of this literature is that politicians and bureaucrats are self-serving 
and act out of their own interests: 
“Governments will say we will give you so much money and if you don’t make 
us a profit on that you won’t get as much next year. Which is really quite 
callous. [Interviewer: So you felt that in the AFP? The push?] I think the law 
enforcement community as a whole. You know Government invest in things 
that are going to give them a good political result and the seizure of criminal 
funds adds to the common community chest. Why not?” 
         Informant 5 
 
The Informants recognized that a focus on measurement was necessary in the 
routine practices of their agencies in the era of NPM. In the excerpt presented below, 
Informant 5 discusses some of the tensions at senior levels as a result of decisions 
about targeting, and how this is reflected in their performance assessments. The 
Informant reflects that drug investigations enable police to obtain more convictions 
and ‘that’s what counts’ (or perhaps that is what is countable). The Informant then 
compares this with a case regarding the financial investigations into the Australian 
entrepreneur Alan Bond (convicted of serious fraud and corporate offences, see: 
Smith, 2002). The Informant questions how low-level drug interdictions and high-
level financial investigations can be validly equated: 
“You have to do it, the accountability process. It usually annoys police 
because it is seen as a simplistic measure. I had an experience when I was 
running my division; I had a disagreement with my boss over a particular 
matter of targeting. He said ‘take the guys off that you’ll never get a result 
there, put them into drug investigations because we get a lot of quick and easy 
hits and results, convictions. That’s what counts.’ But in fact they were 
working on other matters that were probably much more serious than the 
average drug case but more difficult to prove. You can have a case like, I 
remember one guy he was a brilliant fellow in the AFP and who was 
investigating Alan Bond operations and he was investigating for, I think 2 or 3 
years he had the investigation, and he couldn’t ultimately get the prize 
because the Swiss authorities wouldn’t give him access to key evidence that he 
needed that this money was located in overseas bank accounts. It was 
incredibly frustrating for the guy because he was intelligent he was incredibly 
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hard working, absolutely honest decent sort of guy who had all the right skills 
and personality, everything else like that. He just ran into a roadblock he 
couldn’t overcome. At the end of the day if you are counting our statistics, 
some guy down the street who is a sergeant running a small squad probably 
had about 50 arrests or convictions in 6 months period and this guy goes 
through three years with not 1 arrest or 1 conviction. Now how do you equate 
the two? That is the problem with statistics I think.” 
         Informant 5 
 
 The Informant then pointed to the luck that is involved in identifying a large 
(10 or 15 ton) drug interdiction that make the statistics look great, but at the same 
time, is hard to sustain in subsequent years. The Informant claims this demonstrates 
these measures of performance and artificial and simplistic: 
“It shows us that at least they are there and they are doing something but it 
doesn’t… I mean you could have one hit, you could get a 10 or 15 ton hit and 
you don’t get another one for 3 years. So when you are adding up the statistics 
in the next year, people say ‘well obviously your productivity has gone down 
but such and such, this is terrible we are going to have to take money away 
from you, well you aren’t as productive as you were before.’ So there is a bit 
of luck involved in this. It’s not everyday that you get a 10 or 15 ton hit but 
when you do it’s fantastic. It makes the statistics look great but you can see it 
is a bit artificial. It makes very simplistic assumptions.” 
         Informant 5 
 
Informants 4, 7 and 3 were also critical of the measures of performance used 
by police. Looking to the literature on police performance management one will find 
a number of reviews that are highly critical of this approach to measuring policing 
outcomes. Castle (2008) reviews annual reports from a number of police 
organizations (in the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Italy, France, Germany and the 
U.K.), arguing that these measures assess the process of policing rather than the 
progress in reducing (organized) crime. This was a point echoed by Informant 4: 
“That is not monitoring success. That is monitoring activity. No matter the 
beauty of the strategy or the activities, we need to measure the results. They 
are measuring the activities.” 
         Informant 4 
 
In their book The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation, 
Eterno and Silverman (2012) present an assessment of the policing accountability 
strategy of Compstat14 (and variations of this), in a range of countries such as the 
                                                        
14 Compstat is a goal and performance driven managerial strategy for police where senior police are 
held accountable for bringing about crime reductions in their respective districts (see for example: 
Walsh, 2001; Willis, Mastrofski & Weisburd, 2004; 2007). 
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United States and Australia. Eterno and Silverman (2012) highlight how this 
accountability structure has resulted in the dubious and unethical use of measures of 
police performance. Eterno and Silverman’s argument is that police performance 
measures are manipulated to show success in reducing crime, and as such lack 
integrity. Eterno and Silverman (2010) note that the pressures on police can explain 
the unethical use of crime statistics and measures of performance.  
 
Specific to Australia, Eterno and Silverman (2012, pp. 101-102) point out “the 
Australian political climate, as in other countries, frequently fosters expectations of 
crime reductions that are habitually reflected in altered police statistics.” This draws 
attention to the political pressures that policing organizations face in order to 
demonstrate favorable (albeit contrived) returns on investment. The expectation that 
police produce favorable ROIs, transforms policing into a ‘numbers game’ where 
problematic measures of police performance are relied upon (such as the amount of 
drugs seized), or measures are manipulated, to show a favorable result. Ultimately, 
this has consequences for the way police operations are conducted. As demonstrated 
by the statements made by Informant 5 presented above, the expectation to produce a 
favorable ROI means that police focus their attention to obtain results that align with 
performance expectations (i.e. ‘50 arrests or convictions in 6 months’). NPM, and the 
associated bureaucratic designs and tensions related to this, have real implications for 
policing practice. 
 
The primary data generated by this research indicate that senior individuals 
within policy and policing agencies believe that these measures are too narrow, and 
instead should encompass a broader range of indicators such as patterns of drug use. 
For example, according to Informant 7: 
“Key performance indicators are legitimate to use but what’s the bigger 
picture? The amounts of drugs seized, you can draw some conclusions, but 
you also need to look at drug use, drug patterns.” 
         Informant 7 
 
Robert Peel, often referred to as the father of modern policing, proposed nine 
principles of democratic policing to legitimate policing by consent (Reiner, 1992). 
The ninth principle is that the true test of police effectiveness is the absence of crime 
 94 
and disorder, rather that evidence of police action responding to it (as quoted in 
Williams, 2003, p. 100): 
 “The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the 
visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.” 
 
Processes measures of police effectiveness are in direct conflict to one of the 
fundamental principles of Peelian policing and the ideology of professional policing 
in a liberal society. Similarly, Willis, Homel, and Gray (2006) and Willis, Anderson 
and Homel (2011) share dissatisfaction with these types of process performance 
measures. These authors have developed a different framework for measuring the 
effectiveness of drug law enforcement that is more aligned with Peel’s ninth principle. 
Under this framework there are four high level outcomes that Willis et al. (2006; 
2011) propose should be measured, instead of the focus on seizure and arrest data. 
These outcomes are (1) reducing drug crime and drug-related crime; (2) reducing 
organized crime; (3) improving public health and (4) improving public amenity. This 
is certainly a more comprehensive way of assessing police performance, and extends 
the focus from seizures and arrests to other important outcomes such as improving 
public health (which enables links to be drawn to harm minimization). Similarly, 
Informant 3 pointed to the objective of harm minimization, as opposed to the amounts 
of drugs seized: 
“I’m highly critical of those measures… and you can argue that success is not 
all about drugs seized on the street anyway, it’s more about harm 
minimization.” 
        Informant 3 
 
Furthermore, the performance measures selected are indicative of a particular 
conception of organized crime. Informant 6 discusses the best way for police to be 
seen to be intervening in organized crime is by a large drug interdiction or the arrest 
of a ‘Mr. Big.’ This is evident in the Australian Crime Commission’s (ACC) annual 
reports (see: Australian Crime Commission, 2002-2013). The ACC evaluates the 
performance of their investigations and operations by describing the number of 
organized crime groups disrupted (although the nomenclature varies across reports, 
for example: ‘high risk crime groups,’ ‘crime syndicates,’ ‘criminal groups’). The 
selection of these measures (drugs seized, key individuals of the organization 
arrested) points to a certain view of organized crime. That is, an organization with an 
internal hierarchy of members: 
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“The police have got to conduct a certain number of arrests. They have got to 
try and control a particular activity that is going on, whether it will be drug 
distribution, drug sales, shootings or guns in the street or whatever it might be. 
And the best way they can do it is if they say they’ve eliminated the ‘Mr. Big’ 
of that particular crime group.” 
          
“I get back to the original point, police need to be seen to be doing something 
and the best way it is seen to be seen to be doing something is this massive 
bust. And then say you’ve arrested the key players of the organization. Have 
you done that? Yeah, you made a major bust. Have you eliminated the key 
players? I’m not sure. [Interviewer: And why do they need to be seen to be 
doing those two particular things?] Justifies budget.” 
         Informant 6 
 
Since the transition to NPM to promote police accountability, there is a focus 
on implementing institutional structures that epitomize the two main doctrines of 
NPM. These are performance measurement and the measurable outputs of policing 
(Hood, 1991). The Informants commented on the necessity of performance 
measurement in the era of NPM, however at the same time, were critical of the 
measures (as being too simplistic, artificial, narrow, and on the basis of the broader 
objectives of policing). Finally, there is an implicit model of organized crime in these 
performance measures. 
 
TURF PROTECTION AND BUDGETS 
One of the doctrines of NPM involves introducing greater competition in the public 
service (Hood, 1991). The need for each police organization to ‘justify their budget’ 
results in tensions and ‘turf wars’ between agencies when claiming credit for 
successful operations. Fleming and Scott (2008, p. 325) note, “PM [performance 
measurement] can establish a counter-productive competition.” The liberal 
bureaucracy is required to compete with other public organizations for public 
resources. Giauque (2003, p. 574) points out that “introducing market mechanisms 
into public organizations” has the consequence of “putting departments into 
competition with each other.” Evidence of this can be found in the interview data: 
“Firstly is the obvious issue of turfdom in an era of performance indicators, 
KPIs. Turfdom is actually wound up significantly because everyone wants to 
be able to say ‘I collared this particular person’ as part of their KPIs, or 
solved this particular problem.  It’s not really good enough to say ‘I 
contributed to the solution to this problem,’ sadly.” 
         Informant 3 
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“I think at the more senior level it’s a lot more prickly because you’ve got a 
drug bust and the AFP is standing up on the television, they’re saying: ‘this is 
what we got, five kilos, kilos of cocaine,’ or whatever. There were a lot of 
agencies behind that that helped get to that point. But who gets the credit? So 
there is a jurisdictional tussle between agencies, and I think we’ll never get 
rid of that because agencies have to justify their expenditures to the 
government. And they’ve got to justify their budgets, so there have always 
been tension between agencies.” 
         Informant 6 
 
In an examination of organizational pathologies in police intelligence systems 
Sheptycki (2004) points to source of tension between agencies, including institutional 
friction and differences in occupational subcultures. Sheptycki (2004) states that there 
is rivalry within and between police agencies, particularly when “success in law 
enforcement operations looms large as a marker of job success.” In the present study 
the interview data showed that these tensions were not limited to policing 
organizations but also extended between policing and policy domains. As the 
Informant notes in the statement presented below, the Attorney-General’s Department 
(AGD) experienced opposition from Federal police organizations, as AGD was 
making inroads into their territory: 
“There was some reluctance from the Commonwealth law enforcement 
agencies because Attorney-General’s was encroaching on their space… of 
those who felt they have organized crime on their badge.” 
         Informant 7 
 
Looking to the academic literature to interpret this observation, I found that 
the available literature on (bureaucratic) competition (colloquially known as ‘turf-
wars’) mainly concerns criminal gangs feuding for territory. Limited research has 
been conducted from the perspective of tensions between law enforcement agencies 
(for tensions between the FBI as an operational agency and the CIA as an intelligence 
agency see: Turner, 2008; more generally see: Finklea, 2013). Relevant to the 
tensions between the CIA and the FBI, Turner (2008, p. 268) states: 
 “The CIA is now being accused by other government agencies of looking for 
new areas of activity to justify its existence, from joining the drug wars to 
getting into international crime fighting and economic intelligence gatherings.”  
 
In sum, organized crime has emerged as an object of the discourse of NPM in 
policing organizations. This concerns the way in which resources are allocated, the 
measurement of both the problem and policing performance. There is the 
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corresponding implementation of institutional structures to establish NPM as a routine 
practice of the police. The ways in which organized crime is constructed as a result of 
the demands, and the techniques of NPM, is an important dimension of the 
phenomenon. This has implications for the way police respond to organized crime, 
through the operations that are conducted, and how the outcomes of these are 
measured. NPM is another dimension through which the social problem of organized 
crime is ordered. Following from this examination, the next section explores the way 
in which organized crime is constructed through the forging of outlaw identities.  
 
THE FORGING OF OUTLAW IDENTITIES 
The literature on the sociology of deviance has its roots in the labeling perspective 
(Becker, 1963) and moral panic analyses (Cohen, 1972). There is a focus on the 
claims making activities, the social reactions to perceived deviance, and the 
consequence of institutional legacies (Ben-Yehuda, 1986). In the seminal text The 
Drug Takers Young (1971) explores various dimensions of social reactions to drug 
use demonstrating that deviance plays an important role in society. Young (1971, p. 
105) notes “there is little point in having rules if you have no rule-breakers.” 
Accordingly, and consistent with a social constructionist epistemology, “deviance is a 
constructed category rather than some fixed essence” (Young, 2009, p. 7). Young 
(2009, p. 7) continues by arguing, “deviance is not inherent in an action but a quality 
bestowed upon it.” From this perspective, the most common analytic device is moral 
panic analyses (Cohen, 1972). This is because, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a, p. 
170) explain, moral panics are seen as “a crucial element in the fabric of social 
change.” It is argued that moral panics directed towards outsiders (Becker, 1963) or 
folk devils (Cohen, 1972), have consequences for governance and society.  
 
Becker’s (1963) argument is that crime and deviance are social constructs and 
there are investments in the construction and maintenance of categories of crime and 
deviance. Yet, it was Cohen (1972) who coined the term ‘moral panic.’ More recently, 
authors (see: Hier, 2011; Ungar, 2001) point to the expressive elements of moral 
panic in relation to social anxieties, insecurities and fears. This can be related to 
points made by Garland (2008, p. 15) who notes, a group is identified as deviant 
“because it possesses characteristics that make it a suitable screen upon which society 
can project sentiments of guilt and ambivalence” (Garland, 2008, p. 15). Garland 
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(2008, p. 15) argues the targets of moral panics are “cultural scapegoats” because 
their conduct relates to underlying social fears and anxieties. This includes the fear of 
others, and is intertwined with racism and xenophobia. 
 
According to Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a) moral panics occur in the space 
where deviance, social problems, collective behavior and social movements converge. 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a; 1994b) outline five characteristics of moral panic. 
There is a high level of public concern about a certain group; there is hostility towards 
this group as they are considered an enemy or threat to society and its values. There is 
widespread public consensus that the threat is real. At the same time the concern is 
disproportionate to the actual threat the group poses to society; the threat is portrayed 
as being more serious than what it is (this point is considered critically below). Finally, 
moral panics are volatile in their appearance and disappearance in the collective 
consciousness; moral panics have a short life span. However, to say that a moral panic 
is temporally limited is not to imply the consequences of it are also equally short-term. 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994b, pp. 38-39) comment further: 
“Some moral panics become routinized or institutionalized, that is, the moral 
concern about the target behavior results in, or remains in place in the form of, 
social movement organizations, legislation, enforcement practices, informal 
interpersonal norms or practices for punishing transgressors, after it has run its 
course.” 
 
This means that while the initial sensationalized media and public response can be 
short lived, moral panic episodes can have lasting consequences that are forged in the 
routine practices of social institutions (Giddens, 1984). The depiction of the threat 
may mobilize the search for solutions such as implementing new law to deal with the 
threat (Cohen, 1972). Episodes of moral panic are political primarily because they 
“make things happen” (Garland, 2008, p. 15). This means because a behavior that 
threatens the fabric of society has been identified, something can be done about it. 
Overtime repeated moral panic episodes about the same folk devil (or the threat to 
society), create “social divisions” and “infrastructures of regulation and control,” that 
continue to exist after moral panic episodes recede (Garland, 2008, p.16).  
 
This can be related to the notion of criminal ‘criminal iatrogenesis’ that was 
introduced by Cohen (1988) in Against Criminology. This is the idea that criminal 
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policies can have harmful unintended consequences (see also Bowling 2011, 
discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to challenges policing organized crime). Sheptycki 
(2007a) argues that fear targeted towards outsider groups can intensify and further 
cement social anxieties and divisions. Sheptycki (2007a, p. 396) notes: 
 “The social reaction to social practices defined as crime has the tendency to 
alienate those individuals and groups thus defined, thereby actually increasing t he 
perceptions of their criminality by all concerned, affirming the initial intolerance. 
Thus proceeds a delinquency amplification spiral.” 
 
The consequence of the amplification spiral is more fear and anxiety directed 
towards outsider groups, and a corresponding compounding of their deviance. This in 
turn results in more punitive control responses. For example, McCorkle and Miethe 
(2002) examined the emergence of the gang threat in the United States in the 1980s. 
The authors note that the police began to report an increase in gang activity, which 
was followed by an explosion of media coverage depicting sensationalized images of 
gangsters. According to McCorkle and Miethe (2002, p. 4) “newspapers, television, 
and films were suddenly awash with images of gun-toting, drug-dealing, hat-to-back 
gangstas.” Following the heightened media coverage there was an increase in policing 
resources in order to deal with the gang threat. McCorkle and Miethe (2002, p. 4) 
state: “Federal, State and Local [government] funds were allocated to creating anti-
gangs units in law enforcement and prosecution units.” This was accompanied by the 
introduction of new legislation.15  
 
Moreover, McCorkle and Miethe (2002, p. 4) note that this moral panic had 
consequences for the academic enterprise as “millions of dollars were funneled into 
universities and think-tanks to conduct research on the extent, causes and 
consequences of the gang ‘epidemic.’” The moral panic directed at gangs created a 
new body of experts who gave public seminars (McCorkle & Meithe, 2002). 
McCorkle and Meithe (2002, p. 4) highlight the range of actors in the creation of this 
moral panic:  
“Law enforcement officials have figured prominently in the creation and 
promotion of such stereotypes [about gangs], marketing this threat to the public in 
order to protect and advance the interests of their respective police organizations. 
                                                        
15
 A specific example is the City of Chicago’s introduction of anti-loitering laws that aimed to prevent 
gang members loitering in the streets of Chicago. However, in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 
[1999] the United States Supreme Court found this law unconstitutional (see further: Delchin, 2000; 
Kozusko, 2000; Strosnider, 2002).   
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The media has sensationalized the problem in order to attract customers and 
advertisers. And some criminologists, but certainly not all, have given undue 
focus to gangs as a result of a rigid adherence to theoretical perspectives 
regarding the onset and progression of criminal behavior.” 
 
Although well established in the socio-cultural literature on deviance, moral panic 
analyses have been criticised because of the ethics of attribution and debates 
surrounding the assessment of whether a social response can ever be considered 
disproportionate  (Garland, 2008). This is because there is an inherent normative 
judgment in assessing disporportionality (Garland, 2008; Young, 2009). This ties in 
with issues of ontological gerrymandering (Woolgar & Pawlunch, 1985). Woolgar 
and Pawlunch (1985, p. 214) explain that studies of social problems often 
“manipulate a boundary, making certain phenomena problematic while leaving others 
unproblematic.” They term this process of ontological boundary management as 
‘ontological gerrymandering.’ This observation is particularly pertinent with respect 
to moral panic analyses that involve the presumption that a social response to a 
phenomenon is disproportionate. The obvious question becomes: disproportionate to 
what? Of course, this involves making an evaluation of what a proportionate response, 
from an objective standpoint, about an objective phenomenon, would be. Clearly, 
there are some epistemological issues here. Ungar (2001, pp. 284-285) comments that 
the issue of disproportionality has been “undoubtedly the central problematic of the 
moral panic literature” as “researchers make Herculean efforts to find the elusive grail 
of ‘objective reality.’” Garland (2008, p. 22) questions: “can the object of concern 
(the problem, the deviance, the behaviour) ever be known with any objectivity, or are 
there only various subjective interpretations and representations?” It is here the 
incongruous nature of moral panic analyses is exposed. While this does not invalidate 
the wealth of insights gleaned from moral panic analyses, it certainly complicates 
them. 
 
In relation to the debate about whether social reactions are disproportionate to the 
‘true’ or ‘real’ extent of the problem, Cohen (1999, p. 588) argues, “questions of 
power, representation and control cannot be reduced to arithmetical proportions.” Yet, 
this problem is not simply one of mathematics: it strikes at the epistemological heart 
of social problem analyses. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994a, p. 152) sidestep the issue 
entirely: “if we insist that we have no right to determine the nature of the threat posed 
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by certain conditions, such questions are not problematic- indeed, they are not even 
possible.” To avoid these issues and drawing from other literatures, there is a 
complementary lens through which the social problem of organized crime can be 
viewed. We will now turn to this approach, as this does not fall victim to the same 
epistemological pitfalls as moral panic analyses. 
 
Authors have critiqued moral panic analyses from the perspective of the risk 
society (see: Beck, 1992; Hier, 2008; Ungar, 2001). Instead of episodes of moral 
panic, Hier (2008, p. 175) argues that there are “volatile moral discourses [which] are 
transmitted through configurations of grievances and risks under neo-liberalism.” 
Hier (2011, p. 524) discusses processes of moral regulation, arguing that moral panics 
are best conceived as “temporary crises in routine process of moral regulation that 
operate to (re)affirm a sense of existential security in moments of perceived 
insecurity.” This can be related to an argument made by Ungar (2001, p. 271) who 
states that “the sociological domain carved out by moral panic is most fruitfully 
understood as the study of the sites and conventions of social anxiety and fear.”  
Ungar explains that the fear of crime is a “relatively reassuring site for displacing the 
more uncertain and uncontrollable anxieties of a risk society” (Ungar, 2001, p. 275). 
The concept of moral regulation, while substantively similar to moral panic in a focus 
on social anxiety and fears, is “a more accurate and flexible concept” because it does 
not rely upon normative judgments of dis/proportionality (Critcher, 2009, p. 20). 
 
Given the above, the final section of this chapter examines the discursive 
techniques of forging lawless identities according to the perceived risk that certain 
groups present to society. The aim is to untangle the complex relationships between 
the media, political and bureaucratic crusaders (including police and politicians) and 
those who pose a particular risk or threat. Italian and Asian organized crime is 
specifically examined, as these were the ethnic categories that were recurrently 
identified as a risky population in the primary interview data. Organized crime 
according to status is also examined because of the political discourse surrounding 
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs) in Australia, and the status based legislative 
approach targeted against members of these groups (Chapter 5).  
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STATUS AND IDENTITY 
In the statement presented immediately below, Informant 2 discusses the focus on the 
perpetrators of organized crime at the expense of attention to the environment, 
marketplace or any number of other possible factors.  Informant 2 explains that this is 
because it is difficult to understand organized crime analytically, and to obtain the 
necessary data in order to do so. The Informant notes the focus is on the perpetrators 
because organized crime is a highly emotional subject: 
“It’s about the perpetrators. And it is not really based on any great analysis 
on the marketplace and what’s driving it, what the crimes are, how's the 
environment constrained and how does it facilitate, at various times, different 
sorts of offences. I think that’s, partly because it takes a lot of work to do that, 
and lot of research to get the appropriate data. And it’s a messy field. And it’s 
very contested in terms of the number of ways you can go about looking at it 
analytically. But also because it's become such an emotional, subject that 
people are just sort tied up in a view however they've arrived at it. And it’s 
very hard to budge them from the view that they're on about.” 
Informant 2 
 
The focus on the perpetrators can be related to a point made by Informant 4 
who discusses crime polices are often directed against individuals and groups ‘we do 
not like’ who are targeted by moral crusaders and labelled as ‘outsiders’ (Becker, 
1963). Informant 4 notes that in Australia the targets are identified on the basis of 
status and ethnicity. Informant 4 also points to the role of politicians (the moral 
crusaders) in identifying and declaring social problems: 
“It is always useful to ask: in whose interest? The other neat little buzz phrase 
that comes to mind is again ‘the squeaky wheel.’ Crime policies are often 
targeted against people we don't like. In the U.S. of course the religious and 
racist right don't like drug traffickers. In this country we don't like bikies. Or 
we don't like Vietnamese. What are the policies? Our policies are based on 
perceptions and not on analysis. The perception that bikies perpetuate - they 
don't do themselves any favours. The squeaky wheel is often the politician that 
declares ‘such and such is a terrible scourge on the community.’ That may be 
right, but it may not be. Until you do the analysis. There is no use.” 
         Informant 4 
It is clear in the statement above the Informant recognizes that the identified 
and declared social problem is contextually dependent. In the Australian context, the 
Informant suggests that the folk devils (Cohen, 1972) are OMCGs (or ‘bikies’) or an 
ethnic group (Vietnamese). Like Informant 2 above, Informant 4 notes that the focus 
is on the identity of perpetrators, and more specifically, according to group 
membership or on the basis of xenophobia.  
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MEDIA BITES 
Ericson (1991, p. 242) notes that the media “provide a discourse- an institutional 
model of classifying and interpreting reality- that helps people to construct their own 
organizational realities.” There is a complex relationship between what is presented in 
the media and the public’s perceptions of organized crime. Informant 5 commented 
that the public’s understanding of organized crime is influenced by the way the media 
portray organized crime: 
“It’s a term which people recognise because it is on the television, and 
essentially most people regard organized crime as reflected by a television 
series from Hollywood or the Underbelly series, pretty salacious and all that 
sort of thing, or motorcycle gangs, all that sort of crap.” 
        Informant 5 
 
In Hagan’s (1980, p.623) meta-review of the emergence of criminal laws 
(discussed further below) the media is cited as the “lynchpin,” although the exact 
mechanisms of influence are complex, and hence not well understood. Other authors 
writing more recently have refined this model this model arguing there is a symbiotic 
relationship between police, media, politicians and the public. For example Katz 
(2011) adapts and applies Burns and Crawford’s (1999) model of the interactions 
between the media, politicians and public perception to OMCGs. This relationship is 
a reinforcing and self-perpetuating triangle with issue identification, legitimation, 
sensationalization and rhetoric feeding between the three nodes. Informant 6 pointed 
to the relationship between the police, the media and the public perceptions of 
organized crime, and also touched upon the role played by the media in the 
construction of organized crime:  
“It is everything from the media and public perception of what the law 
enforcement agencies do. I mean, it starts in the street when people think, 'Oh, 
there is drugs everywhere on the street. There are people out killing people. 
There's lots of noise, lots of stabbings, lots of shootings there.'” 
        Informant 6 
Informant 6 then explained that it has been difficult to move away from the 
structured (group-based) approach to understanding organized crime because of 
media portrayals:  
“I think it's been very hard to break this, this structured approach to 
organized crime... It is all these sorts of perceptions that media get hold of. 
And they report it as 'Mr. Big guns down three people in Sydney,' or whatever 
it might be… So, you've got this public perception of what is going on in the 
street, based on the media, how the media play it and what the media says.” 
        Informant 6 
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Informant 7 commented the media focuses on ethnicity and group membership 
because it is easy to ‘sell’ these stories: 
“[There is] the media and sound bites and grabs, the media portrayal, they 
need to sell stories- it is simple and easy and the community gobble it up.” 
         Informant 7 
 
This can be related to the point made by McCorkle and Miethe (2002) who 
note the media need to attract customers and advertisers. The media is intimately 
invested, as these stories are ‘salacious’ and ‘sell.’ In turn, this can be connected to 
points made by Garland (2008, p. 15) who notes: 
“The mass media are typically the prime movers and the prime beneficiaries 
of these [moral panic] episodes, since the sensation they create- a kind of 
collective effervescence- sells papers, entertains readers, and generates 
further news and commentary.”  
 
Organized crime is media friendly, it is newsworthy, it captures the public’s 
imagination and most importantly it sells stories. The point to take away here is the 
media has its own stake in a certain view of organized crime, and plays an important 
role in transmitting that view to the public. 
 
MIGRANTS AND IMPORTING ORGANIZED CRIME TO AUSTRALIA 
Hagan (1980) conducted a meta-review of the emergence of anti-narcotics legislation 
in the U.S. and Canada, arguing the primary explanation of the passage of the 
legislation was “middle-class concern for the supremacy of its values” (Hagan, 1980, 
p. 616). That is, there was a perceived threat to the moral values of the middle-class, 
and the criminal laws were introduced in an attempt to protect these. Of the 15 
emergence studies reviewed by Hagan (1980), four explicitly identified that the 
rationale for the introduction of new legislation was founded in a moral consensus 
targeted against ethnic minority groups that were associated with the use of various 
substances. For example, in Reasons’ (1974, p. 390) examination of drug laws in the 
U.S.- a study included in Hagan’s (1980) meta-review- it is argued that “anti-drugs 
became a rally point for racists and nativists who felt themselves in the throes of a 
life-and-death struggle with alien forces.” Importantly “the institutionalization of the 
problem was largely a response to the imagery surrounding those [who] used [drugs]” 
(Reasons, 1974, p. 391, emphasis added). The focus was on the ethnic identity of the 
perpetrators. While these seminal studies are some decades old, the findings are still 
relevant today. For example, this is a point also made by Sheptycki (2003a, p. 126) 
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who argues, “the notion of transnational organized crime is often read against a 
background of crude racial stereotyping.” 
 
Although Reasons’ (1974) study and much of the available literature concerns 
American drug laws, these issues are highly applicable to an Australian context. 
Through historical analysis, Manderson (1993; 1999) traced the emergence and 
evolution of drug laws in Australia. One of the main findings of this study is how the 
long history of racism towards ethnic migrants, and in particular the Chinese, has 
influenced the emergence and expansion of drug laws in Australia. Manderson (1999) 
points to a number of Australian drug laws (e.g. the Opium Act of 1895 (SA)) that 
were introduced as manifestations of xenophobia towards the Chinese and their 
immigration to Australia at that time. These issues are not solely applicable to drugs 
and can be extended to organized crime, as lawless identities are forged on the basis 
of outsider status and ethnicity, further solidified in political discourse and 
institutional responses. Woodiwiss and Hobbs (2009, p. 124) argue: 
“Via an analysis of the policing of organized crime, we can observe how 
moral panics function as vehicles for the repressive and racist government of 
urban life, and for the colonization of democratic states by the penetration of 
political institutions.”  
 
This theme was evident in the interview data:  
“I say organized crime is you know, the Triad, the Chinese Triad groups, the 
Mafia, the Vietnamese 5T, there are the Yakuza, the Japanese Yakuza, the 
Medellin Cartel, Columbia. They are some of the traditional things you think 
of organized crime.” 
         Informant 6 
 
“I mean a lot might be related to Australian immigration policies. Because 
where these groups have emerged it has involved some aspects of immigration 
policy. It’s not just the numbers. It’s the way they've come, where they've come 
from, how they've integrated into the community and all of those sort of things.” 
         Informant 2 
 
Informant 6 provided the explanation that migrants arriving in Australia may 
have turned to crime due to language barriers and challenges in integrating into 
Australian society:  
“So you had these groups of migrants that come to Australia. They have it 
different really, because of the language and marginalization from the 
Australian society, so they looked for alternative means to earn money.” 
         Informant 6 
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This explanation of organized crime can be contrasted with points made by 
Informants 1 and 5 as presented below. These Informants provided examples of 
organized crime groups infiltrating Australia from outside. Informant 1 touches on the 
issue of Asian organized crime groups. The key part of this statement is that the 
Informant points to a coordinating group operating overseas:  
“In that case there was something like 17 separate Asian syndicates operating 
in Australia, unknown to each other. They were all being coordinated by a 
criminal group overseas to distribute drugs.” 
         Informant 1 
 
What is interesting about the above statement is that the blame for the local 
crime problem is directed towards outside groups. Informant 1 then touched upon this 
same point from an Indian perspective:  
 “I went over to India and I was talking to them about the groups operating 
through India to Australia. ‘Oh we don’t have organized crime in India.’ Even 
after meeting with all the British and American agents in New Delhi, as far as 
the Indians are concerned ‘we don’t have organized crime, it is the foreigners 
who are involved in that, Russians and all you people… no, we do not have 
organized crime in India.’ They have got the issue of people trafficking, 
women from Bangladesh being transported around. They have drugs from 
Mexico coming through Mumbai then being redirected to Canada. It is going 
on all the time even although the Americans and Canadians are telling the 
Indians ‘you’re a transshipment base for drugs.’ ‘We don’t have that’ they 
would reply. ‘It is you, all these foreigners, not Indians.’” 
         Informant 1 
 
In this statement it is clear that from the Informant’s experiences in India the 
cause for the organized crime problem is ‘foreigners’, and not Indians. There is the 
displacement of blame to outsiders that poses a threat to society. In relation to 
organized crime being a “foreign contagion” Sheptycki (2003a, p. 126) argues: 
“It is not just that ‘transnational organized crime conjures up visions of a 
criminal other; all demonological depictions of crime divide the world into 
good guys and bad guys. It is that TOC [transnational organized crime] is 
imbued with the flavor of alien conspiracy, a foreign contagion, an infection 
disease from afar that threatens the health of society.” 
 
Another Informant added a similar statement in relation to child pornography 
and ‘snuff’ movies (i.e. films that depict sexual violence, even death). The source of 
vice originates from Eastern Europe: 
“But the problem is that a lot of the generation of child pornography, ‘snuff’ 
movies and all that sort of thing, is actually done in countries where it is 
almost impossible to get at. Eastern European countries in particular: Belarus. 
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Ukraine. Russia. Places like that. Where it is very difficult to have a 
meaningful relationship with the law enforcement authorities because of the 
nature of the community, the corruption within the community, and the fact 
that they are really so different from us and our values and their values don’t 
coincide when it comes to these sort of issues.” 
         Informant 5 
 
These observations tie in with arguments arising from the literature that is 
critical of the identification of alien organized crime groups. The groups identified 
(whether they are coordinating operations from Asia or Easter Europe) are portrayed 
as the cause for the organized crime problem, instead of local demands (see: Edwards 
& Gill, 2002a; Hobbs, 1998a; 1998b; Woodiwiss, 2003a; 2003b). This enables the 
blame for social problems to be shifted elsewhere, and in this case, to an ethnic 
migrant or overseas group who simultaneously act as ‘folk devil’ and scapegoat. It 
should be noted at this point that there is the possibility that these judgments about 
outsiders are correct. 
 
In order to demonstrate the above points in an Australian context, three case 
studies are presented across the recent history of organized crime in Australia (Italian 
organized crime, Asian organized crime and OMCGs). The Informants in this study 
identified three distinct phases of changing conceptions of organized crime across the 
1970-80s, 1990s and 2000s. These case studies were selected as these were identified 
by the Informants and because they each demonstrate the way in which certain groups 
are identified as threats to society that warrant a social response directed towards 
them. The cases bring to light some of the ways in which social institutions and 
practices- whether a Royal Commission, Parliamentary Inquiry or a raft of new laws- 
are developed in response to the perceived problem. Leading into Chapter 5 and the 
institutionalization of organized crime, these cases set up the argument that through 
the forging of lawless identities, social institutions are mobilized. Parallels between 
the three case studies are drawn, with an emphasis on the factors that contribute to 
igniting social and political institutions.  
 
The case studies explored in this section are: 
1. The 1977 murder of the anti-drugs campaigner Mr. Donald Mackay that 
led to the Woodward Royal Commission;  
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2. The 1994 murder of the anti-drugs campaigner Mr. John Newman that led 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority to 
publish a report on Asian Organized Crime in Australia;  
3. The 2009 murder of Anthony Zervas that led to the introduction of the 
Crimes (Criminal Organisation Control) Act 2009 (NSW). This section 
also considers the 2013 ‘bikie brawl’ at Broadbeach because it provided 
the impetus for anti-criminal gang law reform in Queensland (Vicious 
Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD) and the Criminal 
Law (Criminal Organization Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (QLD)). 
 
CASE STUDY 1: THE MAFIA IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
Turning to the first case, the focus on organized crime as Italian Mafia was a central 
theme when discussing Australian organized crime with the Informants in this study. 
Links can be drawn with Cressey (1969) and Iannis’ (1972) ethnic models of 
organized crime described in Chapter 3: 
“There are different categories of organized crime. One category, which is a 
highly structured hierarchical category, involves some of the Italian crime 
groups, which are operating out of Australia.” 
         Informant 5 
 
“I think when I first started, organized crime was a word that was bandied 
around and everyone knew it had something to do with Italians and drugs.” 
         Informant 4 
 
The view of organized crime as Italian Mafia is relevant to the U.S. model of 
organized crime espoused by Cressey (1969) (see: Chapter 3). According to Cressey 
(1969) the Sicilian Mafia or the Cosa Nostra had infiltrated American society. 
Informants 2 and 6 were critical that this model of organized crime had been taken 
from the U.S. and applied to the Australian context:  
“If you look back at the United States in the thirties, forties, fifties, sixties, and 
the Mafia model, that really sort of came to dominate.  That probably was 
most of organized high-level serious crime in the United States at the time… 
We just borrowed that model and said it applied here. And to a certain extent, 
it did with Italian criminals who came to Australia. But we sort of just... We 
got struck in their model, and so did the Americans, and then we kept looking 
at only those sort of people. So that reinforced all of their information, 
reinforced that particular view of the world. But in fact, there were lots of 
other serious crooks going around, doing the same sort of things. And they 
were of different ethnicity. Or they were carrying out their business in 
different ways. Or they were emerging.” 
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        Informant 2 
 
“We were very, very bogged down with the American Mafia approach to 
organized crime. And I think the U.S., the U.S. strategies polluted the way we 
thought about organized crime.” 
         Informant 6 
 
 Informant 2 added that a consequence of the fixation on Italians and their 
ethnic and cultural identity resulted in policing agencies ‘missing’ what was 
happening:  
“We were so fixated on the Italians, and then Chinese, that we sort of missed 
what was actually going on.” 
        Informant 2 
 
 As relayed in the excerpt below, Informant 2 was involved in discussions with 
a range of policing agencies in the 1980s (National Crime Authority, Australian 
Federal Police and State police) about whether Italian organized crime groups were 
the main organized crime group in Australia. The Informant recounts the division 
between agencies, where some believed that Italians controlled organized crime in 
Australia, whereas others though the situation was quite different. The Informant also 
notes the subsequent shift from Italian organized crime groups to Chinese organized 
crime groups:  
“I was involved in the 1980s with a whole lot of discussions in agencies at the 
time, like the National Crime Authority, the State police and the AFP, which 
was sort of pretty new then, about precisely whether Italian organized crime 
groups dominated organized crime in Australia. And there was a real 
difference of opinion, I mean, analytically, the agencies actually were really 
split. And some agencies would say, all important crime in Australia (and it 
was mostly drug crime) is controlled, and hierarchically organized, totally at 
the disposal of Italians. And there was an argument about whether they were 
being sort of ousted by the Chinese organized crime groups.  On the other 
hand, other agencies were saying ‘no, it’s much more complex than that.’”
        Informant 2 
 
Along this line, Informant 6 discussed the monopoly Italian organized crime 
had over marijuana in New South Wales at that time: 
“You have this mass immigration of groups of people. And they moved up to 
the Sunraysia Riviera district… The Italians had a huge monopoly on the 
marijuana distribution. Remember Robert Trimbole and Donald Mackay that 
was killed because he was going to uncover Italian crime.” 
         Informant 6 
 
The point made by Informant 6 is important because it raises an interesting case 
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concerning Italian organized crime in Australia. In July 1977, in the rural town of 
Griffith in New South Wales, anti-drugs campaigner Donald Mackay was murdered. 
This case was the subject of intense media and public attention over the following 
years. Following the media and public attention, the murder of Donald Mackay led to 
the Royal Commission into Drug Trafficking (Woodward Royal Commission, 1979). 
This Royal Commission commenced in August 1977 and concluded with the 
presentation of the final report in October 1979.  
 
There are a number of factors in this case that are of interest. First, Donald 
Mackay actively campaigned against marijuana in Griffith. That is, he was acting as a 
moral crusader. His disappearance incited national media and public interest, which 
was in effect a moral panic about Italian organized crime. This then led to an inquiry- 
a Royal Commission- into drug trafficking. An Italian organized crime group was 
implicated in this murder. Bottoms (1988, p. 46) notes that in the final report of the 
Royal Commission “Justice Woodward concluded that a ‘cell’ or ‘family’ of a secret 
Calabrian criminal society known variously as The Honoured Society, L’Onorata 
Societa or N’Dranghita, operated at Griffith.” The Woodward Royal Commission 
concluded that this Mafia style organization was involved in drug trafficking activities, 
and was responsible for the murder of Donald Mackay. 
 
Stepping over the issue of whether or not Italian organized crime maintained a 
monopoly over marijuana distribution in Griffith or were responsible for the murder 
of Donald Mackay, this case highlights some important elements about the 
mobilization of institutional responses. That is, the focus of this discussion is on the 
social response to the identified threat, and not the existence of the threat itself. 
Firstly, an alien outsider group (i.e. Italian organized crime) was portrayed as being 
responsible for the problem and as presenting a risk or threat to Australian society. 
Moreover, Donald Mackay’s disappearance and murder was subject to intense media 
and public attention. It could be said that this triggered a moral panic targeted towards 
Italian organized crime as the ‘folk devil.’ The moral panic and media attention 
provided the impetus for a highly political and institutional response in the form of a 
Royal Commission. The factors contributing to the mobilization of social institutions, 
as described in the literature on moral panic and risk, are clearly evident in this case. 
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CASE STUDY 2: THREAT FROM THE EAST AND ASIAN ORGANIZED 
CRIME IN CABRAMATTA 
Informant 6 commented on the transformations in the identification of ethnically 
organized crime groups in Australia throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  This 
included the shift from Italian organized crime to Asian (Chinese and Vietnamese) 
organized crime, as also mentioned by Informant 2 above. To further this argument, 
in the statement presented below Informant 6 mentions that the Chinese and Italians 
were the first organized crime groups that had infiltrated Australian society. The point 
is that the identification of organized crime according to (shifting) ethnicity is 
ultimately a racist discourse that targets outsider groups: 
“I always like to look at the early organized crime groups in Australia. And 
you could somewhat argue that Chinese were the first, and Italians.” 
         Informant 6 
 
Informant 6 continues by arguing the Vietnamese began to take over the 
heroin trade from the Chinese in the 1980s and 1990s. That is, there was competition 
between two ethnic groups, both of which at one point or another, were considered 
responsible for the heroin problem in Australia:  
“Then the Vietnamese came. And they started to muscle in on the Chinese 
heroin trafficking and heroin business.  So, you had the formation of 
Vietnamese gangs and Vietnamese organized crime groups that got together 
that then eventually started to compete against the Chinese.” 
        Informant 6 
 
These points are relevant to a study on the emergence of the drug problem in 
America. Reasons (1974, p. 390) discusses that smoking opium was tightly associated 
with the Oriental “yellow peril” and that opium became a way to “characterize the 
Oriental as dangerous, insidious, and worthy of condemnation and isolation.” This 
was how the identity of the Chinese- as an outsider group responsible for the opium 
problem- was forged at that time in the United States. In turn, this can be related to 
Manderson’s (1993; 1999) historical examination of racism towards the Chinese in 
Australia, and the same view that the Chinese were responsible for the heroin problem. 
Manderson (1993) shows that there is a long history of racism towards Chinese in 
Australia which, as discussed above, provided the impetus for new laws (such as the 
Opium Act of 1895 (SA)). 
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This point is relevant to the second case, which concerns Vietnamese 
organized crime in the Sydney suburb of Cabramatta. Like the case of Donald 
Mackay in Griffith, an ethnic organized crime group was constructed as responsible 
for both the drug problem and the murder of an anti-drugs campaigner, resulting in 
intense media and public attention and an eventual political-institutional response. 
The links that can be drawn between these cases show how a racist discourse operates 
to construct outsider groups as responsible for social problems and how intense media 
and public attention directed towards those groups works to mobilize political 
institutions. 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Mr. John Newman, the member for 
Cabramatta in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, was an active campaigner 
against heroin and organized crime in his electorate (Priest, 2010). The Cabramatta 
electorate was an electorate with a significant Asian, and particularly Vietnamese, 
migrant population (Parliamentary Committee Joint Committee on the National Crime 
Authority, 1995).  In 1994 John Newman was ‘assassinated.’ Manderson (1999, p. 
185) comments that “newspaper reports at the time of Newman’s death conflated a 
number of stories in order to give the impression that ‘Asian drug gangs’ co-ordinated 
the heroin trade in Sydney.” In other words, the murder of Mr. Newman triggered 
media and public attention, with Asians involved in the heroin trade becoming the 
folk devil or target of panic.   
 
This public attention led the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National 
Crime Authority in 1995 to conduct an inquiry specifically on Asian Organized Crime 
in Australia. As stated on the first page of the report of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee, the report was written specifically due to public interest following the 
murder of Mr. Newman. That is, there was an institutional response triggered by the 
murder of Mr. Newman and his role as an active campaigner against drugs and 
organized crime in Cabramatta. Again, this is not to deny the existence of Asian 
organized crime in Australia, nor the significance of Mr. Newman’s murder,16 but 
                                                        
16 It is worth nothing that in 2001, Phuong Cahn Ngo was sentenced for the murder of Mr. Newman. In 
the sentencing deliberations it was claimed that the motive for the murder was Mr. Ngo’s political 
ambition as he wished to replace Mr. Newman in the Legislative Assembly (R v Ngo [2001] NSWSC 
1021 (14 November, 2001)). The Crown alleged Mr. Newman was murdered because of political 
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rather to highlight how a single event in Australian history incited media and public 
interest, the identification of a folk devil or threat (i.e. Asian organized crime), and 
the subsequent political and institutional process in the drafting of a parliamentary 
report into Asian organized crime in Australia.  
 
DE-RACIALIZING ORGANIZED CRIME 
 
“You’ve got to be careful not to focus on minority groups.” 
 
         Informant 6 
 
Informants 2 and 6 indicated that there was then a shift away from relating organized 
crime to ethnicity and migrant communities. Informant 2 comments that through the 
arrests that were being made, it became obvious that there was increasing diversity 
and this needed to be explained: 
“So, as the information changes the models change, and that's what happened in 
the sort of eighties when there was this move away from the Mafia model. But first 
of all, it was just substituting other ethnic groups. So there was still a tendency to 
view groups as organized around family ties, being hierarchically organized, and 
vertically integrated. You could find examples of those sorts of groups - it’s not 
that they didn’t exist, but it was obvious that, just from the people that we were 
actually arresting; that things had changed, that you are now finding groups that 
were much more diverse. They hadn't even married into the particular ethnicity.  
They were Australians. Or they were, you know, sort of Albanians or something or 
other, working with Vietnamese. And then you had to try and explain: what were 
they? Was one group sort of subcontracting with the other? Were they hiring in? 
And that’s the sort of things that people would say to try and explain it. ‘Well, it's, 
you know,’ they say ‘the Chinese; they actually own the show and run it. But they 
used the Vietnamese’s muscle because they're happy to go and smack people 
around and that sort of thing. But the Chinese didn’t want to be involved in that. 
They wanted to run the business.’” 
         Informant 2 
 
The connections between ethnic groups, particularly the Vietnamese and 
Chinese, was taken up further by Informant 6. This Informant discussed the interracial 
connections between Vietnamese and Chinese groups operating together. Ethnic lines 
became blurred: 
“It’s no longer just Vietnamese working together. I think it’s a lot more 
interracial… I was seeing groups cross lines and join other groups. You know, 
Chinese and the Vietnamese working together.” 
         Informant 6 
                                                                                                                                                              
rivalry. Mr. Newman’s murder was not a result of his campaigning efforts against drugs and/or 
Vietnamese/Asian organized crime. 
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Informant 2 discussed that it was no longer viable to describe or define 
organized crime according to ethnicity because there was a succession of different 
groups that were identified (the Informant offers the example of Italians, Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Russians and Hungarians), and when a ‘mixed’ group was identified law 
enforcement could not explain what was happening. While it can be argued that the 
focus on ethnicity was blinding (police constantly identifying ethnic groups), after 
time it did not fit what police were finding, and the model had to change: 
“Just defining organized crime in Australia by ethnic group was no longer 
viable. Because it was getting a bit silly in a sense that every time someone 
else would pop up. So it was Italians mostly seemed to get arrested anyway... 
But then Chinese started getting arrested. And then it was Vietnamese. And 
then it was Russians. And then it was Hungarians. So, what now? You've got 
ten ethnically organized crime groups [Informant laughs]. And then you bust 
one gang, and you'd find three different people. And then say, 'So, what’s 
happening here is, oh, it must be the Italians are recruiting the, the whatever 
they were, Martians or whatever' [Informant laughs].” 
        Informant 2 
 
Informant 2 elaborated on the shift away from focusing on ethnic minority 
groups highlighting that there were tensions between whether a focus on ethnic 
groups was an appropriate model for law enforcement agencies to follow. In the 
statement presented below the Informant explains the Australian Federal Police (AFP), 
the then National Crime Authority (NCA) and the South Australian Police argued 
against an ethnic focus:  
“So some people really wanted to hold firm to that, that's the way it is, it's 
hierarchical and it's ethnic based. Some of the other agencies, including, I 
think, the Federal Police at the time and probably some people like South 
Australian Police and the NCA were saying, 'No, no. It's much more 
complicated than that. It's certainly not as hierarchical as it was, if it ever was. 
It's now much more fluid.’” 
         Informant 2 
 
The competing argument was that organized crime was much more fluid than 
being organized on the basis of ethnicity. The Informant also noted that the need to be 
‘politically correct’ was a force driving change. It was no longer appropriate to refer 
to criminal groups according to their ethnicity: the Informant states that police were 
no longer allowed to, possibly due to wider social forces such as the Government’s 
policy on multiculturalism or the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The 
Informant notes that this change coincided with a great focus on the changing 
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landscape in which certain crimes occurred. Police did not have evidence of vertically 
integrated organized crime groups, and those implicated in organized crime were not 
organized according to ethnicity: 
“Then there was this big, sort of partly politically correct sort of argument 
about should you not have ethnic labels on groups, not because it wasn’t real 
but because it wasn’t nice. So that partly drove change. I mean it probably 
didn’t start out changing the operators’ view of what the marketplace looked 
like.  But they weren’t allowed to say there was Asian organized crime 
because that was offensive to Asians or to whichever ethnic group you picked 
on. So, it sort of came [about] trying to do the right thing in terms of respecting 
different ethnic differences. Went hand and glove with the fact that they’re 
actually in this very challenging landscape where they didn’t have any 
evidence of hierarchy, that it was obviously not vertically integrated because 
it was a group over here that was doing the importing and another completely 
unrelated group that was doing the distribution.  Yeah, so the world just sort 
of changed.” 
         Informant 2 
 
The above statement reveals that there was a growing sense in Australian 
police agencies that focusing on ethnic groups was racist and discriminatory, and not 
that helpful either. There were arguments arising from within police to not deliminate 
according to racial lines. This can be linked to the emerging ‘science’ of criminal 
profiling that makes it possible to identify ‘criminal types’ without reference to racial 
considerations. However, as will be shown in the section that follows and the final 
case study, the focus was then increasingly directed at non-ethnic groups that were 
identifiable on the basis of their appearance and status. All the while, the spotlight 
remained, and does still today, on outsiders that present a risk to Australian society. 
 
A NEW LEXICON: CONSTRUCTING THE ‘EAST COAST CRIMINAL MILIEU’  
There was the arrival of a new era in which a racial focus was discouraged. The 
National Crime Authority (NCA) brought a new category of organized crime into 
existence, as the Informant describes in the statement below. According to Informant 
2, individuals were identified that were not of a particular minority ethnicity. This 
required a new lexicon to describe organized crime in Australia: 
“So it got to the point where it became really silly, where the NCA actually 
came up with this thing. I was actually at the meeting where they decided on it. 
And it became an official name called the 'East Coast Criminal Milieu,' the 
ECCM, which became an official organized crime group because, you know, 
they sort of picked off the Italians and the Japanese and the Chinese and the 
Vietnamese and the Albanians. But they had this really serious group of 
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unrelated criminals. They all knew each other and sometimes worked together.  
A group of knock about Australian blokes, mostly. So what do you call them? 
You just can’t call it 'Australian Organized Crime' [Informant laughs]. So they 
called it the 'East Coast Criminal Milieu' [Informant laughs]. And then if you 
ever got NCA reports from the time, for years, when they were dividing up the 
‘what’s organized crime look like’ one of their references was actually 
officially on the East Coast Criminal Milieu.” 
         Informant 2 
 
The National Crime Authority, then, branded the ‘East Coast Criminal Milieu’ 
(ECCM) as a new category of organized crime to be combated.  What is interesting 
about this is the recognition that the ECCM was identified after each of the ethnic 
groups of organized crime had been ‘picked off.’ Moreover, the Informant 
deliberately notes that the law enforcement community felt that this category could 
not, for whatever reason, be called ‘Australian Organized Crime.’ Instead there was a 
purposeful decision to label this the ‘East Coast Criminal Milieu’ or the ‘ECCM.’ 
There was a shift from racist labels to neutral geographic language. 
 
The example of the ECCM is fascinating because it demonstrates that policing 
agencies must be able to draw clear boundaries around organized crime groups, 
whether that is according to ethnicity, group membership or geographic ties. 
Subsequently, this label (or brand) was adopted as a distinct category of organized 
crime in police organizations throughout Australia’s jurisdictions. For example in a 
strategic assessment of organized crime in Queensland, prepared jointly by the 
Queensland Crime Commission and the Queensland Police Service (1999), the East 
Coast Criminal Milieu is detailed under the assessment of Ethnic and Ethos based 
organized crime. Informant 3 also noted the ECCM as being the focus of the AFP at 
the commencement of their career (circa 1996):  
“When I first went in [to the AFP], you were seeing the concentration within 
the AFP was far more on major cannabis, or cannabis resin importations, 
which involve the old players called the East Coast Criminal Milieu, who were 
by and large Anglo-Celtic criminals, who had networks which extended 
globally, they had to.  But were much more in situ criminal figures, who 
everyone knew were engaged in these sorts of activities.” 
         Informant 3 
 
The Informant describes the ECCM as ‘Anglo-Celtic’ (i.e. of British or Irish 
descent, or ‘white’) who were ‘in situ’ criminal figures (operating within Australia). 
The title ‘ECCM’ disguises Australian organized crime. But, it cannot just be 
 117 
‘Australian Organized Crime.’ It must be ‘outsiders.’ This resonates with the idea that 
culture and ethnicity relates to ‘other’ groups. ‘Australian’ and ‘Anglo Celtic’ are not 
denominators for crime purposes as thus another label (ECCM) must distinguish and 
define them as ‘outsiders.’ 
 
CASE STUDY 3: THE WAR ON ‘BIKIE WARS’  
Any examination into organized crime in Australia would be incomplete without 
reference to Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs) as they are currently the main 
targets of the ‘tough on crime’ political discourse and provide the rationale for current 
moves in law (explored at length in Chapter 5). This section will show that the focus 
has shifted from ethnic groups to group membership status. 
 
Specific to an Australian context, Morgan, Dagistanli and Martin (2010) 
charted the media and institutional response to the New South Wales ‘bikie gang’ war 
in 2008-9. This ‘gang war’ involved a series of violent attacks, shootings and murders 
involving members of rival ‘bikie gangs’ (Morgan et al. 2010). Morgan et al. (2010) 
examined the role of the media in focusing public attention on these events and the 
subsequent response including the expansion of police powers and the introduction of 
new laws to deal with OMCGs. Morgan et al. (2010, p. 592) argue: “the interplay 
between sensationalized media coverage, political rhetoric and legislative response to 
the ‘bikie’ violence displays many of the features of a moral panic.” Again, links can 
be drawn to the two earlier cases where outsider groups are identified and there is 
intense media and public attention leading to political-institutional response.  
 
The statements presented below indicate that some Informants in this study (in 
particular Informants 4, 5, 6, and 7) were critical of the political focus on OMCGs. 
For example, Informant 5 notes focusing on OMCGs as an organized criminal group 
overshadows individuals within the group: 
“I mean a motorcycle gang itself is not necessarily a criminal group, in spite 
of what the law is trying to do with them. It is individuals within the group. It 
may be quite a large number of individuals that engage in serious criminality 
and that use the discipline and the ritual and the colours and all that sort of 
stuff of the motorcycle gangs to give them a sense of identity and a sense of 
security and a sense of fear. You know, you get a dozen motorcycle gang 
members walking into a pub, the rest of the pub will clear out. Not that they 
are actually threatening anybody but the appearance is a threatening 
appearance. And within that group there might be two or three who are 
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criminals and the others might just be macho motorcycle riders who go along 
with the mystique of motorcycle gangs.” 
         Informant 5 
 
What is interesting about this statement is how the Informant comments on the 
appearance of members. Members of OMCGs can be readily identified by their 
appearance- the colours and patches that they wear to identify themselves as members 
of the group. As the Informant notes this appearance is ‘threatening.’ Members of 
OMCGs present a threat to society, and one that can be readily identified on the basis 
of appearance. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that they are engaged in 
criminal activity. Informant 4 comments that it is easy to study (and legislate against) 
OMCGs simply because they are readily identifiable:  
“It is dead easy to study bikie gangs. Which is why academics… [Interviewer 
interrupts: Would you say the same thing? That it is dead easy to legislate 
against bikie gangs?]. Absolutely because you can identify them.” 
         Informant 4 
 
Informant 4 makes the point that the ease of identification means that it is easy 
to study and legislate against these groups. However as Informant 6 notes below, a 
focus based solely on appearance leads to the self-fulfilling spotlighting of what is 
perceived to be a ‘bikie’:  
“But I mean we are looking at bikies as what we perceive bikies to be: leather 
jackets, patches, tats, long hair. But you don’t think about the ones in the suits 
and the ones who you wouldn’t recognize in the street, and don't necessarily 
drive a Harley.” 
        Informant 6 
 
This means the attention paid to motorcycle groups overshadows what falls 
outside the group. This can be related to a statement made by Informant 7 who 
discusses that other organized criminals must be rejoicing at the attention directed 
towards OMCGs:  
“Blatantly in your face and that why we have to target them… [There is an] 
Overemphasis on OMCGs [and] a lot of that is political, the legislation and 
the energy and the commitment. Other parts of organized crime must be 
saying ‘yes keep looking at them.’” 
         Informant 7 
 
What is particularly telling about the statement made by Informant 7 is that 
OMCGs have to be targeted because they are ‘blatantly in your face.’ The threat to 
society is readily identifiable and something must be done about it. OMCGs are a 
political issue and this enables links to be made to the section on the politics of law 
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and order discussed earlier in this chapter. There is an identifiable threat to society 
and this must be combated so the state may attest to its ability to control crime. This 
helps explain why there have been dramatic moves to criminalize OMCGs in 
Australia, including prohibiting their presence in public places (Chapter 5).  
 
Sheptycki (2003b, p. 500) argues that it is likely OMCGs are consistently 
identified as posing the highest level of threat to Canadian society because of the 
amount of police attention and resources dedicated to the problem rather than “their 
objective threat.” However, Sheptycki (2003b, p. 500) adds a caveat that: 
“This is not to argue that members of such groups do not participate in 
(sometimes very serious) criminality, or that such crime is not productive of 
social harm.” 
 
This is an important point to make because while the activities of OMCGs are 
being used for political capital, there in fact are people that self-identify as being a 
‘bikie’ and understand what they do to be criminal. Indeed, judgements about 
OMCGs and their involvement in crime could be true. However, the ‘objective’, 
‘actual’ or even ‘plausible’ ‘threat’ of OMCGs is a matter for criminologists of an 
empirical bent to debate. The aim of the present analysis, aligned with the 
epistemological framework of the this thesis, is to explore the way in which the 
process by which outsider groups are designated as ‘lawless’ leading to political-
institutional responses.  
 
The NSW ‘bikie war’ that features at the centre of Morgan et al.’s (2010) 
analysis (described above) culminated on the 22nd of March 2009 with the murder of 
Anthony Zervas. Members of two feuding OMCGs (the Hell’s Angels and the 
Comancheros) were on the same domestic flight landing in Sydney. Upon 
disembarking additional members of the gangs arrived at the airport and a fight 
between members occurred. During this incident Anthony Zervas was bludgeoned to 
death with a metal bollard before numerous bystanders in the arrival hall. Anthony 
Zervas was not a member of an OMCG himself, but his brother Peter Zervas was a 
member of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (Morgan et al. 2010). In reference to 
the same case, and citing Morgan et al. (2010), Ayling (2011a, p. 254) notes, “the 
media reaction to these events was, of course, immediate and intense.” 
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An Informant in this study commented that the Sydney Airport brawl was a 
‘very stupid move’ by OMCGs because by coming to increased public attention 
politicians and police simply had to respond: 
“This is where outlaw motorcycle gangs have come to more attention, they’ve 
crossed that line... You know the brawl at the Sydney airport, for example.  It 
was a very stupid move by outlaw motorcycle gangs.” 
        Informant 6 
 
A swift response followed the spotlighting of the bikie brawl in the media. 
Loughnan (2009) observed that within one week the NSW Government had declared 
its commitment to pass new laws to deal with OMCGs. Drawing from Becker (1963), 
Morgan et al. (2010, p. 584) identify the New South Wales Police Gang Squad as 
moral entrepreneurs as they were “centrally involved in the processes by which 
problems come to be defined and their remedies formulated” through the statements 
made to the media. Morgan et al. (2010) demonstrate how the media and public 
attention enabled the Crimes (Criminal Organisation Control) Act 2009 (NSW) to be 
passed with very little parliamentary debate, to the advantage of the Labor 
Government, who polled favourably following the introduction of the new law. 
Ayling (2013a) comments: 
“When incidents of high visibility crime such as the Zervas murder occur, 
passing legislation often seems to those in power the simplest and most 
expressive option for allaying public concern and signalling condemnation.”  
 
Recently, in September 2013 there was another public brawl between OMCG 
members (Bandidos and Finks) outside a restaurant in the Gold Coast suburb of 
Broadbeach, in Queensland. This event was the subject of widespread media and 
public attention (see for example: ABC News, 2013; The Courier Mail, 2013; Jabour, 
2013). Immediately thereafter, and in direct response to the incident involving the 
Bandidos and the Finks, the Queensland Parliament under the leadership of Premier 
Newman quickly moved to reform Queensland’s anti-gang regime. This included the 
introduction of the Criminal Law (Criminal Organization Disruption) Amendment Act 
2013 (QLD) and the Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD). 
The content, substance, and way in which these laws were introduced are examined 
throughout Chapter 5. It is suffice for the present argument to highlight the title of the 
legislation- ‘Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD)’- and 
how it operates as a discursive technique in forging the ‘lawless’ identities of those it 
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targets. There is the obvious ascription of the identity of lawbreaker through language. 
This is another example of the way outsider groups are identified as a threat (‘vicious’ 
and ‘lawless’) to Australian society, and the consequences of media attention for the 
mobilization of social responses, and in this case legislative reform.   
 
Organized crime has emerged as an object of the discourse of outlaw identities. 
That is, there is a focus on outsider groups whether that is Italian organized crime, 
Asian organized crime, the ECCM, or OMCGs. At a higher level of analysis, the 
points discussed throughout this section can be related to a point made by McCulloch 
(2007, pp.25-26) who notes that suspect or risky populations are “strategically useful 
‘enemies within’” who serve as “convenient scapegoats and distractions from serious 
social and economic problems created through a range of neoliberal government 
policies.” McCulloch (2007, pp.25-26) adds the discursive practices that construct 
outlaw identities in political discourse “provides states with a mechanism for dealing 
with politically inconvenient citizens.” Three cases spanning the 1970-80s, 1990s and 
2000s were presented. Each of these pointed to the ways the forging of outlaw 
identities enables the mobilization of social and political institutions (Royal 
Commissions, Parliamentary Joint Committee inquiries, and legislative reform). 
Ultimately, these cases have shown that although the cast of characters changes, the 
narrative remains the same, time and time again.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter four discourses of organized crime were identified and include: the 
politics of law and order, new public management in policing, securitization and wars 
on crime and the forging of outlaw identities.  The construct of organized crime has 
multiple meanings. What fills the space between this construct and ‘reality’ are a 
whole range of social, economic, moral, political, bureaucratic and scientific factors. 
These factors work together, and against each other, to produce (this chapter) and 
institutionalize (i.e. the development of laws and institutions to combat organized 
crime; the next chapter) the social problem of organized crime.  
 
Before moving on to the final substantive chapter of this thesis, it is useful to 
take stock of the ground that has been covered up to this point. Chapter 3 reviewed 
the different ways organized crime has been constructed in academic discourse, 
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demonstrating that the social scientific discipline of criminology operates as a ‘regime 
of truth’ defining and describing conduct as criminal. It was shown there are a variety 
of different ways in which organized crime has been constructed in academic 
discourse, and that these were influenced by the context at the time of their 
articulation. Thereafter, the present chapter traced the emergence of the social 
problem of organized crime in various social, political, moral and bureaucratic 
discourses. It is within these discourses that the object of organized crime is 
constituted. Hence, dependent on the lens through which the phenomenon is viewed 
there are multiple ways of understanding and speaking about the social problem. 
From this point on, the important question then becomes: given these various 
understandings, how do they influence what is done towards the social problem? 
What will be shown in the following chapter is that the response to organized crime is 
driven by the way the phenomenon is constructed within the discourses explored in 
this chapter. That is, these ways of understanding organized crime provide the 
impetus for the institutionalization of the phenomenon. This is a mutually reinforcing 
and complex process, because the institutions of organized crime both order and are 
ordered by the phenomenon, which in turn further cements organized crime as a 
significant social problem. 
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CHAPTER 5: INSTITUTIONALIZING RESPONSES TO ORGANIZED CRIME 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Central to Giddens’ (1979; 1984) structuration theory is the idea of the dual use of 
knowledge: knowledge is revelatory as it exposes something about the social order, 
yet at the same time, it is a resource for social action. In Chapter 4, four 
understandings of organized crime were explored. The question becomes how do 
these understandings translate into what is done towards organized crime: that is, how 
does knowledge translate into the actions of social actors and the production and 
reproduction of social structures? The aim is to delineate closely related themes and 
the intertwined dynamics between what is known about organized crime and what is 
done to it. For example, McCulloch (2007, p. 19) argues “the construction of a 
transnational crime threat provides a productive fiction, establishing a rhetorical 
platform for the transformation and extension of the coercive capacities of the state.” 
Given this, the present chapter departs from the ‘productive fictions’ of organized 
crime as described in Chapter 4 and examines the institutions that have emerged to 
take action against organized crime. I use the term ‘institutionalizing’ in two ways: 
(1) the enactment of laws that criminalize organized crime and (2) the creation of 
agencies with the mandate to respond to organized crime. 
 
The chapter is structured in the following way: the legislative measures against 
organized crime in Australian jurisdictions are examined, with consideration to 
Australia’s obligations established under international law. It is shown that the threat 
of organized crime provides justification for the introduction of a range of new laws 
and the expansion of state powers. Second, the formation and transformation of new 
state agencies, in particular the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP), is examined. These new agencies are centralized 
hybrids with intelligence, investigative, enforcement and quasi-judicial functions. The 
practices of the agencies are considered with a focus on the productive and self-
reinforcing apparatus of intelligence collection and analysis. Finally, the challenges of 
policing organized crime are investigated, and drawing from suggestions provided by 
Informants in this study who reflected upon their careers in an attempt to make sense 
of the past, possible alternatives to criminalization and enforcement are discussed.  
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CRIMINALIZING ORGANIZED CRIME 
 
From a paradigmatically legal positivist perspective, law is “an officially recognized, 
enforceable system of rules, governing the relations of human beings in society” 
(Gifford, 1995, p. 74). Yet, law is many other things. It has deep philosophical 
foundations, encompasses notions of justice, responsibility, accountability, and 
importantly is always drafted, enacted and enforced in context (Bottomley & Bronitt, 
2012). There are both symbolic and instrumental functions of the law (Edelman, 
1964; Gusfield, 1968; Arnold, 1969). Gusfield (1968, p. 57) notes, “law is not only a 
means of social control but also symbolizes the public affirmation of social ideals and 
norms.” When discussing law as symbolism, Arnold (1969, p. 47) argues, “the 
function of the law is not so much to guide society, as to comfort it.” These are 
important points to keep in mind throughout the following analysis as this enables 
links to be forged between the present analysis, and themes explored in the previous 
chapter about the politics of law and order and the forging of outlaw identities: law 
operates as an expressive instrument for the state.  
 
It is necessary to examine the way in which law institutionalizes organized 
crime because the law, as a social institution, is a constitutive factor in creating 
organized crime as both a legal category and a social reality. Lacey (2007) sets forth 
the framework of criminalization, which draws attention to the context in, and 
practices by which, laws are drafted, enacted and enforced. The framework of 
criminalization does not consider crime as a category that maintains its own 
ontological reality, but instead the focus is on the processes by which conduct and 
people become defined as crime and criminal, through the social institution of 
criminal law. Lacey (2007, p. 197) explains: 
“Escaping the notion of crimes as ‘given’, the idea of criminalization captures 
the dynamic nature of the field as a set of interlocking practices in which the 
moments of ‘defining’ and ‘responding’ to crime can rarely be completely 
distinguished and in which legal and social (extra-legal) constructions of 
crime constantly interact. It accommodates the full range of institutions within 
which those practices take shape and the disciplines which might be brought 
to bear upon their analysis; it allows the instrumental and symbolic aspects of 
the field to be addressed, as well as encompassing empirical, interpretive and 
normative projects.” 
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The framework of criminalization, as espoused by Lacey (2007), in essence, 
represents the application of a social constructionist critique to the study of criminal 
law. Criminalization considers the construction of the criminal identity, the criminal 
subject and nature of the risk. This encompasses the relationship between legal and 
social constructions of crime and criminality (Lacey, 2007). Lacey (2007) explains 
that the main points to examine when thinking under this framework include the 
social, political and institutional relations under which systems of criminal law 
emerge. Following from the framework of criminalization, the aims of this section are 
to overview the way organized crime is defined by law, to examine the legislative 
strategies against organized crime and the rationale that underlies them, and consider 
the intended and unintended consequences. In doing so, connections between social 
and legal constructions of organized crime will be identified. 
 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (UNCTOC) 
As discussed in the section on the discourse of international securitization, the 
growing threat of transnational organized crime emerged as an international security 
problem warranting a coordinated international response and international convention 
(see: Chapter 4; see also: Guymon, 2000). This international convention, the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC), was adopted 
at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2000, and 
entered into force in 2003. The UNCTOC is the only international treaty providing 
State Parties with a legislative framework for combating organized crime. The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the guardian of the UNCTOC and 
the three supplementary protocols of trafficking in persons, firearms and the 
smuggling of migrants. Australia has ratified the UNCTOC, which dictates the 
legislative requirements for signatory States.  
 
According to Article 2(a) of the UNCTOC: 
Organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of 
committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance 
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit. 
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The UNCTOC offers a concise definition of organized crime based on its form 
(structured group), size (three or more persons) and motive (material benefit). That is, 
in a positivist quest to define the phenomenon through a clear rule, the UNCTOC 
proposes a universal equation to identify organized crime:  
 
Form + Size + Motive = Organized Crime 
  
Article 2(b) of the UNCTOC defines a serious crime as an offence that results 
in the maximum deprivation of liberty of four years. According to Article 2(c) of the 
UNCTOC, a structured group is a group that is not formed randomly for the purposes 
of commission of an offence. However, it is not a requirement the structured group 
has formally defined roles, continuity of membership or a developed structure. Article 
3(2) of the UNCTOC defines transnational organized crime as that which is 
committed in, involves activities, or has substantial effects, in more than one nation. 
Article 5(1) of the UNCTOC states all parties shall adopt legislation that establishes 
criminal offences for participation in an organized criminal group. For example, 
Article 5(1.b) of the UNCTOC formalizes the offence of “organizing, directing, 
aiding, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of serious crime involving 
an organized criminal group.” However, the UNCTOC does not require 
criminalization of organized crime as a distinct crime per se. 
 
REALIZING OBLIGATIONS: AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 
ARRANGEMENTS 
In Australia, organized crime is defined17 according to the Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (s 4). Organized crime means and offence: 
 (a) that involves two or more offenders and substantial planning and 
organization; and  
(b) that involves, or is of a kind that ordinarily involves, the use of 
sophisticated methods and techniques; and 
(c) that is committed, or is a kind that is ordinarily committed, in conjunction 
with offenders of a like kind; and  
(d) that is a serious offence within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002… 
 (da) that is: 
                                                        
17 The Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) determine the mandate and scope of the 
Australian Crime Commission’s powers and did not create the offence of ‘organized crime’ per se. 
This is discussed further below. 
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  (i) punishable by imprisonment for a period of 3 years or more; or  
(ii) a serious offence within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime 
2002 Act. 
 
Differences exist between the definitions of organized crime in the UNCTOC 
and the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth). The UNCTOC defines 
organized crime as involving three or more persons (Article 2a) with a maximum 
penalty for the offence of four years (Article 2b). Whereas the Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth) defines organized crime as involving two or more persons 
(s4a) with a maximum penalty for the offence of three years (s4da). This means that 
the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) has a slightly wider remit. This also 
shows that the required number of persons involved, and the penalty of imprisonment 
attracted by the offence, is a decision made in various legislative enactments, and as 
such, definitions of what exactly constitutes ‘organized crime’ vary. This indicates 
that organized crime is not defined by the intrinsic and objective nature of the 
phenomenon itself, but rather is constituted as a juridical-political legal fact. This 
confirms the importance of examining this phenomenon through the framework of 
criminalization. 
 
In 2010, the Australian Commonwealth enacted the Crimes Legislation 
Amendment (Serious and Organized Crime) Act 2010 (Cth) and the Crimes 
Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organized Crime) Act (No. 2) 2010 (Cth). The 
purpose of the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organized Crime) Act 
(No. 2) 2010 (Cth) was to further implement Australia’s obligations under the 
UNCTOC and to strengthen existing laws against organized crime in Australia. These 
included those related to the investigation of organized crime, the prosecution of 
individuals involved in organized crime, and the confiscation of the proceeds of 
organized crime.  
 
Amendments were made to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) to enhance 
criminal asset confiscation and anti-money laundering laws.18 In order to increase 
law-enforcement powers, such as search and seizure the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was 
amended. To strengthen anti-money laundering, bribery, and (to clarify) drug 
                                                        
18 For treatment and review of confiscation schemes and unexplained wealth laws in Australia see: 
Bartels (2010a; 2010b), see also: Bronitt and McSherry (2010, p. 921ff.) 
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importation laws changes were made to the Criminal Code Act 1995(Cth) and the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth). Further 
amendments were made to the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) to 
enhance the operation and oversight of the Australian Crime Commission. Finally and 
most significantly, new offences relating to participation in a criminal organization 
were inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), and corresponding amendments 
were made to the Telecommunications (Interceptions and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) to 
ensure interception warrants are accessible for the investigation of the new criminal 
organization offences.  
 
The new offences “create new forms of criminality” (Bronitt & McSherry, 
2010, p. 1037, emphasis added). Joint commission offences are inserted into section 
112A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) that make all members of a group who 
have agreed to participate in criminal activity responsible for the offences committed, 
even if all individuals did not actually participate in the criminal act. Secondly, there 
is the addition of new offences into section 9.9 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
which criminalize the association, support, benefit, or direction, of a criminal 
organization. The offence of associating in support of serious organized criminal 
activity (s. 390.3 of the Act) attracts a penalty of three years’ imprisonment. The 
offence of supporting a criminal organization (s. 390.4 of the Act) attracts a penalty 
of five years’ imprisonment. The offence of committing an offence for the benefit of, 
or at the direction of, a criminal organization (s. 390.5 of the Act) attracts a penalty of 
seven years’ imprisonment. The most serious offence of directing a criminal 
organization (s. 390.6 of the Act) attracts a penalty of ten years’ imprisonment. The 
Explanatory Memorandum notes the determination of a criminal organization (under 
ss. 390.4, 390.5, 390.6) will be made on a case-by-case basis (this differs from State 
and Territory legislation, discussed below), and the offences (under ss. 390.4, 390.5, 
390.6) require proof of a causal connection that participation supported the criminal 
organization. Quite interestingly, the definition of criminal organization under the 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organized Crime) Act 2010 (Cth) has 
little relation to the way organized crime is defined under the Australian Crime 
Commission Act 2002 (Cth) outlined above. That is, there has been another shift in 
language from ‘organized crime’ to ‘criminal organization,’ demonstrating that over 
time, in law, the concept of organized crime is sharpening. 
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At a Commonwealth level, the criminal organization laws differ from 
terrorism laws, as the legislation does not allow for control orders preventing 
association between individuals of organizations to be made. This is due to an 
absence of referral of powers from the State and Territory jurisdictions to the 
Commonwealth (Bronitt & McSherry, 2010). However, most Australian States and 
Territories have implemented legislation allowing for control orders to be imposed on 
members of criminal organizations. 
 
EXCEEDING OBLIGATIONS: ZERO TOLERANCE CRACKDOWNS IN 
AUSTRALIAN STATES AND TERRITORIES  
In 2006, New South Wales became the first State in Australia to legislate offences 
against criminal organizations19 (Schloenhardt, 2008; Bartels, 2010c; Bronitt & 
McSherry, 2010). The Crimes Legislation Amendment (Gangs) Act 2006 (NSW) 
criminalized the offence of participating in a criminal group (defined as three or more 
people, with shared objectives). Although the objectives of the amendments were to 
deal with organized crime (and serious violence), the term ‘organized crime’ itself did 
not appear in the legislation (Schloenhardt, 2008).  
 
The first piece of legislation enabling association restrictions to be imposed on 
individuals involved in organized crime, and specifically targeting OMCGs, was 
enacted by South Australia in 2008. Although it is not explicitly mentioned in any 
legislation, it is widely understood these arrangements have been enacted specifically 
to combat Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs), also known as Criminal Motorcycle 
Gangs (CMGs) in Queensland (another shift in language denoting that these gangs are 
‘criminal’). However, Ayling (2011a; 2011b) notes the laws are not exclusive to 
OMCGs, and can be applied to any organization that meet the criteria set forth in the 
legislation. The legislative approach of prospectively making declarations of criminal 
organizations and the subsequent imposition of anti-association control orders extends 
beyond Australia’s obligations under international law, which are binding at a 
Commonwealth level.  
                                                        
19 There is a longer history of attempts to combat gang-related crime in New South Wales, in particular 
youth and ethnic gangs. This included the introduction of the Justice Legislation Amendment (Non-
Association and Place Restriction) Act 2001 (NSW) which introduced anti-association orders and place 
restrictions (see: Drabsch, 2003; Lozusic, 2003). 
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In 2008, South Australia enacted the Serious and Organized Crime (Control 
Act) 2008 (SA) which enabled the Attorney-General to declare an organization as a 
criminal organization, on the basis the Attorney-General was satisfied members of the 
organization associate for the purposes of organizing, planning, facilitating, 
supporting or engaging in serious criminal activity, and represent a significant risk to 
public safety and order (s.10). The declaration made by the Attorney-General served 
as the basis for court imposed control orders to be issued against individuals, but did 
not criminalize the organization itself. According to the South Australian Act, 
subsequent to a declaration being made, it was a requirement that a magistrate must 
impose control orders on individuals of the declared organization, provided the court 
was satisfied an individual was a member of a declared organization, and engages, or 
has engaged in serious criminal activity, and regularly associates with other members 
of the declared organization (s.14). This was a mandatory obligation and as such 
removed judicial discretion. Once a control order was issued, the individual was 
prohibited from associating or communicating with members of declared 
organizations, or other persons specified by the control order (Ayling, 2011a; 2011b).  
 
The Serious and Organized Crime (Control Act) 2008 (SA) was challenged in 
the Supreme Court of South Australia (Totani & Anor v The State of South Australia 
[2009] SASC 301) and section 14(1) was found to be invalid because it stated the 
magistrate must issue a control order for individuals of declared organizations. This 
was found to be contrary to the doctrine of judicial power, independence and 
separation from the executive, as established in Chapter III of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) (Weston-Scheuber, 2009; Bronitt & McSherry, 
2010; more generally see: Stellios). The South Australian government appealed this 
decision to the High Court of Australia (The State of South Australia v Totani [2010] 
HCA 39), and the decision of the Supreme Court was upheld. Thereafter the South 
Australian Parliament introduced the Serious and Organized Crime (Control) 
(Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2012 (SA) to rectify section 14, with a 
Commissioner of Police instead making an application to declare an organization, 
which would then be considered by a magistrate. 
 
The South Australian legislation and the subsequent Supreme and High Court 
challenges, served as a model for other Australian jurisdictions to ‘constitution proof’ 
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their respective legislation. New South Wales enacted the Crimes (Criminal 
Organizations Control) Act 2009 (NSW), which addressed the issue of separation of 
powers and differed from the South Australian model as the Police Commissioner 
would make an application for an organization to be declared, and an eligible judge 
(as opposed to the Attorney-General) may (i.e. have the discretion to) grant the 
declaration and impose control orders. However, even with this modification, the 
Crimes (Criminal Organizations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) was successfully 
challenged in the High Court of Australia (Wainohu v The State of New South Wales 
[2011] HCA 24). The New South Wales legislation was found to be invalid because 
Part 2 of the Act stated no reasons need be provided for a declaration, and as the Act 
relied on the validity of Part 2, the entire Act was found to be invalid.  This Act was 
later amended to overcome the invalidity of Part 2 of the Act. According to section 13 
(2) of the amended Act the “eligible Judge is required to provide reasons for making 
or revoking the declaration or refusing the application” (Crimes (Criminal 
Organizations Control) Act 2012 (NSW). 
 
In 2009, the Queensland Parliament enacted the Criminal Organization Act 
2009 (QLD). Then, in 2012, the Assistant Commissioner of the Queensland Police 
Service Michael James Condon applied to the Supreme Court of Queensland to have 
the Finks Motorcycle Club (specifically the Gold Coast Chapter and also Pompano 
Pty Ltd which was considered to be associated with the Finks) declared a criminal 
organization. The Finks Motorcycle Club challenged the Act in the High Court of 
Australia (Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] 
HCA 7). Like previous High Court challenges, this challenge was on made on the 
basis that the Act exceeded constitutional limits established in Chapter III of the 
Australian Constitution (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth)).  
 
More specifically, the principal legal issue related to questions of procedural 
fairness in making a declaration on the grounds of criminal intelligence that has been 
withheld from the defendant. The High Court of Australia examined the requirement 
for the Supreme Court to conduct closed hearings and to make a judgment about the 
nature of the risk the criminal organization poses to the community. The High Court 
ruled that the laws do not exceed constitutional limits because the Supreme Court of 
Queensland has the capacity to consider the information before declaring it as 
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criminal intelligence, and maintains the ability to determine the weight that is given to 
the criminal intelligence. It was reasoned that the Supreme Court maintains its 
decisional independence to avoid and/or mitigate any procedural unfairness that may 
arise in the process of declaring information as criminal intelligence and the 
withholding of this information from the defendant.20 
 
As a result of this ruling the Supreme Court of Queensland can now consider 
an application to declare the Finks a criminal organization and subsequently impose 
anti-association control orders against members of the club (and indeed, any 
organizations that fall within the definition contained within s. 10(1) of the Criminal 
Organization Act 2009 (QLD)). However, since the High Court ruling there have not 
been any further actions to declare the Finks a criminal organization and impose anti-
association orders between members.21 This is the first example of an unsuccessful 
challenge to criminal organization legislation in Australia, following successful 
challenges on constitutional grounds previously made by the Hells Angels in New 
South Wales (Wainohu v The State of New South Wales [2011] HCA 24) and by the 
Finks in South Australia (Totani & Anor v The State of South Australia [2009] SASC 
301). This signifies that anti-association legislation can be devised with Chapter III 
compliance in mind. 
 
In addition to the Criminal Organization Act 2009 (QLD) being upheld by the 
High Court of Australia, and following the change in Government to a Liberal 
National Party Government under Premier Campbell Newman, a raft of new 
legislative measures were introduced in October 2013. These included the Vicious 
Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD) (hereafter the VLAD Act) and 
the Criminal Law (Criminal Organization Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (QLD). 
These laws were introduced following a ‘bikie brawl’ at Broadbeach in the Gold 
Coast in late September involving members of the Bandidos Motorcycle Club 
                                                        
20 The main legal issue relates to the requirement that the legislation does not impinge on the 
institutional integrity of the State Supreme Courts as established by the Kable principle. For complete 
treatment see: Stellios (2010); Guy (2013); Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] 
HCA 189 CLR 51. 
21 On the 11th of April 2014 I attended a Research Roundtable held by the Queensland Department of 
Premier and Cabinet. It was suggested by police attendees at this Roundtable that this was the case 
because the Finks Motorcycle Club had since ‘patched over’ to the Mongols Motorcycle Club, 
rendering any attempt to declare the Finks Motorcycle Club redundant. 
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(Chapter 4). According to the Explanatory Notes of the Vicious Lawless Association 
Disestablishment Bill 2013 (QLD) (para. 1), these new laws represent the Queensland 
Government’s “commitment to adopt a zero tolerance22 crackdown on criminal gangs” 
(emphasis added). This is pertinent because the explicit legislative intent is a ‘zero 
tolerance’ stance towards a ‘lawless outsider group’ that is perceived to pose a 
significant threat to social order. This represents a departure from traditional policing 
in Australia, which has largely denied use of a zero tolerance policy as developed in 
the United States (on zero tolerance policing in Australia see: Grabosky, 1999). Set in 
the current social-political context, ‘zero tolerance’ crackdowns towards OMCGs in 
Queensland are symbolic and expressive of the Government’s ability to control crime. 
This enables links to be drawn to the above discussion on the symbolic functions of 
the law and also organized crime as a discursive object of the politics of law and order 
(see: Chapter 4; Edelman, 1964; Gusfield, 1968; Arnold, 1969; Hogg & Brown, 1998; 
Garland, 2001). 
 
The Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD) 
establishes aggravated penalties solely on the basis of status. Enhanced penalties are 
applied to individuals who are deemed to be ‘vicious lawless associates’ while 
removing the possibility of parole. A ‘vicious lawless associate’ is defined as a person 
who (1) “commits a declared offence,” (2) “is a participant in the affairs of an 
association” and (3) committed the declared offence “for the purposes of, or in the 
course of participating in the affairs of, the relevant association” (s. 5). Under section 
3 of the Act an association is defined as either a corporation, an unincorporated 
association, a club or league or “any other group of 3 or more persons by whatever 
name called, whether associated formally or informally and whether the group is legal 
or illegal.” Section 1 of the Act sets forth the declared offences which are taken from 
the Corrective Services Act 2006 (QLD), the Criminal Code Act 1899 (QLD), the 
Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (QLD), the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (QLD) 
and the Weapons Act 1990 (QLD). The declared offences range across a wide range 
of serious offences such as riots in prison, child sex offences, prostitution, drug 
offences, money laundering, serious violent offences and weapons offences. 
                                                        
22 Harcourt (2001) presents a detailed genealogy of the origins of ‘zero-tolerance’ (or ‘order 
maintenance’ or ‘broken windows’) policing in the United States. See also: Newburn and Jones (2007); 
Lincoln (2004). 
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Under section 7 of the Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 
(QLD), once a person is found to be a ‘vicious lawless associate’ a court must impose 
three penalties: (1) a base sentence (the sentence for the criminal act “without regard 
for any further punishment that may or will be imposed under this Act”), (2) “a 
further sentence of 15 years imprisonment served wholly in a corrective services 
facility” and (3) if the ‘vicious lawless associate’ was an office bearer23 of the 
relevant association a further sentence of 10 years imprisonment must be imposed (in 
addition to the additional sentence of 15 years, therefore a total of an additional 25 
years imprisonment on the basis of status). These sentences must not be mitigated by 
any consideration, they must be served cumulatively (not concurrently) and the 
‘vicious lawless associate’ must immediately serve a term of imprisonment in a 
correctional facility. Under section 8 of the Vicious Lawless Association 
Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD) a ‘vicious lawless associate’ is ineligible for parole 
or early release. At the time of writing (July 2014) the United Motorcycle Council of 
Australia24 has lodged an application to challenge the VLAD Act in the High Court of 
Australia (see: Lewis, 2014). This type of mandatory sentencing for organized crime 
is curbing judicial discretion, which is fundamental to ensuring a fair and proportional 
sentence. Furthermore, critics have pointed out that there is little empirical evidence 
supporting the deterrent effect of laws that introduce mandatory sentencing, while 
suggesting there may be more cost-effective alternative methods of crime prevention 
(Roche, 1999).  
 
In addition to the Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 
(QLD), at the same time the Queensland Government introduced the Criminal Law 
(Criminal Organizations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (QLD). This legislation is 
designed to operate in tandem with the Criminal Organization Act 2009 (QLD) and 
the Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD). Section 42 of the 
                                                        
23 Defined under section 3 as a person who is a “president, vice president, sergeant-at-arms, treasurer 
secretary, director or another office bearer or a shareholder of the association; and a person who 
(whether by words, conduct, or in any other way) asserts, declares or advertises himself or herself to 
hold a position of authority of any kind within the association.” 
24 The United Motorcycle Council (UMC) is an interest group that represents members of motorcycle 
clubs with the objective to lobby for motorcyclists and their rights. The UMC has made submissions to 
proposed anti-association laws and made a number of statements to the media about the laws.  This 
highlights that the subjects of moral panics have agency and can counter and resist the actions taken 
against them, This is a point made by Veno and van den Eynde in their ‘moral panic neutralization 
project.’ On the UMC see: http://www.umcinc.com.au/national/ 
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Criminal Law (Criminal Organizations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (QLD) 
inserted new offences (ss. 60A-60C) into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (QLD). These 
offences include: (1) participants in criminal organizations being knowingly present 
in public places, (2) entering prescribed places and attending prescribed events, and 
(3) recruiting persons to become participants in the organization. This means that 3 or 
more individuals who are considered participants in a criminal organization cannot 
gather in public, or at a prescribed location or event. For example, under s60A of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (QLD): 
 
Any person who is a participant in a criminal organization and is knowingly 
present in a public place with 2 or more other persons who are participants in a 
criminal organization commits an offence.  
 
Since the introduction of the Criminal Law (Criminal Organizations 
Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (QLD) the Queensland Police Service (QPS) (2014) 
has introduced a process and released instructions about how to ‘disassociate’ from a 
Criminal Motorcycle Gang (CMG). This involves completing a Disassociation 
Declaration25 and returning this to the QPS State Intelligence.  The Disassociation 
Declaration requires the individual to describe the steps that they have taken to 
renounce their membership and disassociate from the criminal organization, including 
the return, disposal or destruction of all club colors and the removal or end dating of 
tattoos that signify involvement of the organization.  
 
Furthermore, the Criminal Law (Criminal Organizations Disruption) 
Amendment Act 2013 (QLD) grants additional investigative powers to the Crime and 
Misconduct Commission (CMC) (as of the 1st of July 2014, the CMC was renamed 
the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC)). Under this Act the CCC can hold 
coercive hearings26 (s.14) with punishment of mandatory imprisonment27 for 
contempt and can stop and detain any person if they are reasonably suspected of 
                                                        
25 The Declaration of Disassociation is available from: http://www.police.qld.gov.au/services/form/  
26 Coercive hearings are private hearings where an individual is compelled to give evidence and 
produce documents, with punishment for contempt. A number of agencies in Australia have these 
powers, including the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organization (ASIO). Coercive hearings are discussed further below (see further: Broome, 1998; 
McCulloch & Tham, 2005; McGarrity, 2014). 
27 For the first contempt the length of imprisonment is decided by the court, for the second contempt 
there is a minimum 2 years and 6 months imprisonment, and for the third contempt there is a minimum 
5 years imprisonment (s. 29 and s. 30). 
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participating in a criminal organization (s. 29). Moreover the CCC is not required to 
disclose any information to the defendant about the case against them if it is obtained 
at an intelligence function hearing (s.31). This represents a transformative leap in the 
powers of the CMC, this is discussed further below in relation to the powers of the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC). Moreover, the Criminal Law (Criminal 
Organizations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 reverses the onus of proof so that the 
defendant must prove “that the criminal organization is not an organization whose 
participants have as their purpose, or one of their purposes, engaging in, or conspiring 
to engage in, criminal activity” and they must also show “why the defendant’s 
detention in custody is not justified” (s.4, emphasis added). 
 
The anti-association laws enacted in majority of Australia’s jurisdictions are 
distinctly pre-emptive as the rationale is to prohibit the association of members of 
criminal organizations with the view to prevent the future commission of crime 
(Ayling, 2011a; 2011b). This is, in effect, the logic of pre-crime (Zedner, 2007; 2009; 
McCulloch & Carlton, 2006; McCulloch & Pickering, 2009; McCulloch & Pickering, 
2010; Finnane & Donkin, 2013). According to Zedner (2007, p. 262) pre-crime 
“shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet 
occurred and may never do so.” The focus is on risk (O’Malley, 1996) and security in 
neo-liberal society (Zedner, 2003; Zedner, 2005; McCulloch, 2005).  
 
Zedner (2003) examines changes in the governance of crime around security, 
and the techniques and justifications it provides for public action. Zedner (2003) 
examines six paradoxes of security including the promise of freedom with the 
simultaneous erosion of liberties (a point I return to later in this section). The focus on 
security enables links to be drawn with the discourse of international securitization 
described in Chapter 4. As a result of this shift to the logic of pre-crime, risk 
assessment and intelligence as techniques of surveillance and managing suspect or 
risky populations becomes a central focus for police (discussed further below) 
(Zedner, 2007). Zedner (2007, p. 265) comments the concern is with “identifying and 
classifying suspect populations in order to manage the risks they collectively pose.” 
The changing focus from post- to pre- crime can be seen as another move from 
traditional modes of criminal justice. McCulloch and Pickering (2009) point out that 
this type of preventative approach is distinct from the traditional crime prevention 
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paradigm (that is not coercive). This can further be related to points explored in 
Chapter 4 concerning the crime complex of late modernity and the tensions between 
punitive and preventative approaches to crime control (Garland, 2001). This is an 
interesting example to consider in the context of Garland’s (2001) arguments, because 
the pre-emptive laws with their foundation in the logic of pre-crime are 
simultaneously punitive and preventative.  
 
The legislative approach in Australian jurisdictions has attracted extensive 
criticism from academics and legal practitioners (including the Rule of Law Institute, 
2013), in large part, due to concerns surrounding the legal legitimacy of the measures 
and the violation of a number of civil liberties. For example, no criminal conviction is 
required before an anti-association control order is made, and breaching a civil control 
order attracts a criminal penalty (in Queensland the first breach is a misdemeanor and 
repeat breaches are a crime, see: s. 24(2) of the Act; Ayling, 2011a). This means that, 
in effect, there is punishment without trial or conviction. The issue of coercive state 
mechanisms impinging on individual freedom of association is a serious concern from 
a civil liberties perspective. Gray (2009) cautions there are a range of issues including 
violations of the right to due process, natural justice, freedom of association and 
separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary (as was the subject of 
the High Court Challenges). These are points that are echoed by McGarrity (2012, p. 
168): 
“The bikie control order laws make significant intrusions into fundamental 
human rights. The declaration of organizations unashamedly targets the 
freedoms of speech and association. The control order process undermines the 
fundamental principle that a person’s liberty should not be restricted unless 
there is a judicial finding of guilt.” 
 
Ayling (2011a; 2011b) comments status and group membership represent a 
perceived unacceptable risk to the safety and security of the community, and this 
operates to justify the punitive and preemptive nature of the laws. Ayling (2011a) 
adds that there is a possibility stereotypes and prejudice will influence the decision to 
impose control orders.  Pre-crime prevention measures, as discussed above, have been 
subject to criticism because they are measures “that link substantial coercive police or 
state action to suspicion without the need for charge, prosecution or conviction” 
(McCulloch & Pickering, 2009, pp. 629-630; see also: McCulloch & Carlon, 2006). 
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From a legal perspective this is pertinent, especially considering the provisions of the 
VLAD Act that provide for additional punishment according to status. Bronitt and 
McSherry (2010, p. 9) note: 
“Drafting criminal laws to punish individuals because they possess 
characteristics perceived to be dangerous or anti-social is incompatible with 
the principles of legality.” 
 
Furthermore, as the anti-association control orders are civil orders,28 there is a 
lower standard of proof (on the balance of probabilities), and in some cases the onus 
of proof is reversed so the defendant must prove they are innocent (instead of the 
prosecutor proving they are guilty beyond reasonable doubt). Criminal intelligence 
can be withheld from individuals subject to control-orders meaning individuals may 
not be able to hear the case against them (Ayling, 2011a; 2011b; Weston-Scheuber, 
2009).  
 
Loughnan (2009, p. 464) concludes this legislative approach demonstrates the  
“triumph of ‘law and order’ politics” over established rules of procedure, proof and 
evidence. This can in turn be related to arguments made by Desroches (2013) who 
comments “critics point out that criminal organization laws have also been influenced 
by political considerations and promoted by a ‘get tough on crime’ agenda.” 
Campbell (2013, p. 9) follows a similar line of argument in commenting “what 
appears to be occurring is the prioritization of the demands of security and the 
resolution of crime, and the associated erosion of due process rights.” Campbell (2013, 
p. 9) continues by explaining that the “expressive aspects of the reactions to organized 
crime may be of more significance than their practical effort.” As discussed in 
Chapter 4, organized crime is constructed as a serious threat to social order that forms 
the basis of a ‘tough on crime’ political platform. This is used as justification for the 
introduction of a range of punitive laws that have ultimately resulted in the erosion of 
procedural justice in process and civil liberties in outcome. 
 
In principle, these legislative ‘innovations’ demonstrate changing logic in the 
governance of crime and security and the transformation of traditional models of 
                                                        
28 The use of civil and regulatory measures to control anti-social behavior represents a further departure 
from traditional modes of criminal justice. This is also evidenced with the introduction of Anti-Social 
Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) in the United Kingdom (see: Flint & Nixion, 2006; Squires, 2006; 
Donoghue, 2008; Crawford, 2009). 
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criminal justice (for example the logic of pre-crime as discussed above). However, the 
application and consequences of these laws in practice are yet to be fully realized. 
This is a point that is made by McQueen (1994, p. 189) in relation to anti-money 
laundering legislation that was subject to similar civil libertarian critique: 
“In response to the civil libertarian critiques… there is no guarantee that the 
legislation will end up serving the interests of the New Right anymore than 
there is a guarantee that it will faithfully serve the interests of the left. 
Consequently to oppose or support such legislative innovations is perhaps less 
important than understanding the process of government within which the 
legislation and the policy it embodies is enmeshed.”  
 
Indeed, understanding these processes and conceptions of organized crime that 
lead to these types of responses is the main objective of this thesis. The introduction 
of the pre-emptive anti-association laws is still relatively recent and the practical 
implications of the legislation for civil liberties and individual freedoms are not yet 
well understood. However, Informant 2 commented on the potential of abuse of these 
laws while offering an example of the consequences of the overzealous application of 
similar pre-emptive provisions during the Sydney 2000 Olympic games: 
 
“If you had infinite resources, it might actually be a terrific thing. But that's 
like if you locked everyone up who sort of looked sideways, you'd solve the 
problem too. But you can't do that for all the obvious reasons about civil 
liberties and standards of proof, along with other people that actually 
wouldn't have done anything terribly serious. So, I suspect it won't make a 
huge difference. And it will probably end up being abused because it'll catch 
people who aren't actually central to significant criminality.” 
 
“It happens across the board. In the Olympics, there was a guy who was 
sitting on a fence watching the bike race. And he got hauled away by the local 
constabulary and held for three hours. And the reason that he was held was 
because he wasn't showing appropriate enjoyment, enthusiasm and excitement 
as the thing went by, so they suspected him. And he had a backpack on. So 
they suspected he was there for a serious purpose, i.e. blowing himself up. But 
it turned out this guy had Parkinson's or something or another, so he had a 
rigid face. And he couldn't actually smile. But they made a huge deal of it 
because they pulled this guy with Parkinson's off a fence and treated him 
rather roughly and held him incommunicado for half a day just because he 
can't move his face for a medical reason.” 29 
 
“Now, I mean the power itself is probably reasonable and unexceptional. But 
the difficulty with any of these things is when they get used over-
                                                        
29 Presumably the police did not know that this individual had Parkinson’s disease and as such 
misinterpreted their inability to show enthusiasm as a sign of committing a terrorist act. 
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enthusiastically or inappropriately by some people. And then it becomes 
common practice, particularly if you're taking a preventive approach, which is, 
in this case, what that was all about. I mean you have even more chance of 
abuse. Because you don't take any risks. ‘I just don't like the way you're 
looking or the way your feet are facing or something or other.’ And then you 
might or might not say sorry afterwards. But the damage has been done. And 
for some of them it’s neither here nor there really apart from the insult and the 
inconvenience. But, I mean, it could be serious.”  
         Informant 2 
 
The Criminal Law (Criminal Organizations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 
(QLD) encapsulates the points discussed by Informant 2. The law impinges on rights 
and liberties of individuals as it restricts the movement and association of individuals 
according to their status as defined by the law. There are provisions in the law that 
reverse the onus of proof onto the defendant: the defendant is required to prove that 
the organization is not a criminal organization, the defendant is required to 
demonstrate why they should not be detained. Considered in combination with the 
Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD) (that introduces 
significant mandatory periods of imprisonment without the possibility of parole, while 
removing judicial discretion), this approach takes a deep cut to the fundamental tenets 
of a liberal society. 
 
The Criminal Law (Criminal Organizations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 
(QLD) was rushed through the parliament with the Parliamentary Committee being 
provided with just one day to read and comment on the proposed laws before they 
were introduced (Callaghan, 2013; on this point see also: Ayling, 2013a). The law 
was introduced without any public consultation or announcement. An explanation for 
the hasty introduction is provided in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Criminal 
Law (Criminal Organizations Disruption) Amendment Bill 2013 (QLD) Bill (p. 8): 
“wider consultation has not been possible because of the need to respond urgently to 
the significant public threat criminal gangs pose in Queensland.” The ‘significant 
public threat’ in this case has provided justification for both the exceptional measures 
and a lack of public consultation in introducing them. 
 
Overall, there are two main components in the legislative approach adopted by 
Australian States and Territories. The first, and most widely adopted is the declaration 
of a criminal organization being made, with the subsequent imposition of anti-
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association control orders prohibiting association between members of the declared 
criminal organization. With the exception of the Australian Capital Territory and 
Tasmania, each State and Territory in Australia has enacted legislation similar in its 
objectives and mechanisms to the Serious and Organized Crime (Control Act) 2008 
(SA) (see: Table 1). Victoria initially refused to introduce such legislation due to 
concerns that it ran counter the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 
(Vic) (Bronitt & McSherry, 2010). Yet following a change to a Liberal Government 
in 2010, has since introduced the Criminal Organizations Control Act 2012 (Vic). 
The second component, which at the time of writing is unique to Queensland, is the 
introduction of mandatory imprisonment on the basis of status (Vicious Lawless 
Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD)). As mentioned above, at the time of 
writing, an application has been made to challenge this in the High Court of Australia.  
 
The individual States and Territories of Australia have been engaged in a 
process of legislative reform, refining the legislation in response to the constitutional 
challenges before the High Court of Australia. It seems that the creative adaptation of 
OMCGs (i.e. the Finks ‘patching over’) is matched by the creative adaptation of the 
state, to avoid unconstitutionality and legal invalidity. The Northern Territory took 
cognizance of the High Court rulings explicitly seeking to develop legislation that 
would not fall foul to a constitutional challenge and subsequently introduced the 
Serious Crime Control Amendment Act 2011 (NT). The Western Australian 
Parliament drafted the Criminal Organization Control Act 2012 (WA) and the 
Criminal Organizations Control Regulations 2013 (WA) also responding to the 
constitutional implication set by the High Court. Furthermore, New South Wales 
introduced the Crimes (Criminal Organizations Control) Act 2012 (NSW) in order to 
address the High Court decision of invalidity of the original Crimes (Criminal 
Organizations Control) Act 2009 (NSW). New South Wales later enacted the Crimes 
(Criminal Organization Control) Amendment Act 2013 (NSW) (No. 12) in order to 
include the provisions that were upheld in the High Court challenge by Queensland 
(Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7) 
(see: Rule of Law Institute of Australia, 2013). This demonstrates a high level of 
commitment to this legislative model.
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Table 1. Summary of laws and legal challenges 
Jurisdiction Legal Instrument Legal and Constitutional Challenges 
International United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNCTOC) and the protocols thereto  
- 
Commonwealth Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organized Crime) Act 2010  
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organized Crime) Act 2010 
(No. 2) 
- 
New South Wales Crimes Legislation Amendment (Gangs) Act 2006 
Crimes (Criminal Organizations Control) Act 2009 
Crimes (Criminal Organizations Control) Act 2012 
Crimes (Criminal Organizations Control) Amendment Act 2013 (No. 12) 
Wainohu v The State of New South Wales 
[2011] HCA 2 
South Australia Serious and Organized Crime (Control Act) 2008 
Serious and Organized Crime (Control) (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 
2012 
Totani & Anor v The State of South 
Australia [2009] SASC 301 
The State of South Australia v Totani 
[2010] HCA 39 
Queensland Criminal Organization Act 2009 
Vicious Lawless Associates Disestablishment Act 2013 
Criminal Law (Criminal Organizations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 
Assistant Commissioner Michael James 
Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7 
Application made to challenge VLAD Act 
before HCA 
Western Australia Criminal Organizations Control Act 2012 
Criminal Organizations Control Regulations 2013 (WA) 
- 
Northern Territory Serious Crime Control Amendment Act 2011  - 
Victoria Criminal Organizations Control Act 2012 - 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
No specific legislation  - 
Tasmania No specific legislation - 
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INTERROGATING LEGAL CONCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME 
The UNCTOC and legislation in Australian jurisdictions adopt a common approach 
towards organized crime. This approach criminalizes organizations or groups of 
individuals who are deemed to present an unacceptable threat to society. Despite the 
state’s obsession with positivist definitions of organized crime in law, as discussed 
above, several Informants’ statements below revealed the contours of the 
phenomenon are hazy or fluid and contextual. van Duyne and Nelemens (2012, p. 44) 
conclude following their examination of the definition of organized crime contained 
in the UNCTOC: 
“The coverage of the Convention has no clear boundaries, while its colours 
look very watery. Formulated in formal terms: the organized crime concept is 
an ill-defined construction without the capacity to delineate a set of potential 
observables.” 
 
The first question I asked each of the Informants in this study was what they 
considered organized crime to be (explanatory focus), and secondly, whether the 
legislation captures organized crime as they see it (normative focus). Ultimately, 
distinctions between the explanatory and normative features of the phenomenon are 
not watertight categorizations. The overall objective in the interviews was to have the 
Informants explain what they considered organized crime to be and whether they 
considered this was adequately captured in the laws that define the phenomenon. In 
the first statement presented below there is an immediate recognition of the difficulty 
of this line of inquiry, qualified by repeating the question and framing the answer in 
terms of locality and motive. The second statement below shows the difficulties in 
defining organized crime experienced by the police community, before the Informant 
concedes they do not know the answer:  
“That is a very hard question. The reason why I say it’s a hard question is 
because… [Informant pauses]. What do I consider as organized crime? It 
depends on where I am and how I want to define it.” 
         Informant 6 
 
“And it's something that I think we've all struggled with. And I don't… 
[Informant pauses] the answer is…[Informant pauses] I don’t know the 
answer.” 
        Informant 2 
 
Notwithstanding this initial hesitance and confusion, overall there were two 
main ways in which the Informants both considered, and used as the basis to criticize 
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organized crime as captured in the law. These included a group-based quantitative 
model with a focus on the number of offenders who come together to commit crime in 
an organized way, or alternatively a focus on the qualitative seriousness of the offence 
committed. These are explored in turn below. 
 
QUANTITATIVE GROUP-BASED MODEL 
When discussing the group-based model of organized crime and the criterion of a 
minimum number of people involved, Informant 2 criticized this legal conception of 
organized crime on the basis that it is too broad: 
“What’s gone into legislation is mainly so many people gather together to 
commit a common crime for the purposes of making a profit. None of the 
definitions and legislation actually captures something that is essentially 
organized crime. Because I can apply that definition to any number of things 
that people wouldn’t call organized crime, that literally would fit the 
definition.”  
         Informant 2 
 
According to Informant 2, definitions of organized crime in law are overly 
inclusive: the legal provisions can be applied to a range of things that are not 
organized crime. Indeed, one criticism of the laws is that they can be applied to any 
group the state does not like (see: Ayling, 2011a; 2011b). However, as evident in the 
following statement, Informant 3 argues that the legal definition of organized crime is 
not inclusive enough. As such this definition of organized crime is under- and over- 
inclusive at the same time: 
“With organized crime, and we have simply, I think, said that all of these 
problems are organized crime, and basically what we’re talking about is 
crime.  And I think it’s increasingly less useful the term ‘organized crime’ in 
this sense. Almost all crime is organized, that’s my point…Think of a crime 
other than… crime for personal satisfaction, such as sex crime or those 
limited range of crime, violence against women all of those types of… which 
isn’t organized crime.  But almost everything else, which is perceived as the 
crime problem, is organized crime… I would argue it’s [the legal definition of 
organized crime] almost not inclusive enough.” 
         Informant 3 
Then, what is evident from contrasting these two statements is that organized 
crime as captured in law lacks both sensitivity and specificity. Informant 3 elaborated 
on this point further. Legal definitions establish minimum criteria for the number of 
people involved in criminal activity in order to be considered as organized crime. The 
Australian Crime Commission Act (2002) (Cth) requires two or more individuals, and 
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the UNCTOC requires three or more individuals (contrary to what the Informant 
claims). Informant 3 points out that burglary, which can involve two or more people 
working together to enter and steal property from a house and subsequently sell the 
stolen property, is not considered organized crime, even though it does meet the legal 
standard (under the UNCTOC): 
“Requires two or more people, and the UNODC definition requires that.  
However, there’s a real problem with that in my mind, because burglary can 
be a really difficult problem, as we’ve seen in Canberra, we’ve had real 
problems with burglary. My house has been broken into multiple times and I 
don’t know if it’s a single person or two people, but it’s still a problem, and it 
is still organized, in that the people know what they are doing, they know 
where they are going to sell the stuff, so on and so forth.  And they’re making 
money out of it, so I just think it’s almost a meaningless concept, organized 
crime, I really do.” 
         Informant 3 
 
As such, Informant 3 comments that organized crime in law is a hollow 
concept; it does not encompass crimes that are organized in the sense that the 
perpetrators act in a premeditated and organized way, and instead focuses on the 
number of offenders involved as a key criterion. Here patterns emerge as Informant 2 
raised the same example of home burglary: 
“So it's very, very serious. But it's not organized. I mean it’s not organized in 
the sense of group. You can, have a group of house robbers, who are very 
organized, have a market organized. They organize their group to do the 
burglaries. They organize selling it in the pubs or whatever. It meets all the 
definitions of organized crimes. But you wouldn’t call it organized.” 
 
         Informant 2 
 
In the above statement Informant 2 questions what makes organized crime 
organized and whether that relates to the group involved. This is a point that is 
debated extensively in the organized crime literature (Chapter 3). Further, in reference 
the influence of the academic models of organized crime on legislation in Australia 
Mann and Ayling (2012, p. 5) argue that: 
“It seems that the earliest scholarly models of organized crime, such as 
Cressey’s (1969) model with its focus on structure and hierarchy, may still 
have significant influence on how organized crime is conceptualized in 
Australia. The current anti-association approach simultaneously spotlights 
some forms of organized (overt and semi-permanent groups whose members 
commit criminal acts) while shadowing others (more fluid, opportunistic and 
temporary criminal collectives.” 
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Informant 3 questioned what the implication of the use of the term ‘organized’ 
means, and whether this view rests upon the assumption that all other criminals are 
intrinsically not organized: 
“Yeah even the pedophilia groups are highly organized, and they are very 
clever, and they have got methods of avoiding law enforcement, they’re not all 
in it for money, but they are organized.  You know, what the heck does that 
mean?  Is there an implication that that criminals are intrinsically not 
organized?” 
        Informant 3 
QUALITATIVE SERIOUSNESS OF OFFENCE 
Further discussion around these definitional limits eventually led Informants 1 and 2 
to the conclusion that one person could commit crime in an organized way, and hence 
would not be captured by the legal definitions of organized crime with a focus on the 
group and criteria for the minimum number of individuals involved. Instead there was 
a focus on the seriousness of the offence, and the Informants used the examples of 
fraud and safe-breaking to illustrate the point that an offender could operate alone and 
commit serious and premeditated offences:   
“I think one of the difficulties is distinguishing between serious crime and 
organized crime. You have to be organized to be a successful high-level 
criminal. But you don’t need a gang to do it. So, a serious fraudster, for 
example, could be terribly well organized, but might not have an associate, 
might not use violence or corruption, but might be able to bring down a 
company.” 
         Informant 2 
 
“Well I mean you can be an organized criminal and just operate by yourself. 
There are some very good cases in particular in the area of fraud, significant 
fraud, and safe-breakers. They work by themselves or due to the risks and type 
of activity involved there is no need for them to operate in a criminal gang or 
group.” 
        Informant 1 
 
In contrast to the focus on organized groups of offenders, Informant 2 argued 
that organized crime is more about the seriousness of the offence. This is interesting 
given the focus on the institutional aspects of the ‘organization’ of organizations and 
groups in the legislation at all jurisdictional levels outlined above. Informant 2 points 
out that the focus on the organization, and the group, and the structure of that group, 
have overshadowed other important considerations, such as the creation of a market 
or demand for criminal services: 
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“Well, I’m not sure there is a thing called organized crime. I think it’s really 
about the seriousness. It’s got to do with seriousness and the ongoing nature 
of the criminal enterprise of some sort. But, I think that we’ve got hung up on 
the organization being a central feature of it. So we’re looking at groups and 
group structures, and so forth. And, you know, in a way that takes attention off 
the fact it's actually the markets for crime, for criminal services, that are 
important.” 
         Informant 2 
 
DRAWING BOUNDARIES AROUND CONCEPTUAL PLURALITY 
 
In the statement presented immediately above Informant 2 concedes that they are not 
sure that organized crime is legally definable. This raises an important question about 
how to capture the conceptual plurality of the definitions of organized crime in the 
law and whether it is possible, or even necessary, to draw positivist boundaries around 
the phenomenon. The same line of inquiry led Informant 6 to question the definitional 
boundaries around organized crime and what the impacts of those boundaries are:  
“I think often if the parameters are not set or boundaries are set it makes it 
difficult. Should you establish boundaries? And should you limit yourself to 
the type of crime because organized crime is very dynamic?  Should you be 
limiting yourself? That’s the other question. I don't know.” 
         Informant 6 
 
The literature indicates that these concerns are neither limited to the current 
study, nor the phenomenon of organized crime. Desroches (2013, p. 403) comments 
that laws concerning organized crime are either vague in their definition of organized 
crime or “based on out-dated stereotypes and traditional mafia-style images.” 
Campbell (2013, p. 40) argues that “the entrenchment of such definitions in the legal 
sphere, given the breadth of the criminal law, the duplication of the criminal law and 
the dubious use of such law” is extremely problematic. It is incredibly difficult to 
capture the concept of organized crime in law especially considering there is no 
general consensus in the academic literature regarding what constitutes this 
phenomenon (Chapter 3). This resonates with the evolving and contested legal 
definition of terrorism (see: Blackbourn, 2011). Furthermore, a relevant definitional 
debate was raised in a Supreme Court challenge in the United States. The legal 
question related to what constitutes obscenity and whether this can be determined 
objectively (Jacobellis v Ohio 738 U.S. 184 [1964]). In the judgement about whether 
the film in question could be considered obscene, Justice Stewart stated: 
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand 
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to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”  
 
Like obscenity, it seems that while police are unable to define organized crime, 
or even have doubts that organized crime is legally definable, they ‘know it when they 
see it.’ Hobbs (2013) uses this exact phrase in his examination of constructions of 
organized crime in the U.K. When discussing the definitional difficulties, Hobbs 
(2013, p. 18, emphasis added) reflects organized crime is like “elephants with 
tentacles: you will know it when you see it.” The point is that definitions of social 
phenomena (whether that is organized crime, terrorism or obscenity) are mutable and 
subjective, and as such are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to capture in legal 
definitions.  
 
With this said, there are a number of possible explanations of why this 
legislative approach (a focus on groups and/or criminal organizations) is favoured, 
despite the documented definitional difficulties in the literature and also described by 
the Informants in this study. Relating this to my argument made in Chapter 4, it is 
easier to draft and promote the enactment of laws targeted against ‘outsiders’ or 
‘outlaws.’ Consider the title of the piece of legislation: Vicious Lawless Association 
Disestablishment Act 2013 (QLD). This language is highly emotive in a way that can 
be used to political advantage; the symbolic functions of the law become evident 
(Edelman, 1964; Gusfield, 1968; Arnold, 1969). The law constructs the ‘vicious 
lawless associate’ as a significant threat to society and an outsider: they are a threat 
because they are vicious and they are outsiders because they are lawless. With the use 
of this type of language it is clear that this concerns more than just serious crime, 
there is a particular, and even aggressive, quality to it. These ways of defining 
organized crime in law- as ‘vicious lawless associates’ or as ‘criminal organizations’ 
may make it easier for politicians to sell these laws and a ‘tough on crime’ political 
platform. This can be related to an important point made by Campbell (2013, p. 23): 
“Labels have an emotive effect, and so the use of this terminology may garner 
support for the measures introduced to counter such crime. The ‘emotional 
kick’ imparted by the term justifies increased resources and powers for state 
bodies and so the adoption of these phrases may be a political stratagem 
which ensures the ‘ratcheting-up’ of state powers to combat the threat of such 
criminality.” 
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Another possible explanation concerns the mandate and scope of the 
institutions that the law creates to respond to the social problem, defined by the law. 
The law establishes a number of social institutions with the mandate to respond to 
organized crime (this is dealt with later in this chapter). In relation to the United 
Kingdom’s Serious and Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), Bowling and Ross (2006) 
suggest that a broad and confusing concept of organized crime in the law (that is, the 
organized organization of criminal organizations), means that SOCA has an equally 
broad and confusing scope. The same legal definition that creates organized crime in 
the criminal law also creates policing organizations and establishes their mandate (i.e. 
the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth)). Woodiwiss (2013, p. 14) discusses 
the ever-expanding cycle of definition and reconceptualization of organized crime, 
and its relocation from the domestic to the transnational sphere: 
“What had once been defined as a single threat to American security had now 
been redefined as a large number of multiple threats to international security. 
The absence of a centralizing demonology is to be welcomed but the 
reconceptualization continues to justify continued co-operative efforts against 
organized crime that show no sign of being effective in minimizing the harms 
of organized crime.” 
 
McCulloch (2007, p. 25) adds: 
“In any case, the boundaries and definitions of these crimes are so highly 
mutable and flexible that they constantly expand and morph to include new 
markets, relationships, behaviors, and actors.” 
 
The important point to take away is that while organized crime is a highly 
mutable concept, this never prevents the state from constructing a legal regime around 
it. It is an interesting observation that regardless of the difficulties associated with 
drawing conceptual boundaries around organized crime; a clearly defined legal and 
institutional architecture has been developed in response to it. Following this 
examination into how organized crime is defined in law, and some of the associated 
conceptual and definitional issues, the next section examines the key players in 
problem identification and initiating legislative reform. 
 
ROLE OF POLICE AND POLICE UNIONS IN LAW REFORM 
Informant 1 discussed the important role that police have in the identification of 
problems and corresponding policy options. It is acknowledged that there are complex 
and interdependent factors that instigate and influence legislative reform. The focus of 
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the present section is to specifically review the role of the police and police unions. 
This is because these are the empirical insights that emerged in the course of this 
research, aligned with the method of data collection interviewing senior police. 
 
While the statements presented by the Informant reveal the role that executive 
level police (i.e. Commissioners) play in this process, the police also contribute 
through police unions. Historical research completed by Finnane (2002, p. 69) 
demonstrates that police unions are active in “setting the agendas of law reform and 
policing policy.” Finnane’s (2002) analysis shows that police unions have, throughout 
recent Australian history, been consistently involved the policy-making process as 
they attempt to expand their powers and protect their working conditions (see also: 
Finnane 2000-2001; Finnane 2008b). A clear example is the Australian Federal Police 
Association (AFPA) making recommendations regarding the policing of organized 
crime to the Federal Crime Justice Forum (see: Australian Federal Police Association, 
2008). Further examples of the AFPA making submissions to Parliamentary 
Committees regarding the powers and institutional configurations of federal policing 
agencies are highlighted throughout this chapter.  
 
In the first statement below, Informant 1 discusses that the anti-association 
laws have been developed in collaboration with the respective Police Commissioners 
from each State and Territory in Australia. The important role that the police play in 
initiating legislative reform is revealed further in the second statement. Informant 1 
discusses that at a Commonwealth level the police have initiated the legislative 
process through proposals tabled at Commissioners’ conferences (on the Conference 
of Australian Police Commissions see: Finnane & Myrtle, 2011). That is, the police 
play a central role in this process: 
“That has been done in a collaboration with all the Police Commissioners in 
each State, South Australia raised it and as you know it got turned over and I 
guess it was that issue about bikies and organized crime. So you then put them 
up and say they have been identified as an organized crime group and these 
people are individuals and they are not supposed to associate and you can 
actually take action and I suppose it is a measure to try to break them down, 
to break their association down, stop them from forming to commit crime, and 
as you know each State has different legislation.” 
         Informant 1 
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“And the Federal Government has tried to bring in some legislation as well, 
and that has all been initiated by the police. They raise it at the 
Commissioners’ Conference saying: ‘we need to do something about this.’” 
         Informant 1 
 
I probed further about the structures and processes within police organizations 
to develop new law and suggest policy options. In the statement below Informant 1 
reveals the extent to which police, through their executive structures (for example 
Ministerial Councils for Police Ministers), have a hand in problem identification and 
solution formation: 
“What happens in the structure is there is a Ministerial Council and all the 
Police Ministers, State and Federal, go, and also all the Police 
Commissioners meet, and then you have got the [Australian] Crime 
Commission, and the Crime Commission reports to the Ministers of each State 
as well, under that model, and at these sort of forums, they raise what you 
might call these constant problems in dealing with crime in Australia. So out 
of that will come suggestions, and there will be a working group, and they will 
say ‘it looks like the police are having a problem here we see this new crime 
emerging and we have got these…’ and the Police Ministers say ‘we have got 
to do something about this.’”  
       Informant 1 
 
These data are supported by research conducted by Miller (2004). Miller 
(2004) examined data from United States congressional hearings over a fifty-year 
period (1974-98) to investigate the extent criminal justice bureaucrats participate in 
the process of defining crime problems, setting crime policy agendas and proposing 
criminal justice policy.  Miller (2004) found that criminal justice professionals tend to 
dominate congressional hearings, at the expense of contributions from other interest 
groups such as victims of crime, community groups, civil rights groups and 
academics. An important finding from this study is that criminal justice professionals 
represented over 40% of all witnesses at state-of-the-problem hearings where policy 
options were discussed and problem definitions decided. This finding is important 
because it reveals how police exert their influence in this process, which can be 
related to the statements made by Informant 1.  Looking to available evidence in 
Australia, the Australian Crime Commission advertises the unclassified public 
submissions it has made to various Parliamentary inquiries since its formation. On its 
website, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) notes (2014): 
“The Australian Crime Commission provides specialist advice to government 
on a range of topics that intersect with organized crime. The [Australian] 
Crime Commission’s specialist capabilities and intelligence holdings enable it 
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to provide a unique perspective- one of the ways it shares this is through 
public submissions to Parliament and to government inquiries” 
 
In this way, through its ‘specialized capabilities and intelligence holdings’ the 
ACC provides its ‘unique perspective’ during the process of both problem and 
solution identification. There is a risk that the identification of problems and solutions 
will be considered self-serving; a case of bureaucratic entrepreneurialism as discussed 
in Chapter 4 (Dickson, 1968).  
 
This can also be related to a study conducted by Heeler (2006) who studied 
the influence of the police in the development of anti-gang legislation in Canada. 
Distinct from the results of the Miller (2004) study, the Heeler (2006) study suggests 
that it is the symbolic power of the police and their tacit political support, rather than 
their direct lobbying, which legitimates processes of law reform. 
 
Informant 1 added a caveat to the statements presented above: there is a 
process of cooperation and interaction between police agencies and legislators. That is, 
there is interdependence between these groups with executive police playing a central 
role in the process. The police do not ‘run the agenda,’ they influence it:  
“So I think it is not the police saying ‘right, change the law tomorrow’ you 
find it is because of this collaboration and interaction and this more unified 
approach of looking at the crime problems. These things are raised and then 
they make a resolution and say ‘right, let’s all work together to change the 
legislation’ or one of them might come forward and say ‘here is some draft 
legislation, have a look at it, if you all agree we could all go away and change 
it.’ So I think you will find there is a lot more cooperation in that. I don’t think 
I have seen instances where the police just run the agenda. They don’t.” 
        Informant 1 
 
REACTIVE VERSUS PROACTIVE TURNS IN LAW 
Both Informant 1 and 2 discussed there is a general tendency to reactively introduce 
law in response to problems as they arise: 
“A problem pops up and then they say ‘set up another task force.’ That means 
you have to move people from one area to another. So I think it is an 
extremely difficult environment, and of course they always say ‘well let’s 
legislate, more legislation, more legislation.’” 
         Informant 1 
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What is interesting about the statements made by the Informants is that they 
reveal the reactive nature of this approach to law reform, as legislation is introduced 
in a piecemeal ad hoc fashion. Informant 2 comments that this knee-jerk approach to 
legislating offences results in an uncoordinated, fragmented and incoherent legislative 
framework: 
“I think that’s how most [organized crime] legislation has come about. I think 
that’s true across a lot of areas; it's certainly stayed true in the terrorism area, 
too. As a particular problem comes up, then the police seem to think they 
might be able to knock off that particular problem, so it’s… [Informant 
Pauses]...[Interviewer: Reactive?] It's sort of, it is. It's an accretion of bits and 
pieces that have been done for probably reasonable reasons at the time, in 
their view anyway. I mean it’s a problem, and we’ll just knock it off that way. 
But when you look at them [the laws] all together, they don’t necessarily sort 
of make a coherent whole. Well they don’t stem from a common operating 
picture, of what the environment is like. They're just practical solutions to 
practical problems as they arise. And a lot of them are responding to 
adaptations of the criminals. I mean 'I put this in place so they do that, so to 
get round that. They just, ahh, they've done that, well, okay, I'll put this in 
place now.' And it’s sort of a game, leap frog, in a way.” 
         Informant 2 
 
Informant 2 touches upon the interdependent relationship between the problem 
and the measures implemented in order to respond. Informant 2 explains that this 
approach- leaping one-step ahead- is an artifact of certain models of organized crime: 
“But that takes a lot longer, introducing, quite novel [laws]. That takes longer. 
In the greater scheme of things, it's still reasonably quick to get at least minor 
changes and new [ones] enacted. But it’s all about them reacting to what 
they've observed, not trying to put something in place to deny an opportunity 
that they see as emerging because of the things that are happening in other 
areas. And that's one of the problems with the sort of models that people have 
got.” 
         Informant 2 
 
EXTRAORDINARY CRIME AND EXTRAORDINARY POWERS: POWERFUL 
TOOLS OR BURDENS FOR POLICE? 
Informants 2 and 3 touched upon the practical implementation of the law and the 
challenges associated with translation of the law into operational policing. At the time 
of writing (July 2014), the organized crime anti-association laws are yet to be put to 
use in Australia, as they have been the subjects of High Court challenges each time a 
declaration of a criminal organization has been made. The police have not proceeded 
to declare the Finks Motorcycle Club in Queensland a criminal organization, despite 
the successful outcome in this case, as discussed above. Aside from constitutional 
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challenges, some of the challenges the Informants in this study touched upon included 
the difficulties associated with establishing control orders and the resource intensive 
nature of their policing. This means making the investigative case in the first instance 
and the subsequent monitoring of the orders. It has been discussed in the literature 
that control orders are likely to require significant police resources to monitor and 
enforce (Bronitt & McSherry, 2010; Schloenhardt, 2008; 2011).  
 
In a study of Canadian organized crime legislation, Desroches (2013) argues 
that criminal organization cases are costly and extremely time consuming, which can 
also be evidenced in Australia given the repeated constitutional challenges in the High 
Court. Desroches (2013, p. 409) argues, “organized crime legislation in Canada 
creates major definitional and evidentiary challenges for law enforcement in the 
investigation and prosecution of criminal organizations.” Desroches (2013) discusses 
that these are the main reasons why criminal organization legislation has been put to 
limited use in Canada. Instead, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) prefers 
to make use of conspiracy charges because they are less onerous and costly, and have 
a track record of success (Desroches, 2013). Informant 2 related these points to 
difficulties faced in the field of counter-terrorism, where control orders have also been 
introduced: 
“A lot of those things that sound quite good in theory are actually quite hard 
to put up into practice operationally. They will find the same thing with the 
same control orders as the CT [counter terrorism] people have found with the 
control orders in the terrorism environment in that they are very, very hard to 
get up in the first place.”  
  
“So they're very resource intensive to prove the case to a sufficient level of 
proof… A lot of effort would be required, hopefully, to get to a standard of 
proof to make the association argument in the first place. And then to actually 
monitor it is even more resource intensive.” 
         Informant 2 
 
Informant 3 raised another related issue when explaining that complicated 
jurisdictional and legal arrangements often result in difficulties with implementation. 
In the statement below, Informant 3 considers Australia’s counter terrorism plan to 
illustrate this point. The Informants often interchanged examples between organized 
crime and terrorism and this is likely to have been the case because Australia’s 
organized crime laws, and in particular the anti-association control orders, were 
modeled on terrorism laws (Bronitt & McSherry, 2010):   
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“I think this is an under-recognized issue, the more complicated the 
jurisdictional arrangements, the more complex the solution.  And the more 
complex the solution, the more difficult the implementation. Now that sounds 
really simple, but if you take Australia’s counter terrorism plan, it’s really 
quite complicated if you read it.  And complicated plans in crises are more 
likely to go wrong.  We all know that.  Simpler plans are better plans in a 
crisis.  So it’s very hard to know how to avoid this problem but it is a problem, 
and one only has to read the counter terrorism plan to know we’ve got that 
sort of problem.  And much the same applies to dealing with major organized 
crime activities that are multijurisdictional, as they always are, by their very 
nature.” 
         Informant 3 
 
An important, but also overlooked consideration, is how the legislative 
measures across Australia’s jurisdictions will ultimately translate into the operational 
policing of these offences. There is as yet scant empirical evidence that suggests that 
the legislative approach described at the outset of this chapter will have any impact on 
organized crime. These measures are of questionable worth. In relation to the 
Queensland anti-association laws Schloenhardt (2011, p. 112) comments: 
“At no stage during the development of the [Criminal Organization Act 2009 
(QLD)] Act and the parliamentary debates- in Queensland and elsewhere- 
was any evidence presented that demonstrates that the legislation will indeed 
have an impact on organized crime.”  
 
Schloenhardt (2011) is dubious the control orders will have any effect in the 
short-term, with the exception of inconveniencing and potentially causing declared 
organizations to disperse or relocate. Schloenhardt (2011) considers the long-term 
influence, and suggests organizations will continue to operate clandestinely. This is an 
idea that can be found in the data: 
“Is it going to make it easier for police?  Make it easier for police to disrupt 
particular activity if they see a number of guys walking together, they have a 
reason [to arrest]. I mean, often intelligence is collected through those random 
stops… So it may provide an advantage to law enforcement. But it might also 
send a whole lot of things underground.” 
         Informant 6 
 
Pushing criminal organizations underground is probably the most obvious 
unintended consequence; further potential consequences become apparent when these 
issues are considered more abstractly. Taking the recent legislative measures 
introduced in Queensland as an example, the requirement for mandatory terms of 
imprisonment for ‘vicious lawless associates’ means that terms of imprisonment 
imposed will be significantly longer (an additional 15 years on top of base sentence, 
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an additional 25 years on top of base sentence for an officer bearer, with no 
consideration of mitigating factors and no possibility of parole or early release). An 
additional unintended consequence is that there could be an increase in prison 
numbers over a significant period of time. In response, the Queensland Premier 
Campbell Newman and the Queensland Attorney-General and Minister for Justice 
Jarrod Bleiji have announced that members of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs will be 
housed at a ‘bikie only’ super jail located in Woodford, north of Brisbane. Within this 
facility there will be a range of additional restrictions imposed on prisoners including 
restricted out of cell hours (one hour per day), frequent drug testing and cell searches, 
pink prison uniforms, one hour of non-contact visits with family per week, no 
television or gymnasium and interception and monitoring of all communication 
including mail and telephone calls (Queensland Government, 2013).  
 
 What can be witnessed in the actions of the state is an expressive and 
symbolic attempt to demonstrate an ability to control crime, to be ‘tough on crime,’ to 
‘crackdown’ on organized crime (Edelman, 1964; Gusfield, 1968; Arnold, 1969). At 
the same time, and through the methods by which the Queensland Government have 
rushed the laws through the Queensland Parliament, the repeated attacks on 
established legal principles and individual freedoms, and the increased powers gifted 
to police, the integrity of the legislative and justice institutions within Queensland has 
been undermined. In attempting to fight what is perceived as ‘lawlessness’ with such 
extraordinary measures, the state pushes and bends the limits of the rule of law.  
 
The aims of this section were to overview the criminalization of organized 
crime, to examine the legislative strategies against organized crime in Australian 
jurisdictions, and consider criticisms and unintended consequences. The current 
legislative climate has been reviewed with a focus on the three layers of the 
multijurisdictional legal framework. This included an examination of international 
obligations under the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (UNCTOC) and the way in which Australia is meeting these obligations at a 
Commonwealth level. The legislative approach in Australia’s States and Territories 
was reviewed with a focus on the suite of measures that have cascaded throughout 
Australia’s States and Territories and represent a ‘zero tolerance’ crackdown on 
organized crime. Drawing from the insights provided by the Informants in this study, 
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definitional debates about the concept of organized crime in law were explored and 
issues of translating the law into policing were considered. As Campbell (2013, p. 9, 
emphasis added) laments, the “expressive aspects of the reactions to organized crime 
may be of more significance than their practical effort.” This point can be related to 
arguments made by Gusfield (1968) when discussing the symbolic functions of the 
law. According to Gusfield (1968, p. 59) a law “weak in its instrumental functions 
may nevertheless perform significant symbolic functions.” Issues of legal legitimacy 
and the potential violation of civil liberties were explored. Potential unintended 
consequences of the legislative approach include the potential to push criminal 
organizations underground, cause increases in prison numbers and, undermine legal 
and justice institutions.   
 
Through the above examination a number of links with Chapter 4 became 
evident and connections between social and legal constructions of organized crime 
were identified. Organized crime is constructed as a serious threat to social order. 
Within the discourse of law and order politics there is a ‘tough on crime’ political 
platform that constructs and criminalizes categories of super deviance. The threat that 
organized crime presents to the social order operates as a technique of government 
and justification for the introduction of a range of draconian laws and status based 
offences (Loughnan, 2009; Campbell, 2013; Desroches, 2013). It becomes clear that 
as the state introduces increasingly punitive measures, the real casualties in the ‘war 
on organized crime’ are due process, human rights, constitutional vales and the 
integrity of legal and justice institutions in Australia. At the same time, the law 
creates a number of new social institutions and provides them with the mandate to act 
against organized crime. The next section traces the formation and transformation of 
the agencies that are tasked to act against organized crime within an Australian 
context. 
 
NEW STATE AGENCIES: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPLEX 
 
The law establishes and empowers a number of agencies to take action against 
organized crime. This section examines the agencies that have the mandate to respond 
to organized crime in Australia, specifically at the Commonwealth level. As 
Informant 2 notes below the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian 
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Crime Commission (ACC) are the main agencies tasked to respond to organized 
crime, and will therefore be the focus of this examination: 
“The AFP's sort of core is organized crime and the ACC’s certainly is.” 
         Informant 2 
 
The Informants of this study were largely drawn from federal policing 
backgrounds (i.e. the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the National Crime Authority 
(NCA), the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI), Office of Strategic 
Crime Assessments (OSCA) and the Australian Crime Commission (ACC)), and 
accordingly, the focus of this section is on these federal policing agencies. The 
rationale for sampling from the Commonwealth agencies is set forth in the method 
chapter and will not be repeated here. However, it is important to note in recent years 
there has been a move towards a federal model of policing as the Commonwealth has 
sought to expand its competencies in matters of criminal justice, which is an 
observation explored further throughout this section.  
 
Findlay, Odgers & Yeo (2009, p. 74) note that in recent times, crime problems 
such as organized crime “have often been portrayed as beyond the competence of 
conventional criminal justice investigative agencies.” This has warranted the creation 
of new specialized policing and intelligence agencies. This is a point also made by 
Fairchild (1994, pp. 112-113) who examines the emerging police complex and 
comments the creation of the new state agencies was “inextricably linked to the 
perceived threats of organized crime.” New investigative agencies have been created 
as the “political answer to public sensitivity over ‘new crime threats’ has centered 
around bureaucracy and technology” (Findlay et al., 2009, p. 75). This section will 
show that these new bureaucracies and technologies of policing, both in Australia and 
abroad, signify a major transformation in the nature of policing institutions.  
 
This aim of this section is to overview the policing institutions that have been 
created with the mandate to respond to organized crime in Australia. Particular 
attention will be paid to the governmental rationalities supporting their formation and 
transformation overtime. The emergence of the National Crime Authority (NCA) and 
the subsequent transformation to the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and its 
mechanisms of oversight and corporate decision-making are examined. The creation 
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of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) is then discussed in the context of the 
transformation to transnational and global policing. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS: CENTRALIZATION AND 
HYBRIDIZATION 
There is a current climate of centralization and hybridization within intelligence and 
enforcement agencies. Writing from the perspective of the United Kingdom (U.K.), 
Campbell (2013) notes that shifts from traditional models of policing became evident 
in the U.K. and Ireland in the late 1990s following the establishment of the National 
Criminal Intelligence Services (NCIS) and the National Crime Squad (NCS). It was 
then, in 2005, that the Serious and Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) was established. 
SOCA replaced the Asser Recovery Agency (ARA), the NCIS and the NCS. 
Campbell (2013) discusses that given the agencies SOCA replaced, it had wide 
ranging powers in responding to organized crime. Harfield (2006, p. 743)30 also 
examined the move towards the SOCA, describing it as a “paradigm shift in British 
policing” and a “significant departure from the traditional policing infrastructure in 
the United Kingdom.”  
 
Bowling and Ross (2006) also examined the amalgamation of the ARA, NCS 
and the NCIS into SOCA, but are considerably more critical of this transformation 
than Campbell (2013) and Harfield. In the words of Bowling and Ross (2006, p. 
1025) the amalgamation of the former agencies has created a “new agency with 
unprecedented powers for surveillance, intrusion and coercion.” Sheptycki (2007b) 
also examined the birth of the SOCA situating it within a longer-term trend towards 
new centralized intelligence agencies with increased powers. Sheptycki (2007b) 
examines the new powers gifted to the SOCA, including the power to compel 
cooperation with investigators (coercive examinations are discussed further below). In 
relation to the creation of this new “super-agency” Sheptycki (2007b, p. 51) states:  
“This impressive list of new powers, together with the intention of uniting so 
many of the important national institutions of the UK policing sector into one 
super-agency, spelled out a clear attempt to re-organize policing capacity 
around the objective of fighting serious transnational crime.” 
                                                        
30 Interested readers are directed to Clive Harfield’s work on the United Kingdom’s contribution to 
policing organized crime in the European Union (2000), policing organized crime specifically in 
England and Wales (2008a), and the organization of organized crime policing and its international 
context. 
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Bowling and Ross (2006, p. 1025) discuss a number of concerns relating to 
SOCA including matters of “independence [from central government], regulation, 
transparency and accountability.” Bowling and Ross (2006, p. 1033) conclude that the 
creation of SOCA and the bestowing of a range of powers and centralized control is 
“like the opening chapter of a dystopian science fiction novel, describing the means 
by which a totalitarian state first set about gaining absolute coercive power over its 
citizens.” In fact, Bowling and Ross (2006, pp. 1033-1034) go as far as to conclude 
that the creation of such an “awesomely powerful agency” such as SOCA “must be 
regarded as one of the most worrying developments in the history of British policing.”  
 
The trend observed by Bowling and Ross in 2006 has since continued. After 7 
years of operation, in October 2013 SOCA was abolished and replaced with the new 
National Crime Agency (NCA) (Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK)). The NCA 
consists of the further amalgamation of intelligence and enforcement agencies 
including the National Cyber Crime Centre (NCCC) and the Child Exploitation and 
Online Protection Centre (CEOPC). At the same time, the operational independence 
of local police agencies in the U.K. is reduced, while the oversight mechanisms for 
the NCA are transformed. For example, instead of reporting to an external oversight 
body the Director-General of the new NCA reports directly to the Home Secretary, 
which serves to further the new agency’s national reach (Johnston, 2013). 
 
The shift towards the amalgamation and centralization of enforcement and 
intelligence agencies with increased powers and scope is not limited to the United 
Kingdom. Bowling and Ross (2006) describe parallels between SOCA and the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), although Bowling and Ross (2006) do note 
that the ambit of SOCA is narrower as the FBI is also concerned with national 
security matters such as terrorism, cyber attacks and espionage. Similar moves have 
undoubtedly been experienced in Australia, and there are obvious links between the 
U.K. situation and that which has unfolded in the previous decades in Australia. 
Informant 1 confirmed this: 
“The NCA [National Crime Authority] was established in 1984/5 by the then 
Liberal Federal Government following consultation with the States and 
Territories to investigate the findings from the Costigan Royal Commission 
into Organized Crime.  The NCA was granted special powers to investigate 
various alleged organized crime groups and individuals utilizing a multi 
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agency investigative task force model. In the U.K. at the same time, based on 
the growth of organized crime, the British government established the 
National Crime Squad with similar roles and functions as the NCA, but 
without the coercive powers and multi-skilled task forces. The reason I 
mention the U.K. is both countries seem to have moved at a similar time to 
tackle the growth of organized crime. In 2003 shortly after the establishment 
of the ACC the U.K. Government dissolved their National Crime Squad and 
established the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) with a similar 
emphasis on intelligence based approach to operations. During the 
establishment phase of both agencies there was a healthy exchange of ideas 
and information.”   
 
“I think in actual fact that when the [Australian] Crime Commission was first 
established, I think if you are aware they used to have the National Crime 
Authority, and it is very interesting because the National Crime Authority, 
when it was established in Australia, the United Kingdom set up the National 
Crime Squad the same year. The same year they set up the Australian Crime 
Commission the British government then moved to the a new model, the 
Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA). The change is interesting: based on 
the growth and impact of serious and organized crime both countries moved 
to a new multi-skilled model with increased powers.”  
         Informant 1 
 
In the statements above Informant 1 discusses that these new intelligence and 
enforcement agencies, with increased powers and multi-skilled taskforces, were 
established in order to combat the growing threat of organized crime. It is interesting 
that Australia and the United Kingdom moved towards a similar model at the same 
time, while, as Informant 1 notes, exchanging ideas between the two countries. 
Sheptycki (2007b, p. 51) argues that “many countries… exhibited similar tendencies 
to reconfigure their national policing apparatuses” in response to the threat of serious 
and organized crime. Further, Sheptycki (2007b) discusses that these transformations 
towards centralized intelligence (rather than policing) agencies was aligned with the 
moves to a model of intelligence led-policing (ILP) model (as discussed in relation to 
NPM above and also discussed further in the section below). This is a point also made 
by Harfield (2006, p. 746) who points out that “SOCA blurs the historical distinction 
between the intelligence community and the law enforcement community.” This shift 
is not limited to the United Kingdom context. For example, Elvins (2003) discusses 
similar trends in Europe more broadly, and particularly the lead role taken by Europol. 
Indeed, Elvins (2003, p. 36) points to “a trend towards making Europol the equivalent 
of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations.” Evidence of this trend can be found 
across Europe. According to Sheptycki (2007b, p. 56): 
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“By the beginning of the millennium, 15 European countries with very 
different policing traditions had begun to take steps that prioritized the 
gathering, analysis and dissemination of intelligence in relation to serious and 
organized crime (and terrorism).” 
 
This is a form of policy transfer and highlights the capacity for the 
homogenization of institutional formations across countries (on policy transfer and 
diffusion see: Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; see also Jones and Newburn, 2007 who 
specifically examine U.S. influence over British crime control policy; see also the 
discussion of the U.S. influence in the development of the international security 
agenda surrounding organized crime in Chapter 4). The Australian context and the 
trajectory towards a centralized ‘intelligence-led’ ‘super-agency’ (i.e. the Australian 
Crime Commission) connect with broader international trends. We now turn to the 
historical development of this agency. 
 
1984: THE NATIONAL CRIME AUTHORITY 
Consistent with the points made by Informant 1 in the first statement presented above 
Findlay et al. (2009) place the beginnings of the National Crime Authority with the 
Costigan Commission (Royal Commission into the Activities of the Federated Ship 
Painters and Dockers Union). The Costigan Commission adopted an open-ended 
approach to investigation while making use of new computer technology. This new 
investigative methodology led to a new understanding of the threat of organized crime 
that subsequently provided the rationale for the development of new policing agencies 
and special prosecutors with increased powers (investigative methods and problem 
construction are discussed in the next section). Findlay et al., (2009, p. 78) comment: 
“It is interesting to observe how a new approach to crime investigation, such 
as that adopted by the Costigan Commission, produced new representations of 
the crime threat. These in turn fuelled the push towards new investigation 
agencies and procedures, with wider mandates and more intrusive powers 
than those granted to traditional policing and prosecution agencies.” 
 
The results, and the understanding of the organized crime threat in Australia, 
that were obtained through the investigative processes of the Costigan Commission 
resulted in the call for a new agency to investigate organized crime. Findlay et al., 
(2009, p. 79) put it eloquently: 
“To some extent the ‘new’ institutional and procedural responses to 
contemporary crime problems become part of a self-fulfilling prophecy for 
crime control. The crime threat, said to be behind these new agencies, was the 
motivation for a re-ordering of crime-control priorities. The new crime 
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control agenda that emerged adopted the language and perspective on crime 
and control promoted by these new agencies. Their common development 
seemed mutually supportive to a point where one was soon seen as 
justification for the other. Organized crime had to be addressed by a Crime 
Commission, and this meant a redirection of control resources. The Crime 
Commission becomes the essential feature of the new control agenda, and that 
agenda demands the development of the Commission.” 
 
What this means is that the methods for the unveiling of the new crime threat, 
were at the same time the rationale underling the formation of the new investigative 
agency. Thus, the creation of the methods, threat and agencies was a mutually 
reinforcing process. Moreover the existing state police agencies were not considered 
equipped to deal with the new threat of organized crime, so the formation of a new 
agency with additional powers was required. According to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee Evaluation of the NCA (1988, p. 29):  
 “The debate preceding the establishment of the National Crime Authority 
tended to focus on the perceived inadequacies in dealing with ‘organized 
crime’ and the powers that the [National Crime] Authority would require to 
deal with that phenomenon.” 
 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee Evaluations (1988; 1991) note the 
rationale supporting the development of the agency was that existing police agencies 
did not have the capacity to respond to organized crime. More specifically, according 
to these documents, the main reasons supporting the creation of the NCA included the 
reactive nature of traditional law enforcement agencies, the fragmented nature of law 
enforcement across jurisdictions with a lack of information sharing, combined with a 
lack of resources and specialist expertise. In direct response to these deficiencies, in 
1984 the NCA was formed. The emergence of the NCA represents the first step 
towards centralized police intelligence agencies with extraordinary powers of 
surveillance and investigation in Australia. 
 
As set forth in section 11 of the National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth) there 
were four main functions of the NCA. Taken from the Act and in summary these 
included the responsibility:  
a) To collect and analyze criminal information and intelligence relating to 
relevant criminal activities and disseminate that information and intelligence; 
(b) To investigate matters relating to relevant criminal activities;    
(c) To arrange for the establishment of Task Forces for the purpose of 
investigating matters relating to relevant criminal activities; and 
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(d) To co-ordinate investigations into matters relating to relevant criminal 
activities 
 
In order to achieve these functions the NCA was provided with a variety of 
special powers, beyond those of any other policing agency in Australia at that time. 
These included the ability to hold hearings (s.25) with the power to summons 
witnesses, take evidence and obtain documents (s.28 and s.29), while removing self-
incrimination as an excuse to fail to answer a question or produce a document31 (s.30). 
With the emergence of the NCA there were a number of shifts from the traditional 
policing model including the new inquisitorial role to hold hearings, which is 
certainly not a traditional function of policing agencies. Another transformation was 
the interdependence with central government in determining investigations. The 
National Secretary of the Australian Federal Police Association (AFPA)32 Chris Eaton 
(1997, p. 18) commented in a submission to the Joint Committee on the NCA:  
 “The NCA Act to some extent also changed the independence of policing as 
we understand it. More particularly in how police investigations are initiated. 
For the first time in this country a formal process of political referral, 
implying political consideration, determined what was and was not the work 
of a significant law enforcement body.” 
 
Complete treatment of the concept of police independence in Australia is 
beyond the scope of this section (see further: Bersten, 1990; Stenning, 2007; Stenning, 
2011). However, it is important to note that this is distinct from the doctrine of 
separation of powers as set forth in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 
1900 (Cth) (Bersten, 1990). This is because the doctrine of separation of powers only 
concerns the relationship between (1) the Judiciary, (2) the Parliament and (3) the 
Executive (Bersten, 1990). Stenning (2011) explores the notion of a modified doctrine 
of the separation of powers between the arms of (1) politics (the Government of the 
day, Cabinet and Parliament), (2) the administration (the public service) and (3) the 
law (courts). Police independence can be understood as the independent decision-
making capability of policing organizations and encompasses the degree of control 
and accountability that police organizations are subject to by either the Parliament, 
                                                        
31 Subsequent amendments to the NCA Act expanded these powers and allowed for the provision of 
immunity from prosecution when the person indicated that the information may be self-incriminating, 
see: Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority (2002). 
32 The AFPA making a submission to the Joint Committee on the NCA is an example of police unions 
as important players in the process of legislative reform, as discussed above. 
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Executive or Judiciary (Stenning, 2007). According to Stenning (2007) such decision-
making capabilities may include issues concerning resourcing and deployment of 
resources, organizational structure and management, policies, priority setting and 
operational decision-making.  
 
Stenning (2007) and Bersten (1990) both point out that police organizations in 
Australia, through Police Commissioners, are accountable to the relevant State and 
Federal Ministers, who are in turn accountable to the Parliament (i.e. ministerial 
responsibility). Bersten (1990, p. 304) notes it is ultimately the Parliaments of 
Australian jurisdictions, under the federal constitution, that have legislative power to 
“establish and control the police in any manner the Parliament thinks fit.” This differs 
from the British system of police accountability as described by Reiner (1991).33 
Reiner (1991, p. 237) argues the British police are “virtually impervious to any 
control by elected political bodies.” The Australian context differs as the Parliaments 
of Australia have the power to control the police (Stenning 2007; Bersten, 1990). The 
point made by Chris Eaton (1997) indicates that with the creation of the NCA, there 
was increased political direction and a process of referral in the priorities of a policing 
organization.  
 
ENTER THE AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION 
In the late 1990s there was political dissatisfaction with the NCA. Findlay et al. 
(2009) outline a number of reasons including lack of accountability to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee, failure to combat national and international crime 
threats, dissatisfaction of State and Territory police agencies with the intelligence 
provided, and the autocratic approach in conducting investigations. In the second 
reading speech of the Australian Crime Commission Establishment Bill 2002 (Cth) 
Senator Denman notes that although there was not a single rationale supporting the 
dissolution of the NCA and the creation of the ACC, there was speculation that a 
possible reason included the fact that the NCA showed support for “a heroin trial 
conflicting with official government policy” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). 
Gary Crooke was, at that time, the chair of the NCA and he spoke publicly of his 
support of a heroin trial in Australia (see: Forbes & Taylor, 2001). This can be related 
                                                        
33 According to the Police Act 1964 (UK) the Chief Constable (appointed by the police authority) has 
responsibility for determining operational matters (see Reiner 1991). 
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to the point made by Eaton (1997) that the work of the NCA was determined on the 
basis of political consideration because of dependence with central government.  
 
This is also relevant to the tensions in Australia’s drug policy presented in 
Chapter 4: under the Howard Government, drug policy (in the late 1990s) was a 
‘tough on drugs’ approach. As the NCA supported a harm minimization approach and 
a heroin trial, this was in direct opposition to the Howard government policy. Prime 
Minister Howard publicly challenged Gary Crooke by stating “let me make it clear: 
while ever this government is in office and while ever I'm Prime Minister there will 
be no heroin trial” (as cited in Forbes & Taylor, 2001). This is an interesting point to 
consider in the transformation from the NCA to the ACC, because as Findlay et al., 
(2009) note, former Prime Minster John Howard actively campaigned for the 
dissolution of the NCA, and following reelection in 2001 commissioned a review of 
the agency. Mr. Mick Palmer (former Commissioner of the AFP) and Mr. Tony Blunn 
(former Secretary of the Attorney General’s Department) undertook this review, and 
together produced a report entitled ‘Transformation of the NCA’ (Findlay et al., 2009). 
This report, however, was never made publicly available34 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2002). 
 
The ACC replaced the NCA in January 2003 (Australian Crime Commission 
Act 2002 and Australian Crime Commission Establishment Act 2002). The Australian 
Crime Commission is effectively the amalgamation of the National Crime Authority 
(NCA), the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI) and the Office of 
Strategic Crime Assessments (OSCA). Hence the Australian Crime Commission 
represents a centralized amalgamation and hybrid of these former agencies, and due to 
its corporate structure operates with even less independence from Government, a 
point discussed below. The ACC has the same powers as those that were bestowed on 
the former agencies, and was granted further coercive powers. 
 
                                                        
34 Attempts were made to access this report through the National Archives of Australia, the J.V. Barry 
library at the Australian Institute of Criminology and directly through the Manager of the Serious 
Crime Research and Strategic Analysis Team at the Australian Crime Commission. Unfortunately, due 
to the Australian Crime Commission’s dissemination policy, the report could not be obtained for the 
purposes of this research. 
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Informant 1 was in a key position of authority and leadership during the 
transformation from the NCA to the ACC, and as such provided extensive insight into 
this change. Informant 1 commented on the range of capabilities of the ACC, a 
renewed focus on intelligence, and the effect of combining the NCA, OSCA and the 
ABCI:  
“In short the new agency was set up to bring together all arms of intelligence 
and law enforcement (Federal and State) to unify the fight against serious and 
organized criminal activity. The amalgamation of the agencies acknowledged 
the need for law enforcement agencies in Australia to revolutionize and work 
in partnership to achieve positive outcomes against serious and organized 
criminal activity.” 
 
“The ACC Act provided the new agency with greater intelligence gathering, 
investigative capability and coercive powers than the previous individual 
agencies.  The new legislation incorporated the roles of the integrated 
agencies and created a single body equipped with functions, resources and 
special powers to enhance law enforcement capability in Australia at that 
time. The ACC based its operations, activities and decisions on an intelligence 
framework, while the NCA was an investigative body with limited intelligence 
capability that dealt with the specific crime issues identified in the 1980’s.” 
 
        Informant 1 
 
In the statement presented above, Informant 1 discusses that the amalgamation 
of the NCA, OSCA and the ABCI revolutionized federal policing in Australia. 
Informant 1 compares the NCA to the ACC with the main point of difference the 
enhanced intelligence capabilities of the ACC. The functions and purpose of the ACC 
include the collection and dissemination of intelligence about, and the investigation of, 
federally relevant criminal activity,35 and in particular serious and organized crime. It 
is noted in a report compiled by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National 
Crime Authority (2002, p. 22) “with the incorporation of ABCI and OSCA into the 
organization, that intelligence gathering has been given further importance in the 
work of the new organization.” The ACC is now a hybrid intelligence and 
enforcement agency (a point made by Bowling and Ross (2006) in reference to SOCA 
in the U.K.), with extra powers to conduct secret coercive examinations. It is 
important to note that the secret coercive examinations are conducted for the purposes 
of intelligence gathering, and not for the evidentiary purposes of prosecution (Findlay 
                                                        
35 Federally relevant criminal activity is defined according to section 4 of the Australian Crime 
Commission 2002 Act. Federally relevant criminal activity is a crime against a law of the 
Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, and has a federal aspect. 
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et al., 2009; on the blurring of the distinction between intelligence and evidence see: 
Roach, 2010). This represents a further shift from traditional models of policing.  
 
The ACC has all of the powers of the NCA and the ABCI, but has additional 
coercive powers. The ACC was granted new coercive investigative powers which 
include “the power to summons a person to give evidence under oath, the power to 
demand the production of documents and the power to demand information from 
Commonwealth government departments and agencies” (Findlay et al., 2009, p. 89). 
According to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority 
(2002, p. 21) the coercive powers granted to the ACC “permit an officially sanctioned 
body to take initiatives which ordinarily would be outside the scope of legally 
acceptable methods of criminal investigation.” The major difference between these 
powers and those of the NCA, is that now individuals who fail to respond to questions 
or produce documents as requested by the ACC are in contempt of the ACC and an 
application can be made to the Federal Court or the Supreme Court (of the relevant 
State or Territory) for the individual to be detained and dealt with by that court (see: 
ss. 34A, 34B, 34C, 34D of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002). The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission (2002, p. 4) 
points out that typically “these extraordinary powers are entrusted to the judiciary, 
and not to executive agencies.”  
 
THE BOARD AND THE CEO: COMMERCIAL GOVERNANCE OR EXECUTIVE 
INTERFERENCE? 
In the ‘Transformations of the National Crime Authority’ report (that was not made 
publicly available) it was stated that the governance arrangements for the NCA were 
not effective (as cited in Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime 
Authority, 2002). Therefore, in tandem with the transformation from the NCA to the 
ACC, new governance structures were created. According to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on the National Crime Authority (2002, p. 9) the major difference 
between the structure of the NCA and the ACC is “the separation of the governance 
role for the agency with the creation of the Board.” 
 
The Board of the Australian Crime Commission directs and authorizes the 
activities of the ACC. The Board is composed of the Commissioner of the Australian 
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Federal Police, the Secretary of the Department, the Chief Executive Officer of 
Customs, the Chairperson of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
the Director-General of Security, the Commissioner or Head of Police of each State 
and Territory, the Commissioner of Taxation and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of the Australian Crime Commission (s. 7B of the Australian Crime Commission Act 
2002). The CEO of the ACC is responsible for the management and administration of 
the ACC, including the coordination and the control of all ACC operations and 
investigations (s. 46A of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002). 
 
According to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime 
Authority (2002, p. 13) the new structure for the ACC (i.e. CEO and Board) is a 
“commercial governance model.” The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is expected to 
act according to the advice and decisions of the Board. Therefore, the ACC is not 
independent of the Executive agencies that are represented on the board. This 
signifies moves away from police independence. A CEO is not the equivalent of an 
independent judge or a Police Commissioner. The application of a commercial 
governance model to a policing organization represents another difference between 
traditional law enforcement agencies and that of the ACC. This represents the 
application of private sector managerial techniques to public sector policing agencies, 
which is also reflective of the shift to new public management discussed in Chapter 4. 
Informant 1 discussed the way the Board tasks the ACC: 
“What the ACC did, it was tasked by their Board, to collect all intelligence 
available from all sources, police agencies, government departments and open 
source information, then via a process of analysis, they were able to paint a 
picture of what organized crime looked like in Australia.” 
 
“If the Board agrees they will approve subject to the project requirements to 
combine State and Federal agencies with the [Australian] Crime Commission 
powers on a specified case.” 
 
“Not all investigations run to the timetable due to a variety of factors outside 
the investigation team’s area of control. At some stage for example you might 
find during the investigation that the target group will suddenly stop because 
they have suspected they are under investigation or they are running a drug 
importation and suddenly something occurs to the shipment. They may have a 
falling out within their group and suddenly the job is stopped or you find that 
due to their extended activities you don’t have enough resources.  Based on 
these various factors there may be a need to tread water for 6 months or scale 
the operation down. In such cases there may be a need to go back to the Board 
and seek approval for an extension of time for the operation or have a small 
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unit monitor their activities. When required, the operation can be ramped up 
and resources increased.  In the event the operation does not meet the targets 
set by the Board the operation can be scaled down, varied, referred to another 
agency or terminated.” 
        Informant 1 
 
The Board of the ACC provides an external oversight and managerial 
mechanism in the operation of the ACC and the application of its powers. Findlay et 
al., (2009, p. 84) note that the main challenges of governing the NCA was the 
coupling of the secretive “trust us approach” combined with the specialized 
knowledge produced by the agency. Therefore, during the transformation from the 
NCA to the ACC it was decided that there should be additional mechanisms for the 
transparency and accountability of the ACC (see: example Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on the National Crime Authority, 2002; Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002). For example, Informant 1 touched upon the requirement to secure Board 
approval before using the coercive powers: 
“[If] you have the intelligence to use the coercive powers under that unified 
approach, this approach can be quite effective and a more efficient utilization 
of your resources. However, to do that you have to be able to justify the 
business case [to the Board] in relation to who should be targeted it has got to 
be very strong and reliable intelligence.” 
        Informant 1 
THE POTENTIAL FOR CORRUPTION: SAFEGUARDING THE SYSTEM 
The architecture developed to respond to organized crime, creates a range of 
additional problems, including the potential for corruption, which in turn requires 
further bureaucratic structures to monitor and respond. This is especially pertinent 
given the high-level and systemic police corruption that was uncovered in the 1980s 
and 1990s in Australia. Indeed, it is argued in the literature that “corruption and police 
misconduct are persistent and constantly recurring hazards generated by the 
organization itself” (Punch 2000, p. 301). The issue of (high-level) corruption remains 
relevant. For example, in 2011 Mark Standen, the former Assistant-Director of the 
New South Wales Crime Commission, was found guilty of attempting to import 
pseudoephedrine and perverting the course of justice (see: Harfield, 2012). Informant 
3 discusses that corruption is an “enormous issue” and makes reference to both the 
New South Wales Wood Royal Commission and the Queensland Fitzgerald Inquiry 
(for Wood Royal Commission see: Dixon, 1999; for Fitzgerald Inquiry see: Lewis, 
Ransley & Homel, 2010):  
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“Corruption is an enormous issue.  I mean we only go back to the Royal 
Commissions in Queensland, the Fitzgerald Royal Commission and the New 
South Wales Commission.  And of course, organizations like the AFP were 
living, even in 1996, in the aftermath of that sort of experience.” 
        Informant 3 
 
At the organizational level, Informant 3 reflected upon the need to develop 
well-established multiagency taskforces that can be directed at crime problems. 
Informant 3 notes that in order to have the taskforces work well together it is 
necessary that they collaboratively run operations over a period of time. However, 
Informant 3 points out that this operational structure undermines the flexibility of the 
taskforce and creates opportunities for corruption. As an example, Informant 3 
discusses the Mark Standen case, which was also discussed by Informant 5: 
“So if we’re, for instance, mounting an operation, a major operation and it’s 
multijurisdictional and multiagency, the… what’s it called, the Asian taskforce 
in Sydney, the Asian crime taskforce, it was a multiagency taskforce and it was 
very successful for a long time but it certainly had its problems.  So one of the 
solutions to these were to develop these standing multiagency taskforces 
directed at specific crime problems. But, by its very nature in order to get 
those agencies to work well together you need to maintain those taskforces 
over a period of time.  That both undermines their flexibility, and the flexibility 
of the structures to deal with the evolving crime environment, but it also opens 
out possibilities for corruption as we saw with the Standen situation in New 
South Wales.” 
        Informant 3 
 
Informant 3, who had held senior positions within the Australian Federal 
Police, further elaborated on the operational team structures within that organization. 
According to Informant 3 the operational team structures needed to be flexible to 
respond to the dynamic nature of the crime environment, and as the teams were 
continually being assembled and disassembled it reduced the risk of corruption. 
Informant 3 notes that flexible team structures were implemented within the AFP in 
the aftermath of the corruption in New South Wales and Queensland:  
“The AFP very early on, really in 1996, developed a team model.  Now that 
team model, I think, was an extraordinary innovative and good model for the 
time.  There were flat team structures that were put together for specific jobs. 
The problem with that model was that you traded off expertise for flexibility 
and lack of corruption.  One of the good things about those variable team 
models is that the teams are constantly being put together and broken up, and 
that is inimical to corruption.” 
        Informant 3 
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According to Informant 3 the original team structures consisted of operational 
‘experts’ who had been working within the same team for a number of years, which 
created opportunities for corruption and (too) close relationships with informants. The 
AFP then implemented flexible and short-lived operational teams that were assembled 
to respond to a specific case. Informant 3 notes that while this makes it difficult for 
corruption, it becomes a disadvantage for the police because the team is starting 
‘tabula rasa’ without the necessary expertise or informant connections. It becomes a 
compromise between the prevention of corruption or expert operational teams:  
“The drug squad in Victoria, for instance, turned out to be highly corrupt, and 
some of those people had been working together for years and years and years.  
They were hardly expert, but having people in expert slots over the years 
really opens up the possibility for corruption, because you get to know your 
informants too well... all of the reasons are quite obvious.  Now, the contrary 
model to that is these highly flexible teams, which AFP went down that track 
in 1996, and the problem with that is that everyone’s learning the wheel all 
over again, every time one of those teams are put together.  You’re not calling 
upon the expertise, the old copper type model, that says ‘Yeah, I know Joe 
Blogs he has got his fingerprints all over it’ or whatever.” 
        Informant 3 
 
In addition to Informant 3’s extensive insights into matters of police 
corruption and operational team structures, Informant 7, who held a senior policy 
position within the Attorney-General’s Department, argues that it is important to 
remain vigilant about the possibility of people in positions of power becoming 
corrupt: 
“One thing that was made very clear is that we shouldn’t think we can’t be 
impacted by infiltration leading to the corruption of people of influence.” 
        Informant 7 
 
It is clear that it is necessary to have proper and effective oversight of the new 
federal intelligence and enforcement agencies. As established in section 8 and 9 of the 
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002, the ACC and the Board are subject to 
external oversight by the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Australian Crime 
Commission (IGC-ACC). The IGC-ACC is a division of the Ministerial Council on 
the Administration of Justice (MCAJ), within the Standing Council on Law and 
Justice (SCLJ) (before September 2011 this was named the Standing Committee of 
the Attorney General or SCAG). The MCAJ and the SCLJ are located in the portfolio 
of the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), and ultimate Ministerial responsibility 
lies with the Minister for Home Affairs (Attorney General’s Department, 2011). This 
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is relevant to the above discussion of police independence and ministerial 
responsibility (Bersten, 1990; Stenning, 2007). The IGC-ACC includes the Minister 
for Home Affairs, and Ministers representing each State and Territory jurisdiction, 
which are typically the Police Ministers. In addition to the role of external oversight, 
the IGC-ACC receives the annual reports of the ACC from the Board of the ACC (s. 
61 Australian Crime Commission Act 2002). The IGC-ACC also has the power to 
revoke the use of coercive powers by the ACC.  
 
In addition to the IGC-ACC and the Board of the ACC, the ACC has external 
oversight by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement (PJCLE)36 (s. 
54 of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002). The PJCLE is comprised of five 
members from the Senate and five members from the House of Representatives. The 
function of the PJCLE is to monitor the ACC (and more recently, also the Australian 
Federal Police), and to report to both Houses of Parliament. The PJCLE also 
examines and reports to Parliament matters arising from the annual reports of the 
ACC. Here the role of the Parliament in the control and oversight of the ACC is 
evident (see: Bersten, 1990).  The roles and functions of this oversight committee are 
that of a “watchdog” (Griffith, 2005, p. 25).  The functions include reviewing the 
performance of the agency and reporting to Parliament, the examination of crime 
trends and conducting inquiries in matters that are referred by Parliament (Griffith, 
2005).  
 
Griffith (2005) notes that the creation of the Joint Committee as an oversight 
mechanism of the NCA/ACC (and now the AFP) has raised a number of important 
questions. These include the question of “appearance of supervision over a body 
whose activities were too complex to be monitored meaningfully by busy 
parliamentarians” (Griffith, 2005, p. 27). This does incite consideration of the 
operation, and ultimate effectiveness, of this type of accountability mechanism. While 
no evaluations specifically of the PJCLE have been conducted, the available literature 
suggests there may be challenges and weaknesses with this approach, including 
tensions between the agency and the oversight committee, inadequate funding, and 
                                                        
36 From 2003 to 2010 this was named the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime 
Commission. Prior to 2003 this was named the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Crime 
Authority. 
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difficulties with access to information (see: Griffith, 2005; Gill, 2007; Gill & 
Phythian (2013); Prenzler, 2000; 2011).  
 
Finally, the ACC is under the jurisdiction of the Integrity Commissioner (who 
is appointed by the Governor-General) of the Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI). In 2004, The Howard Government announced the 
creation of ACLEI following claims ACC officers were “involved in stealing from 
drug dealers and picking up prostitutes in government vehicles” (Prenzler, 2011, p. 
295). The Integrity Commissioner is tasked with investigating corruption within 
federal law enforcement agencies, and reports to the Minister of Home Affairs, and 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law 
Enforcement Integrity (PJCACLEI), which like the PJCLE, reports to both Houses of 
Parliament. Although funding has increased, it was stated that the initial budget for 
this agency was “grossly inadequate” which led to criticisms that ACLEI was 
“toothless” (Prenzler, 2011, p. 296).  
 
WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: THE COMMONWEALTH 
ORGANIZED CRIME STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK (COCSF) 
Since the late 1990s there has been a trend for the Commonwealth government to take 
a more active role in the matters of criminal justice. Findlay et al., (2009, p. 106) 
comment “a significant recent trend in Australian criminal justice is the federal 
government’s growing interest and involvement in criminal jurisdiction.” Federalism 
is a mechanism for limiting the power of any single government and ensures there are 
different points of accountability. Painter (1988, p. 57) explains that federalism is a 
way of dividing the power to govern, and this is achieved by dividing competencies 
“territorially and functionally through constitutionally entrenching separate 
jurisdictions.” Under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) 
criminal law and policing are generally considered responsibilities of the States and 
Territories of Australia, and not the Commonwealth. However, in recent years the 
Commonwealth government has expanded its involvement in these matters, through 
national policy, federal legislation and central policing agencies such as the ACC and 
the AFP. Findlay et al., (2009, p. 81) discuss that Commonwealth agencies are 
“claiming pre-eminence over criminal justice as a crucial tool for national security.”  
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Here, there are two intertwined issues including the expansion of the activities 
of the Commonwealth in matters of criminal justice justified by national security, and 
also the notion of ‘whole-of-government’ responses. ‘Whole-of-government’ 
responses or ‘joined up government’ are considered a feature of New Public 
Management (NPM) (as discussed in Chapter 4 above) (Christensen & Laegreid, 
2007). Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has been credited as introducing the 
term ‘joined up government’ in 1997. ‘Joined up government’ was introduced as a 
way to “get a better grip on the ‘wicked’ issues straddling the boundaries of public 
sector organizations” (Christensen & Laegreid, 2007, p. 1060). Interestingly, 
Sheptycki (2007b) notes that it was under the leadership of Tony Blair that the whole-
of-government response to organized crime in the United Kingdom was formulated. 
This response was the restructuring of Britain’s policing architecture into the SOCA 
(described above). In an Australian context, the shift towards ‘whole-of-government’ 
responses is also evident in the composition of the Board of the ACC. For example, 
when discussing the key differences between the NCA and the ACC Findlay et al., 
(2009, pp. 88) point out: 
“The Board was to be given more direct power for the management of the 
Commission’s investigation and intelligence capacities, the activation of its 
powers, and the establishment of its priorities to reflect the federal 
government’s performance commitments on law enforcement and security. In 
fact the organization of the ACC and the discharge of its responsibilities 
clearly reflects a whole-of-government approach.” 
 
 Informant 3 also discussed the issue of ‘whole-of-government’ responses to 
organized crime, noting that this was beginning to emerge in the late 1990s in 
response to the problem of people smuggling. Informant 3 lists the range of agencies 
involved in this ‘whole-of-government response’ to people smuggling, included the 
Office of National Assessments (ONA), the Customs and Border Protection Service 
(Customs), Coast Watch, the AFP, and the Australian defence intelligence 
organizations (which enables links to be drawn to the erosion of the distinction 
between traditional criminal justice and military responses to organized crime): 
“That's when the whole-of-government approach really got under way.  It 
wasn't with 9/11; it was with people smuggling.  And the Office of National 
Assessments was put in charge by the Howard government with coordinating 
the intelligence effort around people smuggling. The multiplicity of agencies 
involved were Customs, Coast Watch, AFP, the major [agencies from] what 
we call the Australian intelligence community, organizations like DSD 
[Defence Signals Directorate, now Australian Signals Directorate, ASD], 
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DIGO [Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organization], all of those agencies 
were involved.” 
         Informant 3 
 
In recent years, the clearest example of the transition to a whole-of-
government response to organized crime is the development of the Commonwealth 
Organized Crime Strategic Framework (COCSF) by the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department. In April 2009, the Standing Committee of the Attorney 
General (SCAG) (now the Standing Council on Law and Justice or SCLJ) agreed to 
develop a national response to organized crime in Australia. SCAG noted that as 
organized crime is a national problem, a national response is required, providing the 
rationale for the Commonwealth to make inroads into criminal justice jurisdiction 
(see: Attorney-General’s Department, 2009; 2010a; 2010b). This is interesting 
because organized crime is not considered as a cross-border issue; it is considered a 
national issue. In this way, calling organized crime a national problem operates as a 
discursive technique to legitimate a national, and Commonwealth led, response under 
cooperative federalism. 
 
In November 2009, the Attorney General and the Minister for Home Affairs 
released the Commonwealth Organized Crime Strategic Framework (COCSF). The 
COCSF focused on (1) threat assessments of organized crime as reported by the ACC, 
(2) the need for a response plan to organized crime in Australia, and (3) the 
implementation of a multi-agency response. The framework describes five 
capabilities required to support the whole-of-government response to organized crime. 
These capabilities include (1) intelligence collection, sharing and interoperability, (2) 
targeting the criminal economy, (3) the investigation, prosecution and management of 
organized offenders, (4) preventative partnerships with industry and the community, 
and (5) domestic, Commonwealth and international partnerships. 
Following the release of the COCSF, the Commonwealth Organized Crime Response 
Plan (COCRP) (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010a; 2010b) was released 
targeting the areas identified by the ACC’s threat assessment. The strategies of the 
COCRP (2010 to 2011) focus on strengthening and the alignment of policy, 
legislation and enforcement operations, increased analytical and intelligence 
capabilities and sharing, increased international engagement at policy and operational 
levels, and enhancing industry and community engagement and awareness. In the 
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COCRP it was noted there is inadequate consideration for the national context of 
organized crime, and therefore in addition to the COCRP, a National Organized 
Crime Response Plan (NOCRP) would also be developed.  
 
The NOCRP (2010-2013) aims to integrate the work of the Commonwealth 
with State and Territory Governments and is governed by a Senior Officers’ Group on 
Organized Crime (SOG on OC) comprised of representatives from law enforcement 
agencies from each Australian jurisdiction. The NOCRP outlines five strategies that 
are effectively similar to the strategies of the COCRP. These five strategies are: (1) 
effective inter-agency, national and international collaboration, (2) increased 
intelligence and sharing, (3) increased multi-jurisdictional approaches to organized 
crime, (4) a national response to the priority areas identified by threat assessments of 
the ACC, and finally, (5) increased industry stakeholder awareness, partnerships and 
public engagement.  In the statement presented below, Informant 5 describes the 
Commonwealth Organized Crime Strategic Framework:  
“The [framework that the] Attorney General initiated in 2010 
[Commonwealth Organized Crime Strategic Framework], was a very good 
approach that was agreed by all the jurisdictions, State, Territory and 
Commonwealth. They decided on a strategy towards organized crime or 
transnational organized [crime].” 
         Informant 5 
 
Informant 7 was responsible for the development of the Commonwealth 
Organized Crime Strategic Framework, and provided a number of insights about the 
process of development and operation in practice. Informant 7 also described the 
process of negotiating with various agencies and jurisdictions. According to 
Informant 7 there was initially hesitation from agencies and jurisdictions that felt that 
organized crime was within their jurisdiction, and not that of the Attorney-General’s 
Department (on the point of bureaucratic competition in the policy process see: 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2005; Chapter 4). The second statement confirms the tensions 
between the Australian States and Territories and the Commonwealth Government, 
and the perception that the Commonwealth is pursuing further powers and 
responsibilities in criminal justice jurisdiction: 
“[We] established a taskforce in Attorney-Generals to bring in officers from 
the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police. [We] 
also wanted to involve industry and non-tradition agencies such as the 
Australian Taxation Office and Centrelink. Agencies that are not operational.” 
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“Then there was concern from other jurisdictions. Is this a grab for power 
and responsibility? The States fiercely hold onto this.” 
 
         Informant 7 
 
THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED 
CRIME, THE AFP AND THE ADVENT OF ‘GLOCAL’ POLICING 
Shifts to a centralized federal model of policy and policing have not been the only 
interesting feature of the current climate of the policing of organized crime in 
Australia. Another key transformation observed has been the move to cross-border 
policing and international cooperation. This change has been justified because of the 
perceived threat of transnational organized crime. Clear links can be drawn with the 
discourse of international securitization in Chapter 4. In essence, the international 
security threat that transnational organized crime presents has provided the rational 
for a new transnational model of policing. The recent development of international or 
global policing has been the focus of much academic attention in recent years (see: 
Nadelmann, 1993; Newburn & Reiner, 2007; Sheptycki, 2000; Newburn & Sparks, 
2004; Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Sheptycki, 2007b; Harfield, 2008; Greener, 
2009; Bowling, 2009; Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007; Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012; 
Hufnagel, Harfield & Bronitt, 2012; Stenning & Shearing, 2012). 
 
Bowling and Ross (2006, p. 1032; 1031) state that transformations in the 
nature of policing to “supranational policing” have occurred a result of the 
“transnationalization of governance.” Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) describe the 
architecture of three tiers of police that have emerged for policing the new world 
order. At the highest tier are the international police agencies and include Interpol, the 
World Customs Organization, the Financial Action Task Force, the United Nations 
Police and the International Criminal Court Police. These are organizations whose 
mandate exists at a supranational level. Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p. 53) point 
out that the most important characteristic of these agencies is that “they are 
constituted ‘above’ the nation-state and are not beholden to any single national 
government.” The second tier is the regional policing agencies, such as Europol 
(under the jurisdiction of the European Union) and ASEANPOL (under the 
jurisdiction of the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations, ASEAN). The third tier, 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p. 73) term “glocal policing.” This involves the 
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reconfiguration, amalgamation and transformation of local (i.e. domestic) police 
agencies at an international level through liaison networks and international postings 
within overseas diplomatic missions and embassies.  
 
Within the Australian context, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the 
‘glocal’- policing agency. In recent years the AFP has significantly expanded its reach 
and representation into the international sphere. In 2012, the AFP International 
Network consisted of 90 AFP officers located in 29 different countries (Hufnagel, 
2013). As this is the Australian police agency that deploys officers into foreign 
countries, it is of particular interest to consider the history that supported its formation. 
  
The Australian Federal Police was created in response to a terrorist attack that 
occurred in the late 1970s. During the 1978 Commonwealth Heads of Government 
(CHOGM) meeting in Sydney, a bomb was detonated outside the Hilton Hotel, killing 
three people including a police officer. Following this terrorist attack the Government 
commissioned a review into counter-terrorism and protective security in Australia. Sir 
Robert Mark, formerly a London Metropolitan Police Commissioner, completed this 
review into Commonwealth policing (AFP Museum, 2004; Chappell & Wilson, 1996). 
The review recommended the formation of a new Federal Police force through the 
amalgamation of the Commonwealth Police and the Australian Capital Territory 
Police (AFP Museum, 2004; Chappell & Wilson, 1996). In 1979, the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) was formed. Chappell and Wilson (1996, p. 127) note the 
formation of the AFP “represented a watershed in the arrangements made for the 
administration of criminal justice in Australia.” This is because it signaled the very 
first move of the Commonwealth Government making inroads into criminal justice 
jurisdiction, a trend that has continued ever since.  
 
The AFP “as a national police agency… is in a unique position to combat 
transnational crime as it straddles both national and international elements of law 
enforcement” (AFP, 2013). The functions of the Australian Federal Police are 
established in section 8 of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), which 
include providing police services to the laws and property of the Commonwealth and 
to protect the interests of the Commonwealth. Since its creation, and in light of its 
mandate to protect the Commonwealth, the AFP has established itself as Australia’s 
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“glocal” policing organization (Bowling & Sheptycki 2012, p. 73) through the 
deployment of Liaison Officers (LOs) in overseas posts (see: Hufnagel, 2013).  
 
Liaison networks are discussed at length by Goldsmith and Sheptycki (2007) who 
highlight that they are a relatively recent development in international policing, a 
point also made by Bowling (2009). Essentially, LOs are facilitators between different 
States: the host and sponsor countries (Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007). LOs connect 
the local to the global. Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p. 78) argue that LOs connect 
local to transnational policing because they are “a primary means of circulating 
knowledge through the global [policing] system.” Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p. 
81) argue that LOs “are one important way that local policing is globalized.” This is 
because LOs “move through the architecture of global policing and epitomize the 
subculture of transnational policing.” However, as pointed out first by Nadelmann 
(1993) and later by Hufnagel (2013), the enforcement and legal powers of the AFP 
rests within Australia, and in accordance with the principles of national sovereignty, 
the policing actions of overseas LOs depend on the support of the nations in which 
they are deployed. The AFP can investigate extraterritorial offences as the criminal 
law extends overseas, but their powers do not. 
 
In 1997, National Secretary of the Australian Federal Police Association Chris 
Eaton called for a new model of global policing in response to the new threats of 
global crime with the supporting rationale being: “if global crime and global social 
reformation are the problems, then global policing, reflecting at least in part that 
global social reformation, is the answer” (Eaton, 1997). The Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on the National Crime Authority (1997, p. 2) also recommended “any 
initiatives which increase Australia’s readiness and capacity to confront the ever-
increasing threat of international criminal activity… should be given serious 
consideration.” Hufnagel (2013) points to key events resulting in the expansion of the 
AFP LO network. These included the ‘tough on drugs policy,’ the focus on people 
smuggling under the Howard Government, and the 2000 Sydney Olympics. 
Furthermore, Hufnagel (2013) points to the 2002 Bali bombings as an important 
influence on the AFP LO network in the Asia-Pacific region. Informants 3 and 5, who 
had both held senior leadership roles within the AFP during their careers, pointed to 
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the expansion of the AFP in the international sphere in response to the perceived 
threat of transnational organized crime:  
“With the growing awareness of the pervasiveness of international crime or 
transnational crime, from the mid-nineties onwards, the AFP, once they got 
the resources, and I’m talking really from ’97, ‘98 onwards, expanded their 
overseas representation enormously in terms of their overall structure. So that 
has been an enormous and incredibly important change within the AFP and 
for many years it was an important seat of their success, and they were quite 
successful for instance against heroin. Those overseas relationships and 
overseas connections and the location of AFP federal agents overseas in 
greater quantities was a very important response to the nature of crime as it 
was starting to impact Australia, particularly in its transnational 
manifestation.” 
         Informant 3 
 
Bowling and Ross (2006, p. 1030) make similar comments about the U.K. 
Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), which in effect became “fully-fledged 
national secret/intelligence police force with transnational reach.” These are points 
were further developed by Informant 5: 
 
“The AFP has got their very strong international liaison network. So that 
wherever these people [organized criminals] are likely to be, we have a pretty 
good relationship with police so we can pick up if they start to run an 
operation into Australia. This is how a lot of big international operations are 
discovered. You begin to get some intelligence locally and then develop it from 
there, liaison with the local liaison with the others services that operate in our 
region and then eventually the idea is not just an intelligence exchange but to 
run joint operations.” 
         Informant 5 
 
Harfield (2008, p. 483) argues that “how policing is organized depends on 
perceptions of what needs to be policed.” What this means is that the political priority 
accorded to the threat of (transnational) organized crime has provided the rationale for 
the creation of new state agencies such as the ACC, and also the international 
expansion of the AFP. There is also a trend towards whole-of-government responses 
where the powers of multiple agencies across multiple jurisdictions are united to 
respond to organized crime, as evidenced by the development of the Commonwealth 
Organized Crime Strategic Framework (COCSF). This can be considered central 
coordination in an attempt to overcome both the bureaucratic and geographic 
boundaries created by the legal and institutional architecture itself. In tandem with the 
expansion of the Commonwealth’s powers in criminal justice matters across the 
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States and Territories of Australia, there have also been moves to expand the 
Commonwealth’s representation beyond Australian sovereign borders through the 
Australian Federal Police LO network. The Australian Federal Police has expanded 
the LO network in response to the perceived threat of transnational organized crime. 
The next section examines the activities and implications of these new agencies, with 
a focus on their intelligence functions. 
 
THE ACTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICING 
 
The previous section described the agencies created to respond to the threat of 
organized crime. The current section extends this examination to the functions and 
activities of these agencies, and the challenges they face in policing organized crime. 
This includes consideration of how the processes of intelligence collection and 
analysis serve to construct organized crime (and vice versa- i.e. how the problem of 
organized crime operates to fortify the intelligence and policing apparatus). Thereafter 
some of the challenges associated with policing of organized crime are explored. 
Finally, possible alternatives to criminalization and enforcement are discussed. 
According to section 7A of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) 
the main function of the Australian Crime Commission is:  
To collect, correlate, analyze and disseminate criminal information and 
intelligence and to maintain a national database of that information and 
intelligence. 
 
Given this is the main mandate of the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), 
as Australia’s premier agency created specifically to respond to organized crime, it is 
necessary to examine the processes and assumptions of intelligence collection and 
analysis. In this context, and with consideration of the mandate of the ACC presented 
above, intelligence means the collection, analysis and dissemination of information, 
which is typically depicted as a cyclic process37 (Gill, 1998). In later work, Gill (2009, 
p. 214) extends his definition of intelligence to: 
“Mainly secret activities- targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and 
action- intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to 
competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities.” 
This definition covers surveillance (targeted collection of information) and 
power (relative to competitors), but Gill (2009, p. 219) argues that the three crucial 
                                                        
37 On this point, see: Gill and Phythian (2013) who argue against a linear model of intelligence analysis. 
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elements of the definition, specific to intelligence, are security, secrecy and resistance 
of competitors. It is important to stress the surveillance information and intelligence 
collected by the ACC is used to support an intelligence picture, and not necessarily 
for the evidentiary purposes of prosecution, which represents another shift in 
traditional modes of criminal justice (Findlay et al., 2009, discussed above). Bronitt 
and McSherry (2010, pp. 51) argue the prevalence of surveillance in contemporary 
society “suggest that the dominant objective of the criminal process is no longer crime 
control, but rather surveillance.” In turn, links can be drawn to the logic of pre-crime 
with a focus on surveillance and risk management of suspect populations (Zedner, 
2007). Bronitt and McSherry (2010, p. 50) also argue “surveillance is integral to the 
process of creating and managing knowledge of suspect populations.” Similarly, Fox 
(2001, p. 254) discusses that there has been a recent shift towards proactive 
surveillance of the public, with one of the main catalysts for this change cited as “the 
growth of organized, sophisticated and serious transnational crime.” Fox (2001) 
draws attention to the concerns related to widespread surveillance for the purposes of 
police intelligence. These include a lack of public debate, a lack of proper limits and a 
lack of legislative safeguards protecting individual rights and privacy.  
 
These moves coincide with shifts towards intelligence-led policing (ILP). 
Sheptycki (2003c, p. 45) argues that transformations to ILP introduced “strategic’ and 
proactive,’ risk-based’ policing” that aims to “target suspect populations and 
individuals in a highly systematic way”. Further, Innes and Sheptycki (2004, p. 2) 
note that instead of the traditional police response of detecting crime that have already 
occurred, “police strategies and tactics increasingly aim to disrupt criminality in such 
a way as to prevent crime from occurring.” The aim of this section is to examine how 
the processes of intelligence collection and analysis operate to construct organized 
crime.  
 
INTELLIGENCE AS AN APPARATUS OF PRODUCTION  
Informant 1 discusses that the processes of intelligence ‘paints a picture’ of organized 
crime:  
“It is basically founded on intelligence. I think if you take it through, for 
example, in identifying those who are involved in organized crime, first of all 
you have to gather all the relevant information. What the ACC did, it was 
tasked by their Board, to collect all intelligence available from all sources, 
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police agencies, government departments and open source information, then 
via a process of analysis, they were able to paint a picture of what organized 
crime looked like in Australia.” 
 
“What occurred was you painted this picture of what organized crime was in 
Australia, in some areas you have some very good information (illegal 
immigration, prostitution, drugs, firearms trafficking), based on this 
information it became very clear how extensive organized crime was and the 
impact it was having on the community from a cost factor. So a picture 
emerged of those who are the high-risk criminal groups, or what you might 
call, established criminal networks that were operating in Australia. All based 
on information, analysis and assessment.” 
        Informant 1 
 
Informant 1 continued by stating that as more and better intelligence is 
collected this picture of organized crime changes. That is, the more and better 
intelligence, the better the understanding of the phenomenon:  
 “The picture of organized crime changed as the intelligence got more 
effective, more efficient, as more intelligence was gathered and analyzed.” 
  
“The picture of crime changed and the reason for that was the collection of 
intelligence from all the States and Federal agencies and a proper analysis 
program, dedicated analysts, more improved databases. This improved the 
picture of organized crime.” 
         Informant 1 
 
It is evident in the above statements made by Informant 1, there is an 
assumption that the insights gleaned from methods of intelligence collection and 
analysis map perfectly onto reality. That is, the intelligence products reflect organized 
crime: the world is painted as it is, without any consideration of the painter or their 
methods and techniques, or the wider social and economic context (i.e. the needs of 
the government and the police themselves). In this sense intelligence products are not 
seen as products or narratives or hypotheses to be tested, but instead as an accurate 
depiction of an external reality. The processes of intelligence collection and analysis, 
and the associated subjectivities and context are overlooked. This is an observation 
that can be found in the intelligence literature.  
 
In their study of intelligence analysis processes Innes, Fielding and Cope 
(2005, p. 52, emphasis added) found that intelligence products “manufactured by the 
crime analysts tended to be treated by police as accurate descriptions of the problem, 
rather than as a partial representation of the problem in actuality.” As indicated by 
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Innes et al.’s (2005) careful selection of words, intelligence and analytic products are 
manufactured through the very processes of information collection (i.e. surveillance) 
and analysis. What this means is intelligence products are not a complete and 
impartial image of reality, but rather are objects of the methods of production. They 
are an “artefact of the data and methods used in their construction, rather than 
providing an accurate representation of any crime problems” (Innes et al. 2005, p. 39). 
Similarly, Innes and Sheptycki (2004, p. 10) argue that intelligence is “dependent 
upon how it is interpreted and defined by its users, who are themselves situated in an 
organizational context.” This can be related more broadly to crime statistics, which 
are an artefact of police recording and reporting practice more than actual crime rates 
themselves. The point being that official accounts of crime are constructed for a host 
of different purposes, reasons and motives. Yet, discussions with the Informants in 
this study revealed that those within policing agencies consider intelligence products 
simply reflections of the way things are: 
“And suddenly because the intelligence said, you realize you’ve got organized 
crime on the waterfront, there is organized crime in the airports, identity 
crime is out of control and firearms trafficking is worse than what we thought.” 
         Informant 1 
Given the above, the argument is that intelligence collection and analysis operates 
to construct organized crime. Through the application of techniques and tools of 
intelligence, organized crime is created as an external reality. This can be related to a 
seminal study completed by Ericson (1981) who examined the way in which crime is 
constructed in detective work. Ericson’s (1981) main thesis is that crime is an artefact 
of police discretion and the choices that are made by police throughout the 
investigative process (i.e. what questions to ask and the subsequent interpretation of 
the responses). These are, in turn, largely a reflection of the work environment in 
which police operate (on this point, see: Innes and Sheptycki, 2004 discussed above). 
Take the explanation from Informant 3 as an example:  
“The intelligence-led policing model in which the intelligence base would be so 
good that you could click into any crime problem, go into the intelligence base, 
and a whole lot of intelligence would come up.  You would certainly have to read 
through this intelligence, and put your instruments, like analysts’ notebook over 
the top of it, whatever you might want to do, and you would come up with the 
answers…[Interviewer: So then the intelligence is driving operations?] That’s 
right.  Well it’s not so much that the intelligence is driving operations, although it 
should have done that on the macro level, but more the intelligence base is there 
through which to trawl to get things.” 
         Informant 3 
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Informant 3 notes that the process of intelligence analysis starts with an 
‘intelligence base,’ although the existence of this ‘intelligence base’ is taken for 
granted (in so much as this intelligence must first be collected and compiled). 
Thereafter, the Informant notes that the intelligence analyst ‘trawls’ through this base 
with the intention to discover something about organized crime. This raises the 
possibility of confirmation bias, which is defined as the tendency to seek out 
information that confirms, rather than disconfirms, expectations (Kebbell, Muller & 
Martin, 2010). In their discussion of confirmation bias in the collection and 
interpretation of intelligence on serious crime (in this case terrorism), Kebbell, Muller 
and Martin (2010, p. 87) write: 
 “In counter-terrorism operations, intelligence analysts may make assumptions 
about factors such as terrorist cell construction or typical perpetrator features 
and may seek confirmation of these leads without considering alternative 
possibilities.”  
 
Informant 6 made a similar observation about the self-fulfilling nature of 
intelligence collection and analysis. Informant 6 notes police and security agencies 
are likely to search for information that confirms their expectations rather than 
disconfirms them, and this governs understandings of organized crime:  
“This is where we go wrong because if law enforcement or it can be any security 
agency has a perception of what a group looks like, then everything they do is 
going to try and build up that group to look like what they think it's going to look 
like.  So, and I think one of the biggest problems with terrorism… if you build the 
wrong picture then you are going to follow the wrong track. So that’s why I think 
we've taken so long because that's still news, this network approached organized 
crime. Or it's because it's been so hard to break the barriers of trying to get them 
[intelligence analysts] to think that something not structured.”   
         Informant 6 
 
This is an example of the way in which the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ of 
strategic intelligence analysis operates (see Ratcliffe & Sheptycki 2009). 
Sheptycki (2004) raises this issue in an examination of organizational pathologies in 
police intelligence systems. For example, Sheptycki (2004) discusses defensive data 
concentration in specific databases that relate to high-profile priorities for police (for 
example firearms, sex offenders, armed robbery and other serious crimes). Sheptycki 
(2004, p. 322) argues that the consequence of organizing and structuring intelligence 
like this is that “strategic analysts may be systematically robbed of the chance to 
develop information about lesser-known problems.” Similarly, Cotter (2010, p. 246) 
 187 
discusses that intelligence officers’ conceptions of organized crime tend to centre on 
the “usual suspects” of organized crime, being OMCGs or ethnic groups. Cotter (2010, 
p. 259) argues this “suggests rigidity in police perceptions” of organized crime. While 
highlighting the relationship between organizational structures and understandings of 
organized crime, Cotter (2010) demonstrates that the identification of the ‘usual 
suspects’ occurs because intelligence units are divided into portfolios around each 
organized crime group (according to ethnicity- e.g. Italian, Asian, Eastern European- 
or OMCGs). In this way, and unsurprisingly, dividing intelligence units into discreet 
portfolios around a group or ethnic based model of organized crime, results in a focus 
on that group. Therefore, the organizational structure of intelligence units predicates 
and determines the understanding of the phenomenon and the police response. 
According to Cotter (2010, p. 259, emphasis in original) “when OC is examined 
according to the ‘usual suspects’ or criminal portfolios there are a number of OC 
related phenomena or activities that are ignored.”  Gill and Phythian (2013) make 
these same arguments from a perspective of bureaucratic politics. Gill and Phythian 
(2013, p. 26) pose the question “who determines that a threat exists, and who 
determines that a threat has ceased to exist?” Gill and Phythian (2013) argue that 
these questions are overlooked or not captured in the current linear model of 
intelligence analysis that simply starts with ‘threat recognition.’ Gill and Phythian 
(2013) highlight there are a range of different motivations and factors at play in the 
identification of threats.  
 
Then, there is the application of intelligence instruments to the intelligence 
data. Informant 3 notes the program ‘analysts’ notebook’ as a specific example. 
Through this process, the analyst arrives at some conclusion about the nature of 
organized crime. Gill (1998; 2009, p. 215) states that analysis is “the crucial stage at 
which ‘information’ must be evaluated in order to create ‘intelligence.” Each of these 
steps is ‘taken for granted’ by those in the agency and overlooked in the construction 
of the phenomenon of organized crime. Indeed, the stage of analysis alone raises a 
number of questions about the processes of transforming data/information into 
inferences/intelligence, and these processes are not well understood in the intelligence 
literature (see: Gill & Pythian, 2013). Ultimately, the ‘answers’ about organized crime 
are legitimized through this process, and are considered as established ‘facts’ that are 
subsequently disseminated and used to inform resource allocations (see also: 
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Sheptycki, 2003b; 2004; Innes and Sheptycki, 2004; Ratcliffe & Sheptycki, 2009 as 
discussed above in Chapter 4 under the section of New Public Management), direct 
investigations and operations.  
 
Tracking back and forth in the literature to make sense of these interview 
responses I identified a number of interrelated explanations, drawing from both the 
fields of forensic case construction and the philosophy of science. Inspired by earlier 
work completed by Ericson (1981), McConville, Saunders and Leng (1991) 
conducted a study into the ways in which the police construct cases for the purposes 
of prosecution (see also: Sanders, 1987; Smith, 1997). In their analysis, McConville et 
al. (1991, p. 7) show how “official accounts are problematic, selective renderings of 
complex realities.” McConville et al. (1991, p. 10) argue that the police operate as 
“definers of reality” and that “in the processes of creating this official reality the 
‘facts’ as well as the ‘rules’ are malleable.” McConville et al. (1991, p. 11; 12, 
emphasis in original) conclude that such “cases are social constructions which further 
broad socio-political objectives” and that case construction “involves not simply the 
selection and interpretation of evidence but its creation.” 38 
 
This can be related to Latour and Woolgar’s (1986/1979) study of the way in 
which scientific facts about reality are constituted by the very scientific tools or 
laboratory apparatuses, techniques and methods that have been produced in order to 
study that reality. The crux of Latour and Woolgar’s (1986/1979) argument is that 
through techniques of science, the object under investigation becomes an objective 
entity that can be measured through the instruments and techniques of science. That is, 
the existence of an object is created and confirmed by the methods and techniques of 
studying it: “the phenomena are thoroughly constituted by the material setting of the 
laboratory” (Latour & Woolgar, 1986/1979, p. 64). This means that the process of 
collecting and analysing information (about objects of reality; in Latour and 
Woolgar’s study the peptide TRF(H), in this case organized crime) reifies the object 
under study. In the context of this research, it can be argued that intelligence about 
organized crime is constructed and not merely discovered. This can be related to a 
                                                        
38 Interested readers are directed to a published debate that appeared in the British Journal of 
Criminology between McConville et al (1997) and Smith (1997; 1998) regarding McConville et al.’s 
(1991) case construction thesis. In essence, Smith (1997) disagrees with McConville et al.’s arguments 
and McConville et al. (1997) respond that Smith (1997) misrepresented their work. 
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point made by Informant 1 who commented that following the first years of operation 
of the ACC fraud in Australia was extensive:  
“Then after the first or probably the second year of the [Australian] Crime 
Commission, the Commissioners all acknowledged their understanding of 
organized crime in Australia has been blown out of the water, because they 
said for example ‘that we never knew, we never realized the extent of fraud,’ 
why they didn’t understand the extent of fraud was because banks used to 
write off fraud offences as a loss and not refer most of the information to 
police.” 
 
“Everybody believed the fraud problem is X, and then when they have got all 
the intelligence and data they have gone, ‘gee wiz, we didn’t realize the fraud 
problem in Australia is so extensive.’ Once your knowledge gets better and 
gets more improved, suddenly things look worse, don’t they?” 
         Informant 1 
 
As Informant 1 notes in the statements presented above, it is through the 
process of reporting by financial institutions, and the collection and analysis of this 
information by the police, that the serious and large scale fraud problem in Australia 
is born. At the same time there is little recognition of the processes (i.e. banks 
considering fraud as a loss, not a crime, and reporting information to the police) that 
produce the problem. As such, construction cuts both ways in terms of what is 
identified as a problem (fraud as crime) and non-problem (fraud as loss). Further, 
‘crimes of the suites’ including fraud, corporate and white-collar crimes are not 
typically regarded as ‘organised crime.’ The consequences is that they “have not been 
a traditional focus of the law and the justice system,” providing further support for 
this argument (Friedrichs, 2007, p. 2). Latour and Woolgar (1986/1979, p. 240, 
emphasis in original) conclude, “the result of the construction of a fact is that it 
appears unconstructed by anyone.” This is not a conscious operation by key players; it 
occurs implicitly. Innes et al. (2005, p. 54) argue the “subjective and interpretative 
practices” involved in the construction of intelligence are “routinely ignored and 
glossed over.” 
 
Furthermore, Innes et al. (2005, p. 52) note there has been a push for the 
intelligence community to adopt more ‘scientific’ methods throughout the analysis 
process (certainly words like ‘analysis’ are laden with scientific connotations) 
providing an “illusion of objectivity.” This is consistent with current policing 
strategies that advocate the application of the scientific method to policing with the 
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aim of making it more ‘rational’ and efficient (for example intelligence led policing 
and strategic intelligence analysis discussed in Chapter 4, see for example: Ratcliffe, 
2002; 2009). The emerging science of intelligence shares affinity with Foucualdian 
notions of methods of examination, and in particular methods of ‘scientific’ 
examination in the formation and legitimation of knowledge. When discussing the 
rise of the disciplines, Foucault (1977, p. 185) questions:  
“But does their [the human sciences] very technology, this tiny operational 
schema that has become so widespread… this familiar method of the 
examination, implement, within a single mechanism, power relations that 
make it possible to extract and constitute knowledge?”  
 
Through examination, and in this case surveillance, intelligence collection and 
‘scientific’ analysis, the problem of organized crime is constructed. This argument 
can also be found in the literature on intelligence-led policing (ILP). For example, 
Sheptycki (2004, p. 328) argues that “the institutional thought-world of the policing 
sector… exercises a relatively large degree of control over the way problems of 
organized and serious crime are perceived.” Further, in a study of strategic 
intelligence practices in Canada, Sheptycki (2003b, p. 489) examines intelligence 
analysis as “micro-processes of knowledge construction.” Sheptycki (2003b, p. 490) 
concludes that organised crime is “not so much something that happens ‘out there’ in 
society as it is a product of institutionalised thinking.”  
 
CLASSIFIED WORK AND BLINKERED PERSPECTIVES 
Informants 2 and 4 both discussed the consequences of limiting the analysts who 
examine intelligence and produce understandings of organized crime to those who 
work within intelligence agencies. This is a point also touched upon by Gill (1998) 
who draws attention to police suspicion, including that which is directed towards 
civilian analysts. Similarly, in an examination of organizational pathologies in police 
intelligence systems, Sheptycki (2004) points to similar barriers in intelligence work 
including intelligence-hoarding and information silos. Intelligence work is secretive 
and protected; one must work within the organisation and maintain the necessary 
security clearance to be privy to it. Informant 4 explained: 
“The secrecy surrounding law enforcement and organized crime means that 
the only analysts who get to look at the data are already inside the AFP and 
are blinkered because of their position there, so you don't get the external 
insight that has been so productive in areas of ordinary crime.”  
        Informant 4 
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The secrecy of intelligence collection and analysis comes at a certain expense. 
For example, Informant 4 notes intelligence analysts may be ‘blinkered’ or blinded 
because of their position within the policing organization, which operates as another 
form of bias. The closed and secretive nature of intelligence may also foster ‘group 
think’ where innovative ideas are stifled in favour of conformity to predefined ways 
of thinking about the phenomenon, and in particular traditional group or ethnic 
conceptions of organized crime (Cotter, 2010). According to Informant 2, if 
intelligence data were made available to individuals outside intelligence organizations 
it is likely that different insights about organized crime would be generated: 
“We only know what we look at because most of our information, particularly 
in Australia, is law enforcement source because there's so little research. We 
really only know what we're investigating.” 
 
“You're likely to get a different set of information and learn about things that 
maybe the police don’t even know about or don’t know about in detail. And 
you obviously get a different mindset coming to it.” 
        Informant 2 
The structures and processes of intelligence determine the understanding of 
the phenomenon, as the example provided by Informant 1 in relation to fraud in 
Australia indicates. The methods and techniques of intelligence collection and 
analysis play an important role in the construction of organized crime.  This includes 
the application of analytic tools and techniques (i.e. analysts’ notebook) and the 
authority of the positions of intelligence analysts (situated within the police and with 
the necessary security clearances). Through this very authority (of the Australian 
Crime Commission, of the analytic tools, and of the ‘scientific’ method) this 
knowledge is legitimized as a social reality, while the subjectivities of the methods 
and processes by which this reality is produced are overlooked and ignored (Innes et 
al., 2005). The perceived threat of organized crime strengthens surveillance, analysts 
look for what they know and find what they look for, and this cements the picture of 
organized crime. Ultimately, this serves to further reinforce the operation of 
intelligence, which is at its core, an apparatus of surveillance. As Foucault (1977, p. 
224) concludes “the formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly 
reinforce one another in circular process.”  
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CHALLENGES OF POLICING ORGANIZED CRIME 
A discussion of policing practice rounds out this chapter on the institutions of 
organized crime. I questioned the Informants about the challenges of policing 
organized crime. Some of the key issues identified by the Informants included 
challenges associated with cross-border policing and the resilient and adaptive nature 
of organized crime, which operates as an explanation for the persistent nature of the 
problem. There is recognition within the Informant community surveyed here, that 
organized crime cannot be eliminated from society through criminalization and 
policing, and as such questions arise about whether an enforcement driven approach is 
the best social policy to adopt. This chapter closes with a discussion of possible 
alternatives to criminalization and enforcement. These include harm minimization and 
regulation, crime prevention and smarter, not more, policing.  
 
Informants 2 and 3 discussed the challenges associated with policing across 
jurisdictional boundaries. Informant 2 and 3 note this is a disadvantage the police face, 
as criminals do not need to negotiate different administrative procedures and systems 
of law in their interactions and operations. In the statement presented below, 
Informant 2 discusses that national boundaries coupled with bureaucratic processes 
slows the police:  
“And the other thing that's really important with, well particularly with trans-, 
I mean, all what we call organized crime now has a transnational element. 
And most of it is transnational crime, is that it's much easier for criminal 
groups to interact internationally than for the police to do. Because of the fact 
that we've got national boundaries and different systems of legislation. And 
you've got to officially get permission to do this, that and the other thing, 
which has to meet certain tests and often involves the judicial system and what 
not. I mean that all slows everything down.” 
         Informant 2 
 
Hufnagel (2012, pp. 192-193) describes the practical challenges of police 
cooperation across jurisdictions, noting that Australia’s system of federation 
“generates significant challenges of coordination in relation to cross-border 
investigation, evidence gathering and information exchange.” It is evident that 
Hufnagel (2012) is referring to cross-border policing within Australia’s national 
border. Yet, this issue extends further. As the statement from Informant 3 below 
demonstrates, there are more challenges when jurisdiction extends internationally:  
“In the sort of environment in which the AFP is working, there’s a whole host 
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of reasons why it’s so difficult, and it is not always because it’s organized 
crime. You can have someone sitting in Moscow as a single person who is very 
clever, implementing bank, Internet fraud or whatever, and the fact that 
they’re in Moscow and they’re a single person makes it extraordinarily 
difficult for the AFP to deal with that problem, simply via the virtue of all of 
the jurisdictional issues involved.  And it’s not going to be identifiable as 
coming out of Moscow.  It will be rerouted through multiple routers and so on.”  
         Informant 3 
 
Informant 3 provides an example of an individual conducting fraud from 
Moscow, highlighting the difficulties this presents for the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) in terms of jurisdiction. Despite attempts to develop a Model Criminal Code 
addressing the issues of jurisdiction, Informant 2 and 3 believe that the arbitrary lines 
that create different jurisdictions create challenges for the police in responding to 
organized crime (see: Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General, 2001; see also: Bronitt & Gani, 2003 on the issue of 
jurisdiction of cybercrime offences). 
 
Another challenge discussed by Informants 1, 4 and 2 was the resilience of 
organized crime in the face of police intervention. In the statement presented below 
Informant 1 discusses that policing has no lasting impact:  
“Traditional law enforcement approaches have no lasting impact on some 
major criminal and criminal networks due the criminal or network’s ability to 
regenerate within weeks of successful police operations.”  
         Informant 1 
Informant 1 provided the specific example of a high-level drug importer who 
was jailed yet reassumed his operations immediately upon release:  
“I recall a guy we extradited back to Australia who went to jail for 23 years 
and when he got out he did exactly the same thing, except he learnt his lesson 
and varied his method of importing drugs into Australia. He eventually went 
back to jail again. They are resilient, you take one away and the business still 
runs.” 
         Informant 1 
 
Informant 4, who had consulted for AUSTRAC, discussed a case of drug 
trafficking in the Western Sydney area. The Informant raised this specific case as the 
significant transactions (i.e. those over an amount of $5,000) were closely monitored 
by AUSTRAC before, during and after an AFP operation in that area. Informant 4 
notes that following the operation the amount of significant transactions reduced by 
two thirds, but within a short time the amount of significant transactions had returned 
to the levels seen before the intervention, indicating the illicit trade had rebounded. 
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Informant 4 used this example in order to demonstrate the futility of policing willing 
buyers and willing sellers (i.e. ‘victimless’ crimes): 
“About 18 months ago or 2 years or something like that [in 2010], the AFP 
identified a network of drug traffickers in Western Sydney, operating out of a 
suburb in Western Sydney connected with Vietnam. The [Australian] Crime 
Commission then asked the AFP not to go in to allow this group to continue 
operations for 3 months, ‘we will tell you when,’ sort of thing. In the mean 
time AUSTRAC was asked to monitor, not suspicious transactions, but 
significant transactions. This is all transactions over $5,000 in those suburbs 
of Western Sydney. They monitored the level of transactions for 3 months and 
then they nodded to the AFP, and overnight they went in and I don't know 
what the figures are but it was something like 90 offenders and $80 million or 
80 offenders and $90 million dollars or something like that. Simultaneously in 
Sydney and Vietnam. They got large numbers of people and huge amounts of 
money. AUSTRAC was then asked to continue to monitor the financial 
transactions in those suburbs. Immediately they are divided by three. The big 
money transactions in those suburbs disappeared when that gang was broken 
up, or locked up. Three weeks later, it was back to normal.” 
         Informant 4 
 
Informant 4 continued by discussing the strategy of asset forfeiture. Informant 
4 notes that this strategy serves to increase the price of illicit commodities, and this is 
eventually recouped in higher pricesAccording to Informant 4 this becomes a spiral 
with assets being seized, and the price of the commodity being increased to 
compensate for the asset lost. That is, policing action causes increases in the prices, 
and profitability, of illicit substances:  
“Seizing the assets simply puts up the costs of the business which is then 
recouped in higher prices. It then becomes a spiral.” 
        Informant 4 
 
van Duyne (1998) is also critical of these types of policies, arguing instead for 
a market based orientation because there is greater chances of impacting on the 
structure of the market. Furthermore, Informant 2 argues that criminal organizations 
have a competitive advantage vis-à-vis police. Informant 2 notes the police are 
bureaucracies limited by law and public accountability. Like the complicated 
jurisdictional differences, these factors operate in a way that provides an advantage to 
those the police are attempting to apprehend: 
“The police are becoming more adaptive. But they've still got the constraints 
of being government agencies and legislative frameworks and the 
accountabilities and all of those sorts of things. I mean if you're a criminal 
organization and you can just change overnight or you can just go and shoot 
someone if you feel like it to enforce your point of view or to remove the 
competition, then you're obviously much more able to move through the sort of 
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changes in the environment than the cops are.” 
         Informant 2 
 
When examining the academic literature to explain these points I found that 
the concept of resilience has been explored from a network perspective (Morselli & 
Petit, 2007), a market perspective (Bouchard, 2007), and an organizational 
perspective (Ayling, 2009; 2011c; Chabot, 2008; Kenney, 2006; 2007b). It became 
evident that the understanding of organized crime, qua an organization, a market, or a 
network (Chapter 3), directs any understanding and explanation of the resilience of 
the phenomenon. Therefore, it is argued that the assumptions that ground that object 
(as a network, as a market, or as an organization) determine the understanding of 
resilience. While this is interesting in the context of the conceptual understanding of 
resilience, the divisions in the criminological literature about the object of organized 
crime are dealt with extensively in Chapter 3 and thus are not repeated here. What is 
interesting to note is how powerful the account of resilience is in operating as an 
explanation (or excuse) for police about why the phenomenon they are tasked to 
combat is never defeated (i.e. because it is ‘resilient’). This means that police can 
refrain from publicly surrendering to their inability to eliminate organized crime from 
society (which is bureaucratically and politically unpalatable), while further justifying 
the existence of their organization and mandate. There is a cycle of control: police can 
never succeed in defeating the problem of organized crime, which always demands 
more control. 
 
According to the Informants in this study, police face a number of challenges 
in responding to organized crime and this leads to questions about whether 
criminalization and policing could ever eradicate organized crime from society. In 
turn, this casts doubt on whether these are ideal strategies to adopt when responding 
to organized crime. In fact, it has been suggested that the criminalization and policing 
response contributes to more problems (such as police corruption and increasing the 
profitability of illicit commodities) than it resolves. This is an argument made by 
Bowling (2011, p. 12) who questions: “why do certain crime control models become 
orthodox and remain unchallenged despite their obvious failures…?” Drawing from 
the work of Stan Cohen, Bowling (2011, p. 1) draws attention to “criminal 
iatrogenesis” which can be described as the “harmful results of well-intentioned crime 
control practices.” Bowling (2011, p. 8) examines the criminalization of psychotropic 
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substances arguing that this has caused an  “increasingly powerful system of policing” 
and a range of “iatrogenic side-effects” including those previously discussed above 
(for example corruption). Bowling (2011, p. 12) concludes, “Criminology [as a 
discipline] often seems content blithely to describe the harm of criminalization 
although this was a minor caveat to an otherwise well-functioning criminal process.” 
In later work, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p. 98) revisit this theme with reference 
to the “security-control paradox.” Bowling and Sheptycki (2012, p. 98) define the 
security-control paradox as “the pervasive sense of insecurity that exists amid, in spite 
of and sometime because of the multiplying of tactics for ensuring security” 
(emphasis in original). This is in reference to the observation that a focus on security 
amplifies worries and concerns about insecurity. With the potential for iatrogenic 
consequences of responses to organized crime noted, the next section examines 
alternatives to criminalizing and policing organized crime. 
 
FUTILITY OF CRIMINALIZATION: ALTERNATIVES TO ENFORCEMENT 
Given the challenges discussed above, the next logical question becomes: what are 
possible alternatives to criminalization and policing? In the statements below 
Informant 6 concedes that organized crime can never be eliminated from society. That 
is, the Informant reflected on the futility of the policing of organized crime in 
defeating the problem. Instead of reactively responding to organized crime through 
enforcement (i.e. ‘trimming the hedge every spring’) Informant 6 advocates a ‘roots 
down’ approach. A possible interpretation of a ‘roots down’ approach could consist of 
changes to social policy:  
“You will never, you will never, eliminate it. You know, that’s naïve. But, if 
you took a roots down approach as opposed to just trimming the hedge every 
spring, there may be more success.” 
 
“We’re always focusing on this reactive model of policing and organized 
crime. And that’s arrest or bust. But what’s getting to that point? It's like 
terrorism. What’s getting these people to commit these types of activities?” 
         Informant 6 
 
Similar concerns led Informant 1 to conclude that the policing driven approach 
to organized crime in Australia has to change. Informant 1 criticized policing only 
approach as limiting and unlikely to defeat organized crime: 
“One thing that is going to have to happen is the model to target organized 
crime in Australia is probably going to have to evolve into another model. The 
policing organization and the ACC have to change, they have to realize that 
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you can’t defeat organized crime by just using a police only approach. They 
are limiting their options.” 
        Informant 1 
While all of the Informants discussed the challenges and difficulties associated 
with policing organized crime, and Informants 1 and 6 agreed that enforcement driven 
responses to organized crime are unlikely to eliminate organized crime, only 
Informant 4 discussed possible alternatives. Informant 4 argued for the regulation of 
illicit drugs, echoing calls that have been made in the literature for some time. While 
due to space constraints and the original scope of this thesis, the drug debate cannot 
be reviewed at length here,39 the main argument is that criminalization of drugs is first 
and foremost ineffective at preventing access to drugs, causes a range of additional 
associated harms, and, as Informant 4 notes, creates an illicit economy which creates 
the potential for police corruption. In the second statement, Informant 4 further 
discusses some of the negative consequences that are associated with criminalization 
and enforcement: 
“Now to me this shows the futility of using law enforcement against businesses 
that deal with willing sellers and willing buyers. It shows you the potential for 
corruption, the amounts of money that gang was generating that wasn’t being 
used to corrupt the police but certainly could have been, and probably has 
been. So the criminalization was putting money into the hands of organized 
crime, that has proven serious corruption impacts on police and the judiciary 
and accounting professions, the real estate, stuffing up the values of real 
estate up and down the Queensland coast and so on. It raises the question, 
really, if the resources are diverted to anti-money laundering and being 
devoted to analysing the impact of policing on that particular type of crime 
then any logical conclusion would have to be that decriminalisation and 
regulation of illicit drugs would be far cheaper, far less likely for corruption 
and so on. It would probably reduce the deaths and health concerns.” 
 
“Criminalization firstly removes any obligation on the seller to even know 
what is in it or tell you. There are no controls or recommended doses. Then, 
criminalization massively boosts the profits. I forget what the ratio is but I 
think the producer of heroin gets something like 1% or less of the total cost to 
the consumer. It is a tiny tiny fraction. If it was legal, instead of it being $50 
per hit, it would be $1 per hit, and then you could tax it up to $20. It produces 
massive profitability, which then produces the economic power to corrupt 
massively, which you need to do because you are conducting illegal business. 
You need to protect yourself and create immunity against prosecution. This is 
what traffickers do. They either do it by violence or threats of violence or by 
clever ways. There are other examples. Prostitution. When illegal, it was run 
by organized crime with massive profitability and corruption. When 
                                                        
39 For further discussion of the drug debate see: Boaz (1990); Rasmussen and Benson (1994); Jensen 
and Gerber (1998); Inciardi (1999); Wodak and Moore (2002); Douglas, Wodak and McDonald 
(2012); Douglas and McDonald (2012); Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter (2012).  
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decriminalised and regulated there are still some undesirable elements but it 
is a different element of criminality. Criminality in prostitution these days isn’t 
so much stand over tactics on prostitutes, it is the illegal immigration aspect.” 
        Informant 4 
 
There have been recent calls for the decriminalization of illicit substances in 
Australia through the platform of the think-tank Australia 21, which has held a series 
of high-level roundtables and published a series of reports on the topic (The 
Prohibition of Illicit Drugs is Killing and Criminalizing Our Children and We Are All 
Letting it Happen authored by Douglas and McDonald, 2012; and Alternatives to 
Prohibition: Illicit Drugs: How we Can Stop Killing and Criminalizing Young 
Australians authored by Douglas, Wodak & McDonald, 2012). These roundtables 
were attended and supported by a number of former politicians and policing 
executives, including the former Commissioner of the AFP Mick Palmer and former 
Federal Minister for Health in the Coalition Government Michael Wooldridge. Such 
public support for the decriminalization of illicit substances by both Palmer and 
Wooldridge is especially noteworthy as both were responsible for elements (i.e. 
implementation or enforcement) of Howard’s ‘tough on drugs’ policy (Armitage, 
2012). Instead of criminalization and enforcement, Informant 4 argues that the 
regulation of drugs is the logical conclusion for social policy as it reduces the 
possibility of police corruption and the harm associated with drug use. This is an 
argument that is found consistently in the academic literature. For example, 
Woodiwiss (2013, p. 17) states: 
 “It is possible to argue that if the system of global drug prohibition were to 
be replaced by a regulatory system that reduced profitability of illicit drug 
flows the revenue saved could be usefully redeployed to tame the illicit with 
more effective and more achievable regulation of the licit.” 
 
Here, the question becomes: why does the state prefer to approach the problem 
by criminalizing and policing? Rasmussen and Benson (1994) point to the politics and 
rhetoric of the drug wars, investments in the drug problem and the involvement of 
interest groups. Johns (1991) discusses some of the ‘successes’ of criminalization. 
These include diverting public attention from other social problems, marginalizing 
some sections of the population (along racial lines) and legitimizing the expansion of 
state power. McCulloch (2007, p. 24) adds: 
“If we accept the idea that countermeasures purportedly aimed at 
transnational crime have other unarticulated agendas, then the impact of 
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transnational crime countermeasures might be best understood as failures that 
are really victories in terms of these hidden agendas.”  
 
Similarly, Manderson (2013) examines the moral rhetoric surrounding asylum 
seekers and drug users, while drawing links to the political response of 
criminalization and policing in Australia. Manderson (2013) states: 
“The most important point of comparison between the drug problem and the 
asylum problem in Australia lies in the kind of legal and political response 
which moral panic produced. The ‘drug problem problem’ led to increasingly 
draconian legislation, increased law enforcement and the criminalization of 
growing numbers of drug users.” 
 
The argument for regulatory responses instead of criminalization and 
enforcement is not new in the context of drug policy. In relation to organized crime, a 
similar argument is emerging. For example, Ayling (2013b; 2014) points to the 
repressive measures grounded in the criminal justice system adopted in Australian 
jurisdictions and contrasts this with the administrative response towards organized 
crime implemented in the Netherlands. Ayling (2013b; 2014) extracts the main points 
of difference, showing the Netherlands have adopted administrative strategies that 
aim to reduce opportunities for organized crime by focusing on certain industries (sex, 
gambling, hospitality) and preventing the issuing of commercial licenses and 
purchasing real estate when there is a risk that these are to be used to commit criminal 
acts (Ayling terms these ‘administrative privileges’). Ayling (2013b; 2014) points out 
that in comparison to Australia’s ad hoc reaction to criminalize organized crime, the 
response adopted in the Netherlands represents a planned and systematic framework 
for prevention (see also: von Lampe, 2011, Chapter 4). This takes us back to the 
coexistence of two contradictory approaches to crime control: the sovereign state 
strategy of punitive segregation, and an adaptive strategy stressing prevention 
(Garland, 1996; 2000; 2001; Chapter 4). Arguments for this type of preventative 
response can be found in the data of the present study: 
“The police are very much better at reactive response. And have been late 
converts to crime prevention, and again crime prevention is something that is 
almost impossible without the sort of analysis that came along with smarter 
policing. Crime prevention depends of having information about 
circumstances and environment and so on. This is something that is not well 
developed in the area of organized crime… They don't have the information, 
they don't collect the information, and they don't analyze the information 
necessary to develop that preventive element.” 
         Informant 4 
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Waller (2006) also makes the argument for smarter policing instead of more 
policing. Informant 4 discussed a specific example of smarter policing, which would 
consist of changing the focus from diffused financial transaction monitoring and anti-
money laundering initiatives, to searching for unexplained wealth through the 
Australian Taxation Office. This means there is a more targeted approach to policing, 
instead of diffused surveillance of all of everybody’s financial transactions: 
“The notion of money laundering came when it was realised that if you can’t 
catch drug offenders and drug traffickers, through their trafficking activities, 
maybe you could catch them through their financial activities. So now what we 
have done, part of what used to be the money that went into law enforcement 
chasing drug traffickers, is now being spent on the financial transaction 
monitoring. Instead of having a really targeted law enforcement element, we have 
a really vague huge diffused effort sucking in everybody looking at finance 
transactions, and not working. Has anti-money laundering now become too much 
a focus of concern and taking away the resources that should have reasonably be 
devoted to law-enforcement? Should law-enforcement reasonably be analysing 
the results of what they do, instead of simply focusing on what they are told to 
focus on? So it would make much more sense to have all of those resources 
perhaps that are devoted to anti-money laundering, and all those resources, or 
lots of those resources that are devoted to ASIO, actually converted into auditing 
and assisting the Tax Office in the search for unexplained wealth. That would be 
far more effective than monitoring all of everybody’s transactions. Unexplained 
wealth is a much more direct way to attack Mr. Big.”  
         Informant 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
Reflecting across their careers in the policing of organized crime in Australia, 
and in an attempt to make sense of the current situation by extrapolating from the past, 
the Informants in this study lament that it is unreasonable for politicians and policy 
makers to believe that organized crime can be eliminated from society through 
criminalization and policing. In this section some of the challenges of policing 
organized crime were discussed. These included issues of jurisdiction, the potential 
for corruption, and the resilience of organized crime, that operates as a powerful 
excuse about why police cannot eliminate organized crime from society. Alternatives 
to criminalization and policing were subsequently investigated, and these included a 
focus on crime prevention, administrative initiatives and smarter policing.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the power of academic theorizing and criminal justice 
institutions to construct a particular category of crime and develop responses to it. It 
has shown how, through the activities of the discipline of criminology and the agents 
of discipline in criminal justice, organized crime has become an ‘objective fact’ and a 
‘social reality.’ The thesis has examined and, where appropriate, critiqued the 
constructions and processes through which this happens. An appreciation of the nexus 
between the emergence of the problem, and the formation of institutions in response 
to it, is really important in developing a more complete understanding of the various 
dimensions of the social problem. The Informants in this study worked at the apex of 
the policing of organized crime in Australia over the previous three decades. They 
were incredibly reflective of their respective careers, their roles in the development of 
the policy and policing response, and the associated political and bureaucratic 
constraints. The significance of this research lies in the fact that this is the first time 
these policy and policing executives have ‘opened up’ to academic scrutiny. 
 
Before summarising the substantive chapters of the thesis, I must first reflect 
on the method as this influenced what I was able to construct, find out and do. The 
aim was to examine the phenomenon of organized crime through the eyes of those 
whose job it is to fight it (and in doing so define it). Given this aim, it was necessary 
to speak to individuals who played key roles in the policing of organized crime in 
Australia, and to situate their reflections in context, which was achieved by examining 
relevant social-historical archival data. A sample of seven individuals, who had held 
leadership positions in federal policy, policing and intelligence agencies were 
interviewed, and their stories are detailed within these pages. Though, it was through 
the process of interrogating and structuring their ‘truths’ another ‘truth’ of organized 
crime was written. This is my story of organized crime because the methods I adopted, 
the questions I asked, and the interpretations of the data in the context of the previous 
literature and theory, are my own. McConville, Sanders and Leng (1991, p. 13) make 
this same point when telling their own research story:   
 “The account which follows is our account not in the trivial sense that 
someone else did not write it but in the important sense that no-one else could 
have written it. The account, and the data upon which it relies are not 
separate from ourselves, the methods and strategies adopted, the choices and 
selections made and the meanings and interpretations adopted or imposed. 
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Research, like the world of its subjects, is a process of construction. In 
describing the ‘realities’ presented by police and prosecution, we set up 
another ‘reality.’”  
 
My methodological reflections and epiphanies are about the co-construction of 
knowledge. That is, a social constructionist critique applied to this very research. As 
McConville, Sanders and Leng (1991) note, research is knowledge construction in 
practice. Indeed, method does not merely reveal, uncover or discover social realities; 
it is through methods of examination that social realities are created and legitimated 
(Foucault, 1972/1969; 1977; 1980; Latour & Woolgar, 1986/1979; Law, 2004). The 
findings developed and detailed in this study were co-produced and co-constructed in 
the relations and interactions between the Informants in the study and myself: they are 
subjective. With this important point in mind, to ensure there is conditional 
intersubjectivity (Stenbacka, 2001), it was a paramount concern when writing this 
story to detail my method at length and to make sure my analytic leaps are transparent 
(Xiao & Vicente, 2000; Dekker & Nyce, 2004). This is so you, the reader, can follow 
me along my research journey and trace my interpretative trail. 
 
In Chapter 3, a genealogy of criminological thought and theorizing 
demonstrated the way in which the social scientific discipline of criminology operates 
as a ‘claims-making discipline.’ The social ‘scientific’ study of crime is a regime of 
truth that creates knowledge and exercises power over the objects of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1972/1969; 1977; 1980). It was shown that that through recent history, the 
academic enterprise has articulated multiple scientific ‘truths’ about organized crime. 
These have included organizations (Cressey, 1967; 1969; 1972), syndicates (Albini, 
1971) families (Ianni, 1972), enterprises (Smith, 1971; 1980), entrepreneurial 
partnerships (Haller, 1990; 1992), markets (Reuter, 1983; 1985) and networks 
(Morselli, 2005; 2008). These ways of constructing the phenomenon were influenced 
by the social context, the political winds and the intellectual climate of the time, 
meaning they are contingent. Importantly, through criminology’s authority as a 
‘science,’ it legitimates social responses directed towards phenomena. According to 
Haggerty, “knowledges produced about the objects of governance shape the types of 
strategies that are imaginable” (Haggerty, 2004, p. 214). This makes the relationship 
between power and knowledge more visible.  
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Chapter 4 demonstrated there are multiple meanings of organized crime that 
have arisen from an interconnected set of social, political, moral and bureaucratic 
discourses, that provide the impetus for the response mapped out in Chapter 5. 
Organized crime goes to the heart of social anxieties that there are criminal collectives 
operating across borders and that pose a significant risk to the very fabric of society. 
This risk can, and should, be mitigated through the control of groups that can be 
classified according to their ethnicity and/or identity/status. The political capital 
provided by criminal justice as an area for governance was clear in both the political 
discourse and the state’s crime control agenda towards organized crime. Hogg (2008, 
p. 281) argues that social anxieties, and especially those concerning crime, have 
become an “increasingly important currency of political power.” This was evident at 
both domestic and international levels. Organized crime is an object of the discourse 
of international securitization and through the discursive technique of metaphors of 
‘war,’ organized crime is linked to inter/national security. Furthermore, organized 
crime is ordered through the discourse of new public management in policing. The 
liberal bureaucracy (Giauque, 2003) must constantly legitimize its existence, thus the 
focus on efficiencies and performance measurement. Through the discipline of 
economic managerialism and in the measurement and costing of organized crime, the 
social problem becomes material in both its existence and fiscal implications.   
 
Chapter 5 traced the dimensions in which organized crime becomes real in its 
consequences. In response to the proclaimed need to counter the threat of organized 
crime, most of the respective States and Territories of Australia have resorted to 
criminalization and the introduction of a range of offences that “create new forms of 
criminality” (Bronitt & McSherry, 2010, p. 1037). Organized crime operates as a 
justification for the expansion and hybridization of new intelligence and enforcement 
agencies such as the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP). Through the activities of these agencies, and their operation as 
apparatuses of production, organized crime is further confirmed as a serious problem 
warranting intervention, and the continued funding of these very agencies themselves. 
At the same time, there is a range of problems associated with the architecture of 
criminalization and enforcement. However, this is the only politically viable option, 
because the threat of organized crime, located within the discourse of law and order 
politics, excludes alternative possibilities.  
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In conclusion, it is interesting to have learned in this research how questioning 
and acts of interrogation led to new story lines, to new narratives, in which Informants 
became active participants and co-constructors (in the emergence of the social 
problem, the responses to it, and this research). The ‘objective reality’ of existing 
crime-to-be combated was what often did not survive such encounters. An occasional 
impression of mild yet rueful complicity, and a sense of lingering unease about the 
futility of policing organized crime, often did. The contours are hazy and the 
Informants I spoke to could not agree about the explanatory nor the normative 
characteristics of the phenomenon, not least because, in fairness, multiple meanings 
of organized crime have emerged from a complex interconnected set of discourses 
located in the social and historical ‘conditions of possibility.’ Notwithstanding the 
mutability of organized crime, it has led to a new generation of increasingly 
preemptive and punitive laws, and the creation of new state agencies with amplified 
powers. 
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